Stay
87.I had some debate with leading counsel as to whether I needed to go on to consider the application for a discretionary stay if I decided that there was no jurisdiction for the petition itself. I have decided the issue of jurisdiction on the basis of findings of fact that I consider not susceptible to challenge elsewhere. Nevertheless, if I was wrong about jurisdiction, I consider it would assist for me to indicate what I would have decided in relation to the application for a stay.88.I would have dismissed the Husband’s application for a discretionary stay. I make it quite clear that I am entirely satisfied that substantial justice would be done in terms of financial remedies in both Norway and Austria. Both have well developed legal systems that provide good quality justice, even if the results might, on occasions, be somewhat different to the position in this jurisdiction. I would not have refused a stay for that reason. 89.The reason why I would have refused a stay is that I am not satisfied that the Husband has shown that Norway is clearly the more appropriate forum. I accept that there are pointers to Norway being the correct forum, such as the existence of the Marriage Contracts; the fact that Norwex is a Norwegian based company; the fact the Husband is Norwegian and has now returned there; and the other matters relied on by Mr Yates. On the other hand, Mr Todd can point to the properties in this jurisdiction; and the fact that the Wife and both the children of the family now reside here. The crucial aspect that would have tipped the scales decisively for me was the Husband’s own answer to where he intended to litigate when he was asked that question by Mr Todd. He was quite unable to say. He said he hadn’t even thought about it. He thought it was probably easier to go in Norway but then that maybe it was easier to go in Austria. He did not know. I would have been quite unable to say that Norway was clearly the more appropriate forum when even the Husband was not sure that is where he wanted to proceed.90.Finally, in the case of Pierburg, I said the following:-“I very much hope that it will be possible to reach a sensible and fair compromise of [the wife’s] financial claim. If not, there may come a time when this wife wishes to apply in this court pursuant to Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 for financial relief following an overseas divorce. Any such application is reserved to me.”91.Exactly the same applies in this case. Any such application pursuant to Part III is reserved to me. 92.Finally, I want to pay tribute to the very high quality of advocacy I have had during this case from both sides. Nothing more could have been said or done on behalf of either party.Mr Justice Moor1 July 2022
- JUDGMENT
- The relevant history
- Pierburg v Pierburg
- Z v Z
- The law I have to apply
- Rogers-Headicar v Headicar
- Marinos v Marinos
- V v V
- Pierburg
- IB v FA
- Burden and standard of proof
- Language barrier
- Lucas
- Marinos
- Discretionary stay
- de Dampierre v de Dampierre
- S v S
- C v C
- Ella v Ella
- Tan v Choy
- Otobo v Otobo
- The evidence that I heard
- My conclusions on habitual residence
- Stay
