BL-2021-002235 - [2025] EWHC 1966 (Ch)

More generally on the law of contempt of court, at first instance in Business Mortgage Finance 4 Plc v Hussain ([2022] EWHC 449 (Ch)), Miles J said:

“37.

The principles are well known. Proceedings for civil contempt are sometimes described as ‘quasi-criminal’ because of the potential penal consequences. They are criminal proceedings for the purpose of Article 6 of the ECHR. The charges raised have to be clear; the criminal standard of proof applies; and the respondent has a right to silence. There must be a high standard of procedural fairness: see Navigator Equities Limited v Deripaska [2021] EWCA Civ 1799, per Carr LJ, at [79].

38.

The fact that civil contempt proceedings are criminal proceedings for the purpose of Article 6 does not mean that they are not civil proceedings: see Masri v Consolidated Contractors International Company SAL [2011] EWHC 1024 (Comm), at [157]; Navigator Equities at [80].

39.

The applicant is required to establish the following elements to the criminal standard of proof: (i) that the alleged contemnor knew of the terms of the order; (ii) that he acted (or failed to act) in a manner which involved a breach of the order; and (iii) that he knew of the facts which made his conduct a breach: see Kea Investments Ltd v Watson [2020] EWHC 2599 (Ch), per Nugee LJ, at [19]. It is not necessary for the applicant to show that the alleged contemnor acted in the belief that what he did was a breach of the order or that his conduct was contumacious (though that is highly relevant to sanction): Kea Investments, at [26].

40.

Each element has to be proved to the criminal standard. This does not mean that every fact or piece of evidence relating to each element must itself be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In a case based wholly or primarily on circumstantial evidence, the Court must assess the evidence cumulatively rather than piecemeal …” (referring to JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov (No 8) [2013] 1 WLR 1331, at [52]).

The decision of Miles J was affirmed by the Court of Appeal: [2023] 1 WLR 396. As to the law of contempt, at [96], Nugee LJ said:

“There was again no dispute as to the legal principles applicable to Miles J's findings of fact. They were summarised by him in the Liability Judgment at [37]-[42] and [counsel for the appellant] did not criticise this summary.”