[2025] EWHC 2501 (Ch)

Mr Robins says that giving permission to take contempt proceedings in this case would result in an unjustified amount of the court’s resources and other resources being devoted to those proceedings and the use of those resources would be disproportionate to the issues raised in such contempt proceedings. Mr Robins assertions related to all the grounds on which Sanman seeks permission. Mr Watson denied both assertions.

At the start of his oral reply, I suggested to Mr Watson that, because it was clear that Sanman’s case on grounds 3 and 4 (no permission being needed for ground 2) was stronger than it is on grounds 1 and 5, it could be argued that it would be a better use of the court’s resources and other resources and more proportionate for me to grant permission to proceed on grounds 3 and 4 only and not on grounds 1 and 5 as well (if all other factors pointed in favour of giving permission on grounds 1,3,4 and 5). Mr Watson said that Sanman’s case is that the false statements alleged in grounds 1 and 5 and those in grounds 2 – 4 are part of the same scheme by Mr Ginda to make false statements aimed at reducing the effectiveness of the Freezing Order as a means of protecting Sanman against the wrongful dissipation of TGDM’s assets. The false statements referred to in grounds 2 - 4 covered up the fact that the statements referred to in grounds 1 and 5 were false. Reducing the number of grounds for which permission is given would not, Mr Watson said, reduce the extent of the factual investigation at the final hearing of the contempt allegations. Sanman would still want to present evidence and (if he gave evidence) to cross-examine Mr Ginda on the statements that form the basis of grounds 1 and 5, even if permission were only given to bring committal proceedings in relation to grounds 3 and 4.

Had I determined that Sanman had made out a strong prima facie case that the statements to which grounds 1 and 5 relate were knowingly false, I would still have considered carefully whether the public interest was sufficiently furthered, by giving permission to proceed with contempt proceedings on grounds 1 and 5, as well as grounds 3 and 4 (assuming that the grounds to grant permission on all those grounds was otherwise made out) to justify the use of the resources which would be expended in prosecuting them. It is common ground that Sanman’s case in respect of grounds 3 and 4 is materially stronger than its case on grounds 1 and 5 (principally because it is also common ground that the statement which forms the basis of grounds 2 - 4 was false). It seems to me, in spite of what Mr Watson says, that the public interest in committal proceedings being taken against the Respondents, in this case, would be substantially met by giving permission to Sanman to proceed on 2 grounds, rather than 4, at least potentially thereby using less of the court’s resources and other resources and at a more proportionate cost (on the assumption that I would otherwise give permission on all 4 grounds). This is therefore, in my judgement, another factor against granting permission on grounds 1 and 5.