KB-2024-004175 - [2025] EWHC 2050 (KB)

The decision of the Supreme Court in Wolverhampton City Council and others v London Gypsies and Travellers and others[2023] UKSC 47 makes plain that any claim and application for injunctive relief against newcomer Persons Unknown is to be treated differently to those against named defendants. In particular a Claimant must show a ‘compelling need’ for the order sought (at Paragraph 218):

“any [claimant] applying for an injunction against persons unknown, including newcomers … must satisfy the court by full and detailed evidence that there is a compelling justification for the order sought … There must be a strong probability that a tort … is to be committed and that this will cause real harm. Further the threat must be real and imminent.”

Following Wolverhampton, Ritchie J summarised the requirements for an injunction against persons unknown in Valero Energy Ltd v Persons Unknown [2024] EWHC 134 (KB). In particular a number of substantive and procedural requirements must be satisfied before relief could be granted.

The substantive requirements are:

The procedural requirements are:

On the basis that in this case the Claimant is seeking an element of precautionary relief the Court would usually be required to have regard to the multi-factorial test stated by Marcus Smith J in Vastint Leeds BV v Persons Unknown[2019] 4 WLR 2. That test requires these two questions to be answered in the affirmative before injunctive relief could be granted:

Those questions are to be addressed by reference to the following factors:

In Rochdale MBC v Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 1314 (KB) Garnham J considered the Vastint test and how it sat alongside the Wolverhampton framework and concluded at Paragraph 78:

“In my judgment, the test articulated by Marcus Smith J in Vastint Leeds BV v Persons Unknown [2019] 4 WLR 2 and approved by Sir Geoffrey Vos MR in Barking and Dagenham v Persons Unknown [2022] EWCA Civ 13 has been subsumed into the Wolverhampton framework. The Vastint test, however, provides a useful double check.”

Approach to ‘review’

At Paragraph 225 of the Judgement in Wolverhampton the Supreme Court observed that the temporal limitation and periodic review of newcomer injunctions provides:

“all parties an opportunity to make full and complete disclosure to the court, supported by appropriate evidence, as to how effective the order has been; whether any reasons or grounds for its discharge have emerged; whether there is any proper justification for its continuance; and whether and on what basis a further order ought to be made.”

A series of recent decisions have considered how the Court should approach the review exercise. In High Speed Two (HS2) Ltd v Persons Unknown [2024] EWHC 1277 (KB) (‘HS2’),Ritchie J considered the correct approach and concluded that (at Paragraph 32):

“Drawing these authorities together, on a review of an interim injunction against PUs and named Defendants, this Court is not starting de novo. The Judges who have previously made the interim injunctions have made findings justifying the interim injunctions. It is not the task of the Court on review to query or undermine those. However, it is vital to understand why they were made, to read and assimilate the findings, to understand the sub-strata of the quia timet, the reasons for the fear of unlawful direct action. Then it is necessary to determine, on the evidence, whether anything material has changed. If nothing material has changed, if the risk still exists as before and the claimant remains rightly and justifiably fearful of unlawful attacks, the extension may be granted so long as procedural and legal rigour has been observed and fulfilled.

On the other hand, if material matters have changed, the Court is required to analyse the changes, based on the evidence before it, and in the full light of the past decisions, to determine anew, whether the scope, details and need for the full interim injunction should be altered. To do so, the original thresholds for granting the interim injunction still apply.”

The same approach was taken by Morris J in Transport for London v Persons Unknown & Ors [2025] EWHC 55 (KB) and by Hill J when conducting the annual review in Valero Energy Ltd v Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 207 (KB).

In Basingstoke & Deane BC v Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 738 the Court took a different approach and conducted a further full Wolverhampton assessment. However, in Rochdale Garnham J considered that Basingstoke could be regarded as an outlier for good reason on the facts and held that:

“In my judgment the correct approach is dictated by the Supreme Court’s judgment in Wolverhampton and in particular [225]. This is not a “tick box” exercise, but the matters on which evidence should be adduced and argument focussed are (i) how effective the order has been; (ii) whether any reasons or grounds for its discharge have emerged; (iii) whether there is any proper justification for its continuance; and (iv) whether and on what basis a further order ought to be made. The parties should give full disclosure, supported by appropriate evidence, directed towards those questions.”

In this case Miss Pratt submits that there has been no change of circumstance that would necessitate a full Wolverhampton assessment and that I should follow the approach taken in Rochdale and other cases, effectively treating Basingstoke as an outlier.

I accept the Claimant’s submission as to the correct approach to review in this case. This is not a de novo hearing of the application for a Persons Unknown Order, and the Court has previously, and on two occasions, performed a full Wolverhampton assessment alongside a Ziegler proportionality assessment. The process of annual review provides an additional check and balance on an Order that has already been the subject of anxious scrutiny against stringent criteria. The purpose of the review is to ensure that there has been no change of circumstance as would mean that the continuation of the order was unnecessary or that it should otherwise be discharged or varied.

Miss Pratt referred the Court, in discharging the Claimant’s obligation for full and frank disclosure, to the decision of Nicklin J in MBR Acres Limited & Ors v Curtin & Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 331 (KB) (a decision handed down after the Order made by Tipples J in this case).

That decision, is notable for two reasons:

Having drawn my attention to that decision Miss Pratt nonetheless urged me not to vary the form of any order I am willing to make in this case so as to make it a truly contra mundum order. She submitted that such an approach would be inconsistent with the approach taken in a number of other cases decided post Wolverhampton, and that although Fordham J followed the same approach as Nicklin J at the first hearing of a without notice application in The Chancellor, Master and Scholars of the University of Cambridgev Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 454 (KB), that approach was not followed by the Soole J on the return date who preferred and adopted the ‘conventional’ approach (See [2025] EWHC 724 (KB)).

Miss Pratt further submits that I should not impose a permission condition in this case. Accepting that such conditions have featured in some other recent injunctions (See for example Trinity College Cambridge v Persons Unknown and St John’s College Cambridge v Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 1577 (Ch)), she submits that: