BL-2021-002235 - [2025] EWHC 1966 (Ch)

The order made by the deputy judge began with the following recitals:

“UPON the Claimant’s claim by Part 8 Claim Form dated 8 December 2022 [sic]

AND UPON the trial of the Claim, the Court having ordered on 11 February 2022 that the Claim proceed as a Part 8 Claim and be tried on an expedited basis

AND UPON the Defendant, Kevin Gerald Stanford being on notice of the hearing of the trial, and having the opportunity to attend, but not appearing or being represented

AND UPON reading the written evidence filed by the Claimant and the Defendant

AND UPON hearing Ben Valentin QC for the Claimant … ”

The relevant operative terms of the order were as follows:

“IT IS DECLARED THAT:

1.

Pursuant to a Share Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 5 May 2011, and a Settlement Agreement dated 22 November 2012, each between (among other parties) Lion/Heaven UK II Limited and Mr. Stanford:

(1)

Mr. Stanford has no rights, interest or claims in or to the ‘A’ ordinary shares and preference shares which he had formerly held in the capital of All Saints Retail Limited (‘the Shares’) (or any of them) because Lion/Heaven UK II Limited is the legal and beneficial owner of the Shares; and/or

(2)

Mr. Stanford, having agreed not to assert that he has any rights, interest or claims in or to the Shares (or any of them), and having released Lion/Heaven UK II Limited from any claim to the contrary, is not entitled to claim or assert that he has any rights, interest or claims in or to the Shares (or any of them).

AND IT IS ORDERED THAT:

Permanent Injunction

2.

Mr. Stanford is restrained, by himself, or through others acting on his behalf or on his instructions or with his encouragement, from asserting in any way whatsoever any rights, interest or claims in or to the ‘A’ ordinary shares and preference shares which he had formerly held in the capital of All Saints Retail Limited.”

This order was not served personally on the defendant. One of the issues which I will have to deal with in this case is whether I should dispense with that requirement, by exercising the court’s undoubted discretion to do so. I will return to this issue later.