BL-2021-002235 - [2025] EWHC 1966 (Ch)

In addition to the respondent’s application for a stay, the respondent’s son Lukas Kevin Stanford made a similar application, by notice dated 17 July 2025 (though he neither attended nor was represented at the hearing). He did this purportedly in his capacity as sole trustee of the DS Family Trust. The application notice is actually in the name of “DS Family Trust”. But in English law a private trust is not a legal person, and thus cannot be a party to litigation. Instead, it is a legal relationship between certain persons in relation to certain assets. The trustee of the trust is the legal owner of the assets, the person with the responsibility of protecting and vindicating the trust property for the benefit of the beneficiaries of the trust. It is therefore the trustee who takes part in any relevant legal proceedings.

Looking at the documents filed, this discretionary trust for the benefit of members of the Stanford family appears to have been settled in 2009, in the usual offshore trust way of the time (see eg Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd [2003] 2 AC 709, [1]). In the present case, this involved the apparent provision, by a person unconnected with the family, but defined as “the Settlor”, of a nominal sum of money, to which more significant assets were later added by the real settlor, whose name does not appear. The original trustee was Axis Fiduciary Ltd of Mauritius. There was no evidence to show directly how and when this company ceased to be trustee. It was still in office in 2011 and 2012, when it was party to the share purchase agreement and the settlement agreement in that capacity. There was a letter in the hearing bundle dated 5 June 2025 signed by the Settlor of the trust (but no one else) purporting to appoint Lukas Stanford as trustee.

The problem with this letter is that, according to clause 12 of the trust deed in the documents before me, the power of removing and appointing trustees is conferred upon the protector of the trust, or, failing a protector, upon the trustee. But the Settlor is neither of these. Moreover, according to the same clause, the new trustee must sign the document of appointment. Again, Lukas Stanford has not signed the letter of 5 June 2025. Accordingly, it does not appear that Lukas Stanford was ever validly appointed as trustee of the trust. On that basis, therefore, he had no standing to present this application in the capacity of trustee, and I could properly have dismissed the application on that ground alone, let alone that he did not appear to make his application before the court.

Nevertheless, I considered the position as if he had such standing. The problem then would be that his complaint, in part at least, was the same as that of the respondent. That is, that there was a fraud in the transactions of 2011 and 2012, and also in procuring the decision of deputy judge Ambrose, which fraud (it is said) avoided the sale of shares to the applicant. Yet that adds nothing to the application of the respondent himself, which (as I said) I refused for reasons given in my oral judgment given on 23 July 2025. So, even if he were properly appointed the sole trustee of the trust, I could not accede to the application to grant a stay on that basis.

However, Lukas Stanford submitted that the trust (more correctly, the trustee, which is the legal person concerned) had a further complaint. This was that, since the then trustee was a party to the share purchase agreement of 2011 and the settlement agreement of 2012, the trustee should have been joined to the 2022 litigation. However, in breach of the rules, he said, it was not. Moreover, the 2022 order affected the rights of the trustee, and so should not have been made. I gave another extempore judgment, dismissing the application on its merits, and setting out my reasons. In summary, I said that Lukas Stanford’s understanding of the rules was mistaken, that the claim and order in 2022 concerned only the respondent and his shares, and not the trust and its share, that it was for a claimant to decide who to sue, and that as a general proposition court orders do not bind non-parties, so that the trust, not being a party, was not prejudiced.