Drafts of the $440 million CLN and the Omnibus Deed
Drafts of the $440 million CLN and the Omnibus Deed
GCPL held a Board meeting on 29 October 2020 and approved a resolution to enter into the “Proposed transaction” which included entry by GCPL into the “Katerra Agreement” pursuant to which GCPL would (among other things) “release SoftBank from all liability in relation to the Katerra Programme, the …[Katerra Notes] and Credit Enhancement Programme in so far as it relates to the Katerra Notes and/or the Katerra Programme” and “account to the Vision Fund for any amounts recovered in respect of the Katerra Notes”.
This led to the negotiation of draft legal agreements. This took place between Allen & Overy (“A&O”) for the Greensill Group, Morrison and Foerster (“MoFo”) for SBG, and White & Case for the Vision Funds.
A&O was initially instructed on 28 October 2020 to document an agreement “between SoftBank, the Vision Fund and Greensill”. This later became the “Omnibus Deed” but was originally called the “Katerra Agreement”.
On 4 November 2020 Mr Jamie Funder of A&O emailed Mr Grubb-Sharma of MoFo, saying:
“On the transfer of the Katerra Notes to SVF, Greensill does not agree this position and is comfortable with the drafting suggested by SVF in the Katerra Agreement. SVF is putting Greensill in funds to the amount of $440m and Greensill will be able to use this to fund the buy back of the CS notes. That is why Greensill has the obligation to remit any funds recovered.”
On 6 November 2020 Ms Briony Edwards, Legal Director (Corporate Affairs) at the Greensill Group, emailed Mr Grubb-Sharma of MoFo stating:
“Greensill can reasonably agree to remit any recovered amounts within 21 days. We require this time because unwinding defaulted or cancelling existing notes requires unique actions by Clearstream, the Note Issuer SPV and by Citibank in its capacity as Security Trustee and Issuer - this will certainly take more than 3 days. Given the severe consequences of a breach (i.e. the first loss protection falls away) we need to build in a longer period of time. The loss of this protection would be cataclysmic for Greensill.
Any recoveries will rest in the segregated Katerra Collection Account - which is the way the Greensill process works.”
- Heading
- INTRODUCTION
- The claimants
- The defendants
- The Greensill Group and supply chain funding
- The SCF Funds
- The securitised funding arrangements
- The SoftBank Defendants’ relationships with the Greensill Group
- The Credit Enhancement Programme
- The Katerra Group companies
- The SoftBank Defendants’ investments in the Katerra Group companies
- 2019 discussions about revisions to the Credit Enhancement Programme
- The Fairymead Note Programme
- December 2019: further discussions about the CEP
- The issue of notes under the Fairymead Note Programme
- 2020: Financial stress in the Katerra Group
- SVF1 invested further in Katerra
- Katerra identified improper revenue recognition
- Appointment of new management and restructuring advisors
- Developments concerning the Greensill Group in 2020
- CSAM reduced concentration limits on Greensill Group investments
- GCPL planned a capital raise and Initial Public Offering
- Drafts of the $440 million CLN and the Omnibus Deed
- The 10 November 2020 agreements
- The $440m CLN
- The Omnibus Deed
- The SBIA Undertaking
- Use of the $440 million proceeds of the CLN
- Further developments in November 2020 concerning the Katerra Group
- SVF1’s bridge loan to the Katerra Group
- SVF1’s, SVF2’s and the Greensill Group’s approvals following the withdrawal of the New Money Consortium
- Documenting the agreements
- Signing of the CEA and TA and placing them in escrow
- Further agreements executed in December 2020
- The CEA
- The TA
- Further investments in Katerra Cayman by SVF1
- The Preferred Share Purchase Agreement
- The SVF Habitat Share Subscription
- The Vision Funds’ stake in the Katerra Group
- November to December 2020: developments concerning the Fairymead Note Programme
- December 2020 – March 2021: Financial position of the Greensill Group
- Discussions between Greensill and CSAM in December 2020 about exposure limits
- The 31 Dec/14 Jan Fairymead Trade – “the Secondary Trade”
- Publicity about the restructuring of the Katerra Group’s debts
- The cancellation of the Secondary Trade
- March – June 2021: Default on the Fairymead Notes and bankruptcy of the Greensill Group and Katerra Group
- WITNESSES
- FINDINGS ON CONTESTED FACTUAL AND EXPERT ISSUES
- SECTION 423 OF THE INSOLVENCY ACT 1986
- DETERMINATION OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE CLAIM
- Conclusions
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