Case No. ZC20D00020

v Pierburg [2019] 2 FLR 527, they rely on the decision in Z v Z [2010] 1 FLR 694 where Ryder J accorded real significance to whether an intention to change habitual residence was communicated to the other spouse. In relation to forum, they also complain that the Wife has not backed up her assertions as to the position in Norway, with expert Norwegian law. The law I have to apply43.I will deal first with habitual residence. Pursuant to Article 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003, jurisdiction in relation to divorce shall lie with the courts of the Member State:-(a)In whose territory:-i.the spouses are habitually resident; orii.the spouses were last habitually resident, insofar as one of them still resides there; oriii.the respondent is habitually resident; oriv.in the event of a joint application, either of the spouses is habitually resident; orv.the applicant is habitually resident if he or she resided there for at least a year immediately before the application was made; orvi.the applicant is habitually resident if he or she resided there for at least six months immediately before the application was made and….in the case of the United Kingdom and Ireland, has his or her “domicile” there;(b) ….in the case of the United Kingdom and Ireland, of the “domicile” of both spouses.44.The only ground pleaded for jurisdiction in this case is “indent” 5, namely that the Wife is habitually resident here if she resided here for at least a year immediately before the application was made. 45.I have to be satisfied about jurisdiction (see Rogers-Headicar v Headicar [2004] EWCA Civ 1867). It follows that the court’s jurisdiction does not depend on the pleadings. In closing submissions, Mr Todd, on behalf of the Wife, tentatively suggested that I could also consider indent 6, namely whether the Wife was domiciled here by the relevant date and had been habitually resident here if she had resided for at least six months immediately before the application was made. Mr Yates, on behalf of the Husband, objected strenuously. He pointed out that this had not been raised at any time prior to closing submissions. In consequence, there had been no evidence at all directed to the question of the Wife’s domicile. He had asked her no questions on the topic and, for example, there had not been disclosure of her tax returns to show what she had told HMRC about her domicile. I consider he is entirely correct about that. If I was even contemplating deciding the case on the basis of domicile, I would have had to have adjourned for the evidence on that aspect to be gathered and tested. I remind myself that the Wife even made reference in her statement to the fact that the third petition would make the job of the court easier as she was not pleading domicile. It follows that I am quite satisfied that I should deal only with indent 5, the indent pleaded and decide the case on that basis. 46.When I decided the case of Pierburg v Pierburg (above), there was a dispute between the parties as to what needs to be established to satisfy indent 5. After extensive argument, I came to the clear conclusion that the dicta in the cases of Marinos v Marinos [2007] EWHC 2047 (Fam); [2007] 1 FLR 694 and V v V [2011] EWHC 1190 (Fam); [2011] 2 FLR 778 were wrong and that the correct position was to be found in the observations of Bennett J in Munro v Munro [2007] EWHC 3315 (Fam); [2008] 1 FLR 1613 and in the textbooks Dicey, Morris and Collins and Rayden and Jackson. 47.I can see absolutely no reason to revisit my decision in Pierburg. Indeed, Mr Todd has not really argued that I should. Moreover, Mr Yates has drawn to my attention a recent decision of the CJEU that, although not binding upon me, is persuasive as to the correct interpretation. He says that it confirms my interpretation of indent 5. The decision is