Developments concerning the Greensill Group in 2020
Developments concerning the Greensill Group in 2020
The Covid-19 pandemic led to a decline of global markets in March 2020. This affected Greensill’s liquidity.
On 24 March 2020 SBG invested $1.5 billion in the SCF Subfund. An internal SBG Investment Division presentation recorded: “The purpose of the investment was to support the operations of Greensill Capital whose supply chain deals are financed by the Fund”.
In return for the provision of liquidity, the SCF Subfund and CSFM entered into a side letter agreement with SBG (“the SBG Side Letter”). This provided that the SCF Subfund should acquire only notes sourced by the Greensill Group’s supply chain finance programme while SBG invested in the SCF Subfund.
SBG and Mr Greensill had agreed that SBG’s investment would be in place until 18 May 2020. However, GCPL requested two extensions to the redemption schedule, first until 22 June 2020 and, later, until July 2020. In exchange for the delayed redemption schedule, SBG requested various shares in GCPL, and GCPL’s agreement to sell its corporate jets and to be audited by one of the Big 4 accounting firms.
When considering Mr Greensill’s second redemption request in June 2020, Mr Misra sent an email to Katsunori Sago (Executive Vice President, SBG), copying Mr Cheung, Mr Fan and others. He stated:
“Only internal SoftBank - Lex is slippery and prone to lying so the penalty has to be high.
He gives 3% extra stake no matter what the excuse if
- auditor is not upgraded by November, regulator approval or not.
- all the aircraft from the company/bank balance sheet is sold in the next 4 months.
- December quarter end audit is performed by a big 4 audit firm.”
By 16 July 2020 SBG’s investment in CSV was fully redeemed and the SBG Side Letter was terminated.
On 6 August 2020 Mr Son emailed Mr Greensill noting that it was necessary for the Greensill Group to reduce their costs:
“Lex,
I am glad to hear that business is starting to recover. The team has given me an update on the progress you have made in recent months.
I am worried about how market volatility can dramatically affect your business. Liquidity can go away fast and, if it does, you will not be able to fund your customers.
I know you are still growing the company as you expect a strong fourth quarter. But you need to reduce your operating costs in case volatility returns. The markets will be volatile again and your funding is still fragile.
You are a growth guy and so am I, but you need to lean towards discipline after the recent near death experience. There is no need to be so aggressive in the short term until you are sure of liquidity. Give yourself some cushion. Please cut your costs now.”
- Heading
- INTRODUCTION
- The claimants
- The defendants
- The Greensill Group and supply chain funding
- The SCF Funds
- The securitised funding arrangements
- The SoftBank Defendants’ relationships with the Greensill Group
- The Credit Enhancement Programme
- The Katerra Group companies
- The SoftBank Defendants’ investments in the Katerra Group companies
- 2019 discussions about revisions to the Credit Enhancement Programme
- The Fairymead Note Programme
- December 2019: further discussions about the CEP
- The issue of notes under the Fairymead Note Programme
- 2020: Financial stress in the Katerra Group
- SVF1 invested further in Katerra
- Katerra identified improper revenue recognition
- Appointment of new management and restructuring advisors
- Developments concerning the Greensill Group in 2020
- CSAM reduced concentration limits on Greensill Group investments
- GCPL planned a capital raise and Initial Public Offering
- Drafts of the $440 million CLN and the Omnibus Deed
- The 10 November 2020 agreements
- The $440m CLN
- The Omnibus Deed
- The SBIA Undertaking
- Use of the $440 million proceeds of the CLN
- Further developments in November 2020 concerning the Katerra Group
- SVF1’s bridge loan to the Katerra Group
- SVF1’s, SVF2’s and the Greensill Group’s approvals following the withdrawal of the New Money Consortium
- Documenting the agreements
- Signing of the CEA and TA and placing them in escrow
- Further agreements executed in December 2020
- The CEA
- The TA
- Further investments in Katerra Cayman by SVF1
- The Preferred Share Purchase Agreement
- The SVF Habitat Share Subscription
- The Vision Funds’ stake in the Katerra Group
- November to December 2020: developments concerning the Fairymead Note Programme
- December 2020 – March 2021: Financial position of the Greensill Group
- Discussions between Greensill and CSAM in December 2020 about exposure limits
- The 31 Dec/14 Jan Fairymead Trade – “the Secondary Trade”
- Publicity about the restructuring of the Katerra Group’s debts
- The cancellation of the Secondary Trade
- March – June 2021: Default on the Fairymead Notes and bankruptcy of the Greensill Group and Katerra Group
- WITNESSES
- FINDINGS ON CONTESTED FACTUAL AND EXPERT ISSUES
- SECTION 423 OF THE INSOLVENCY ACT 1986
- DETERMINATION OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE CLAIM
- Conclusions
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