AC-2024-LON-002099 - [2025] EWHC 1980 (Admin)

This is an appeal in extradition proceedings.

The appellant is Andre Eugen Miron. He was born on 9 December 1999 and is now aged 25. The appellant is represented by Ms Stevens of counsel. The respondent is the Tirgu Bujor District Court in Romania. The respondent by Ms Herbert of counsel. The court is grateful to both counsel for their first-class assistance.

By way of a notice of appeal dated 20 June 2024, the appellant seeks to appeal the decision of District Judge Louisa Cieciora (“the Judge”) sitting at the Westminster Magistrates' Court on 14 June 2024. The Judge ordered his extradition to Romania. The appellant was found by the Judge to be a fugitive from Romanian justice. He came to the United Kingdom in 2019 following committing a criminal offence in Romania. He was convicted in his absence of a criminal offence of breach of a court restraining order through contact with his father. A 6-month custodial sentence was imposed by the Romanian District Court. The full custodial term remains to be served.

The appellant was granted of permission to appeal by Chamberlain J at an oral renewal hearing on 18 February 2025, following refusal of permission on the papers by Heather Williams J on 4 November 2024. The appellant submits that the Judge was wrong to order his extradition under section 21(3) of the Extradition Act 2003 (“the 2003 Act”) as surrender to the Romanian authorities is disproportionate and incompatible with the appellant’s article 8 rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”). Further, if the court finds that the Judge was correct in her assessment, the court is invited to undertake the “Celinski balancing exercise” afresh (Celinski v Poland [2015] EWHC 1274 (“Celinski”)). The court is invited to conclude that owing to the length of time the appellant has now spent on non-qualifying curfew, with a substantial period of time having passed since the Judge’s extradition order, extradition would now in any event amount to a disproportionate interference with the appellant’s article 8 rights. Consequently, the appeal should be allowed.

The appellant relies on two matters not raised with the Judge. First, the question of curfew restriction while on bail; second, the possibility of early release. As Ms Stevens puts it, the balancing exercise should therefore be “recalibrated in favour of discharge”. Ms Herbert in opposing the appeal submits that the Judge was right; nothing should have been decided differently. Even if the court were to consider matters afresh, the result would be the same. The impact on the appellant’s private life is “nowhere near” the needed level of severity.

Following this introduction, I structure the judgment by setting down the (II) background relevant facts, (III) extract the relevant parts of the judgment below, (IV) identify the relevant legal framework, (V) state the appeal test, examine in turn the two factors not considered by the Judge ((VI) curfew and (VII) early release), before (VIII) conducting an overall discussion of the merits of the appeal.