[2025] EWHC 2501 (Ch)

Mr Watson says that Sanman does not need permission to bring contempt proceedings against the Respondents in relation to:

Mr Robins says that:

InCole v CarpenterTrower J said the following at paragraphs 21, 23 and 24 of his judgment:

“21.

In the circumstances to which I shall come shortly, the Defendants contend that Annex 1 to the Claimant’s reply is a forgery and the case that the Claimant advances based on it is a dishonest fabrication. They contend that, in these circumstances, there are two grounds for the committal which they seek. The first is based on the Claimant’s intentional interference with the due administration of justice. The second is based on a contention that the Claimant deliberately made a false statement of truth …

23.

At the beginning of the hearing, I expressed some scepticism that the Defendants did not require permission in relation to ground 1. The reason for my scepticism was that, although ground 1 was formulated as an interference with the due administration of justice, it was at least well arguable that an application based on ground 1 was also “made in relation to… an allegation of knowingly making a false statement in any document verified by a statement of truth…” so as to fall within CPR 81.3 (5)(b). If that were to be the case, they would also require permission for a contempt application based on ground 1, even though there might be other categories of interference with the due administration of justice for which permission is not required.”

“24.

In the event, Mr Bheeroo did not pursue this submission. I think he was right to take that course. Even if permission is not required for ground 1, the allegations of fact relied on in relation to both ground 1 and ground 2 are in all respects identical. In the circumstances, there is at least a serious possibility that the court would consider it appropriate to stay contempt proceedings based on ground 1 if permission is refused on ground 2 … ”

As to ground 2, Mr Robins accepted that, because this ground is based upon the content of a letter written by the Respondents then solicitors, to Sanman’s solicitors (see paragraph 12 (b) above) the allegation is not in substance one that is based upon a false statement in any affidavit, affirmation or other document verified by a statement of truth. Mr Robins argues however that, because the statement in the letter is identical to that contained in paragraph 12 of Mr Ginda’s affidavit of 12 November 2024 (ground 3) if I refuse permission to bring proceedings on ground 3, I should also stay the contempt proceedings that Sanman intends to bring, on ground 2. Mr Watson says that there is no application before me to stay proceedings on ground 2 and I should not grant a stay, even if I refuse permission to bring contempt proceedings on ground 3.

Given that the question of staying contempt proceedings under ground 2 only arises if I do not give Sanman permission to bring contempt proceedings under ground 3, I will postpone my consideration of staying proceedings under ground 2, until I have made my decision as to whether or not I should give Sanman permission to pursue contempt proceedings under ground 3.

Ground 4 is that the statement, in paragraph 10 of Mr Ginda’s affidavit of 12 November 2024 that: “[TGDM’s] only asset worldwide exceeding £10,000 in value is £9,315,733 in TGDM’s bank account with Punjab National Bank ..” amounted to a breach of paragraph 9 of the Freezing Order which required an affidavit to be served upon Sanman’s solicitors, within 5 business days of service of the Freezing Order on TGDM, which verified TGDM’s assets worldwide in excess of £10,000.

I consider that Mr Robins is right to say that ground 4 is in substance an allegation based upon a false statement in an affidavit and that Sanman cannot pursue ground 4 without permission under CPR 81.3(5)(b), even though the ground is framed as a contempt resulting from a breach of the Freezing Order. I have come to this conclusion because:

Mr Watson and Mr Robins referred me to a large number of authorities from the High Court and Court of Appeal that they said set out alone or between them the principles that I should apply in deciding whether or not to grant permission under CPR 81.3(5)(b).

I asked Mr Robins which authority or authorities he said contain the best summary of the principles that he said I should apply in deciding whether to grant permission under CPR 81.3(5)(b). Mr Robins said that Butcher J’s decision in Olympic Council of Asia v Novans Jets LLP [2022] EWHC 2910 (comm)(paragraph 41)provides the best overall summary of principles, but that I should also have regard to:

Mr Robins also referred me to the content of paragraph 53 of the judgment of Briggs J as he then was in Sectorguard PLC v Dienne PLC [2009] EWHC 2693. That paragraph is an example of a judge taking into account (in that case, in refusing permission) the motive of the applicant in bringing its application for permission. This is the so called “prosecutorial motive” which is included in Butcher J’s summary of the relevant principles and is not therefore additional to those principles.

Mr Watson did not dispute the principles that Mr Robins suggested apply here, the disagreement is about the emphasis or weight to be applied to each principle and whether or not they are met in this case. I will adopt therefore the principles that Mr Robins says that I should apply which are as follows ((a) and (b) are from paragraph 41 of Butcher J’s judgment; and (c) and (d) are from paragraphs 40 and 42 of the judgment of Moore-Bick LJ):