AC-2024-LON-002099 - [2025] EWHC 1980 (Admin)

The approach I take to evaluation of the Judge’s decision is taken from Celinski. The Divisional Court said at para 22:

“The single question therefore for the appellate court is whether or not the district judge made the wrong decision. It is only if the court concludes that the decision was wrong, applying what Lord Neuberger said, as set out above, that the appeal can be allowed. Findings of fact, especially if evidence has been heard, must ordinarily be respected. In answering the question whether the district judge, in the light of those findings of fact, was wrong to decide that extradition was or was not proportionate, the focus must be on the outcome, that is on the decision itself. Although the district judge's reasons for the proportionality decision must be considered with care, errors and omissions do not of themselves necessarily show that the decision on proportionality itself was wrong.”

In Celinski, the Divisional Court further stated at para 39 that where a requested person is a fugitive from justice, very strong counterbalancing factors would need to exist before extradition could be regarded as disproportionate. The Judge found to the requisite criminal standard that the appellant is a fugitive. That finding has not been challenged (confirmed at skeleton argument, para 49), nor plausibly could be. He signed a document that specifically acknowledges his obligation to inform the judicial authorities of any change of address within 3 days. He did not. He has evaded the Romanian authorities by remaining in the United Kingdom despite the ongoing proceedings against him in the criminal court in Romania.

One criticism of the Judge’s decision must be dealt with now. It was submitted by the appellant in his skeleton argument that the Judge wrongly placed weight on the underlying assault on his father as well as the fact of the breach of the restraining order not to contact him. The argument ran that this was a clear error by the Judge since the appellant has not been convicted of the assault. Initially in oral argument, this submission was repeated. It became necessary to examine what the Romanian court in fact decided. This is clear from the arrest warrant:

“Description of the circumstances in which the offence(s) was (were) committed, including the time, place and degree of participation in the offence(s) by the requested person

On 17.04.2019, the criminal investigation authorities at Section 5 Rural Police in Radesti, Galati County, while being on duty, were notified via SNUAU 112 by the injured party Miron Viorel in the commune of Baneasa, about the fact that during the day of 17.04.2019, in the midst of a spontaneous conflict, he was hit with a shovel into the left shoulder by his son, Miron Andrei-Eugen, and the said Stratulat Vasilica (his grandmother) was punched in the chest, at the same time violating the restraining order issued by the Tirgu Bujor District Court. Based on the aforementioned, the police agents went to the scene and they found that the notified things were confirmed, circumstances in which they drew up an official report ex officio, in relation to the commission of domestic violence offences, provided by art. 199 paragraph 1 in relation to art. 193 paragraph 1 Criminal code and non-compliance with court decisions provided by art. 32 paragraph 1 from Law no. 217/2003 Republished, both with the application of art. 38 paragraph 1 Criminal code, and afterwards, they demanded the beginning of the criminal investigation in relation to the offences of commission of domestic violence and non-compliance with court decisions.”

This makes clear that, as Ms Stevens accurately submitted, there was a request for a criminal investigation into the assault rather than evidence of a conviction. However, following argument it was evident that the court in Romania found the facts (“the circumstances”) of the assault that led to the breach of the restraining order. It was thus appropriate for the Judge to consider the factual underpinning as well as the fact of the breach. The two are intimately connected. As the Judge found, his offending is serious “amounting to an assault using a weapon, in a domestic context, and in breach of a court order” (para 48: why it is necessary to clarify the finding of fact of the assault).

I also note the terms of the Criminal Practice Direction. Chapter 12 is devoted to extradition. Under “General guidance under s.2(7A) Extradition Act 2003 (as amended), it says at para 12.2.1:

“When considering under s.21A(3)(a) of the Act the seriousness of conduct alleged to constitute the extradition offence, the judge will determine the issue on the facts of each case as set out in the warrant …”

The Judge’s approach was meticulously in accordance with the Practice Direction. This criticism of the Judge therefore falls away.

I turn to another aspect of the judgment. The Judge fairly acknowledged that the appellant has led a lawful life in the United Kingdom and made the best fist of it he can, finding himself employment, accommodation and a “friendship circle”, as the Judge termed it at para 44. But he remains a fugitive from Romanian justice and developed these features of his private life in this country in the full knowledge, as the Judge found, of his fugitivity (para 46).

Having examined all the factors in his favour as they stood at the time of extradition decision below, the Judge was correct to conclude that they come individually and cumulatively nowhere near to the high threshold necessary to counterbalance the constant and weighty public interest in returning him for the Romanian judicial authorities to decide how to treat his case once he is in their custody.

The gravity of the offence in the eyes of the Romanian authorities is marked by the imposition of a six-month custodial sentence. It is not for this court to intrude and seek to resentence an offender. Despite the evidence from the appellant about the background to the incident, on the facts before the Judge and as she found them to be, it was an entirely reasonable and rational conclusion that this was “serious” offending and she had the finding of fact made by the Romanian court. A weapon was used against one victim, who was supposed to be protected by the restraining order, and an elderly female relative was also assaulted, all at the time of a serious breach of a court restraining order.

The appellant then engages in an analysis of how such a breach would be treated in the United Kingdom and whether it would cross the custody threshold here. This is precisely what the court should not do. As the Divisional Court stated in Celinski at para 13, it will rarely be appropriate for this court to consider whether the sentence was very significantly different from what a United Kingdom court would have imposed, let alone to approach extradition issues by substituting its own view of what the appropriate sentence should have been. On this, the fact that the appellant was bailed during the investigation cannot much alter the gravity of the offence given the ultimate 6-month custodial sentence.

There is nothing in the section 65(1) point, a statutory provision that sets a minimum sentence of 4 months’ custody to qualify for extradition in a category 1 territory. The sentence imposed is above the qualifying threshold and 50 per cent higher than the minimum.

The Judge found that such delay as there is in this case is principally attributable to the appellant’s fugitivity and thus he is chiefly culpable (para 49). She was right to reach this conclusion.

I conclude with no hesitation that in Celinski terms the Judge did not make the wrong decision. She was correct to make the extradition order on the material before her. She should not have reached a different decision. Testing that conclusion using the Belbin rubric, I conclude that the Judge did not misapply well-established principles; did not make unreasonable material findings of fact; took into account the relevant factors before her (note: before her); and reached a conclusion that was rational. Indeed, I judge that on the material at the extradition hearing, she was right.