Use of the $440 million proceeds of the CLN
Use of the $440 million proceeds of the CLN
The $440 million paid pursuant to the $440m CLN with GCPL was paid into GCUK’s general account on or around 10 November 2020.
GCPL did not use the $440 million to repurchase or redeem the Fairymead Notes. On 18 November 2020 Ms Sally Singer (Distribution team, Greensill Group Middle Office) sent an email to Mr Jesensky which stated:
“we [Greensill] have cash from SB to repurchase Katerra, that cash is being used for other stuff, we will get another instalment from somewhere else, but that is paying off CS loan and other stuff”.
On 27 November 2020 Mr Rob Sumara (Finance Partner, Greensill Group) sent an email to Mr Steve McElroy (Finance Team, Greensill Group) which stated: “seem to have gone through all the $440m intended for Katerra having only paid $70m toward it”.
A&O (counsel to the Greensill Group) gave a later summary of the use of the $440m in an email in April 2021 as follows:
“$250m was paid to GB to hold against collateral against re GFG positions. The balance was used in a combination of (i) transient "asset purchase liquidity" e.g. $70m was used on 25 Nov 20 to purchase assets on GCUK's B/S until 16 Dec 20 when the money was returned via sales and maturities of the assets, and (ii) "operational liquidity" for GCUK to fund monthly opex $35 million pcm) until administration on 12 Mar 21.”
- Heading
- INTRODUCTION
- The claimants
- The defendants
- The Greensill Group and supply chain funding
- The SCF Funds
- The securitised funding arrangements
- The SoftBank Defendants’ relationships with the Greensill Group
- The Credit Enhancement Programme
- The Katerra Group companies
- The SoftBank Defendants’ investments in the Katerra Group companies
- 2019 discussions about revisions to the Credit Enhancement Programme
- The Fairymead Note Programme
- December 2019: further discussions about the CEP
- The issue of notes under the Fairymead Note Programme
- 2020: Financial stress in the Katerra Group
- SVF1 invested further in Katerra
- Katerra identified improper revenue recognition
- Appointment of new management and restructuring advisors
- Developments concerning the Greensill Group in 2020
- CSAM reduced concentration limits on Greensill Group investments
- GCPL planned a capital raise and Initial Public Offering
- Drafts of the $440 million CLN and the Omnibus Deed
- The 10 November 2020 agreements
- The $440m CLN
- The Omnibus Deed
- The SBIA Undertaking
- Use of the $440 million proceeds of the CLN
- Further developments in November 2020 concerning the Katerra Group
- SVF1’s bridge loan to the Katerra Group
- SVF1’s, SVF2’s and the Greensill Group’s approvals following the withdrawal of the New Money Consortium
- Documenting the agreements
- Signing of the CEA and TA and placing them in escrow
- Further agreements executed in December 2020
- The CEA
- The TA
- Further investments in Katerra Cayman by SVF1
- The Preferred Share Purchase Agreement
- The SVF Habitat Share Subscription
- The Vision Funds’ stake in the Katerra Group
- November to December 2020: developments concerning the Fairymead Note Programme
- December 2020 – March 2021: Financial position of the Greensill Group
- Discussions between Greensill and CSAM in December 2020 about exposure limits
- The 31 Dec/14 Jan Fairymead Trade – “the Secondary Trade”
- Publicity about the restructuring of the Katerra Group’s debts
- The cancellation of the Secondary Trade
- March – June 2021: Default on the Fairymead Notes and bankruptcy of the Greensill Group and Katerra Group
- WITNESSES
- FINDINGS ON CONTESTED FACTUAL AND EXPERT ISSUES
- SECTION 423 OF THE INSOLVENCY ACT 1986
- DETERMINATION OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE CLAIM
- Conclusions
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