BL-2021-002235 - [2025] EWHC 1966 (Ch)

Accordingly, I find the following facts for the purposes of this application. As the third recital to the order made clear, but the other evidence satisfies me, the respondent knew of the 2022 trial, but chose not to attend it or be represented at it. On 6 April 2022, the applicant’s solicitors sent copies of the sealed order to the respondent by email to his personal email address, and by post to his two home addresses (which letter and order in fact the respondent exhibited to his affidavit on this application). They did not personally serve it on him. The court itself emailed a copy of the judgment to the respondent’s personal email address on 8 April 2022.

The terms of the respondent’s own email to the court later on the same day showed that he had received the judgment. His letter of 12 December 2024 to the directors of the claimant (apparently sent by Post Office “special delivery”) referred to “the enclosed sealed Order dated 5 April 2022”, which the respondent said contained defects rendering it unenforceable. (These were the fact that in 2024 he had changed his name and evidenced this by an enrolled deed poll, and the fact that the order was not signed by the judge.) Finally, albeit this is after the conduct complained of, his own affidavit of 17 July 2025 refers to “the declaration dated 5 April 2022.” It is clear beyond a peradventure that the respondent has since April 2022 had copies, and been aware, of the judgment and the order, and of the precise terms of both.

The two documents relied on by the applicant in its application notice as evidencing the breaches of the order are (1) a letter dated 2 January 2025 from the respondent to officers of the applicant, and (2) a document headed “Statutory Notice under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002”, dated 9 May 2025.

Document (1) on its face says it is sent from the respondent’s home address, and it is apparently signed by him. In paragraph [54] of Mr Baker’s first affidavit, he says this:

“By a letter dated 2 January 2025 sent to Messrs Lea and Darwent in their capacities as directors of Lion Capital, Mr Stanford set out the basis for a fraud claim in relation to the Applicant’s acquisition of the shares in ASRL.”

The respondent’s affidavit does not in terms deny that he sent that letter. However, in section 5 of the affidavit he says:

“In neither of Mr Baker’s affidavits does he identify a single act that breaches the 2022 Order.”

I do not read this as a denial of sending the letter, but, in the context of what the respondent also says, rather a statement that nothing that he has done amounts to a breach. In other words, although Mr Baker has referred to many things, none of them is an “act which breaches the 2022 Order”. In these circumstances, I am satisfied, to the criminal standard, that the respondent sent this letter.

The letter itself is very long. It includes the following:

“The Fraud and its Impact on Title

The enclosed chronology shows how my assets were used in a conspiracy between the management of Kaupthing Bank Luxembourg (KBLUX) and Kaupthing Bank HF (KBHF) just days before the bank’s collapse to save KBLUX.

… Ultimately, KBHF misappropriated and used my assets to settle this exposure (GBP 250,479,179.38) to KBLUX within the Conditional Settlement Agreement (CSA) on 3 March 2009, despite relying on fraudulent documentation and misrepresentations, meaning KBHF never obtained lawful title … ”

and

“ … fraud prevents any transfer of ownership that would extinguish my equitable interest in the assets.”

The letter also contains the following statement:

“Full Compliance with Court Order BL-2021-00223

Despite the fact that the Order with Penal Notice issued in claim BL-2021-002235 references an implied name that is not legally enforceable against Kevin-gerald Stanford, I have continued to act in full compliance with its terms.

This correspondence is not intended to challenge the Court’s authority or assert rights over the shares referenced in the Order. Instead it seeks to offer a constructive resolution by addressing the unresolved questions regarding [the applicant’s] awareness of the fraud preceding the 2011 SPA and its implications for the chain of title.”

Document (2) is headed “Statutory Notice under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002”. It is addressed to a number of persons or entities, including the applicant. It is dated 9 May 2025, and once again bears what appears to be the respondent’s signature, though this time there is no address given for him. In his first affidavit Mr Baker says:

“56.

On 9 May 2025, Mr Stanford purported to issue a ‘Statutory Notice under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002’ (‘POCA Notice’). The POCA Notice was sent as an attachment to an email on 9 May 2025 to Messrs Lea and Darwent, other members of Lion Capital, ASRL, Proskauer, KPMG, EY, Wells Fargo, Lloyds Banking Group, Allianz, Coface and the British Venture Capital Association … ”

Once again, the respondent’s affidavit does not in terms deny that he sent that letter, but contains the statement in section 5 of his affidavit identified above. For the same reasons as previously set out, I find that the evidence of Mr Baker on this point too is in effect unchallenged. I am satisfied, to the criminal standard, that the respondent sent the Notice of 9 May 2025.

This Notice contains the following statement, amongst others:

“This is a notice only, issued on the basis that shares in AllSaints and any derivative proceeds or related instruments constitute criminal property under section 340(3)(b) POCA. The origin of the taint is the unlawful misappropriation of those shares through the Conditional Settlement Agreement (CSA) dated 3 March 2009, which was used to settle internal Kaupthing Bank debts using my assets without authority, consent, or lawful title. That misappropriation constitutes the moment at which the shares became criminal property. The taint attaches at the point of misappropriation and renders the title irrecoverably defective. No downstream transaction, including the 2011 Share Purchase Agreement, can cure or sanitise the origin. The shares are criminal property in law and void in equity, incapable of conferring lawful control or benefit.”

It also contains the following statement:

“For the avoidance of doubt this notice does not challenge, circumvent or seek to vary the sealed Order dated 5 April 2022. It asserts no legal or equitable claim, seeks no enforcement, and is not a substitute for litigation. It is issued solely to discharge a statutory duty under section 340 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, now that the evidentiary threshold has been met and the risk of continued use of criminal property has crystallised.”

The references to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 are explained below.

Although the applicant in its application notice relied on statements made in these two documents, the evidence in support of the application referred to a further 10 documents which it was said were sent by the respondent and which contained similar statements to those in the first two documents. They were sent in May and June 2025. I was taken through all of these documents at the hearing by Mr Valentin KC, on behalf of the applicant. On the material before me, I am satisfied to the criminal standard that the respondent did produce and send all of these documents. The statements contained in them are largely to similar effect as the statements in the first two documents, and I am satisfied that none of them contains any material which goes further than that which is contained in those documents. Given that they were the focus of the application itself, I shall therefore concentrate on what is contained in them.