HT-2023-000321 - [2025] EWHC 1764 (TCC)

Mr Moore sought to identify all downtime associated with the operation of the UTV-670 and its associated equipment including its breakdown and maintenance. The equipment, for which Pharos was responsible, considered in this analysis was (1) the UTV-670 including jetting swords, TSS350 survey equipment to measure depth of cable burial (DoB), MBES sonar and GPS antenna; (2) the 8” Oroflex 20 lay flat water hoses and their couplings; (3) the hose spooler unit and section of round hose integral to this equipment; (4) the tether management system (TMS) including umbilical; and (5) the water pumps and suction hoses providing water under pressure to the jetting system.

Mr Moore then calculated the total technical and operational related downtime and identified the equipment to which the downtime related as follows:

Whilst Mr Moore was challenged on some of the views he expressed about responsibility for some of the problems encountered with the equipment identified above, his assessment of downtime to cause was not challenged.

Mr Scott’s analysis of Tool downtime was contained in Appendix A8 to his report. His evidence about this Appendix was not entirely satisfactory. The Appendix appears to contain a number of semi-rhetorical questions, which Mr Scott indicated were notes that he had made for himself rather than conclusions. Mr Scott was taken to an example of 25 June 2022, where the number of tool downtime hours was identified to be 4. Mr Scott was asked how he had calculated 4 hours, and he answered, frankly, that he had no idea, other than he thought it came from the DPR. It did not, however. The Pharos DPR identifies 2.13 downtime for asset breakdown. Mr Moore’s schedule for the same date allocates (by including matters which the Pharos DPR had not specifically identified as asset related downtime, but which Mr Moore considered should be) over 7 hours’ downtime, the specific causes clearly particularised. The KML DPR does not identify any specific period of standby or downtime. There is no obvious explanation from the DPRs as to how 4 hours tool downtime might have been arrived at.

Mr Scott then candidly admitted that he was only aware that the document forming Appendix 8 had been inserted as an Appendix at the last minute, and, equally honestly, that the Court should not take much notice of it. Mr Scott did commend his conclusions in his Appendix A7 as to downtime, but this Appendix identified hours (e.g. the same 4 hours for 25 June 2022) but contained no explanations as to how the numbers had been arrived at. It may be for this reason that it was thought important (perhaps by those assisting Mr Scott in the compilation of the report) to include a document which sought to provide at least some explanation of the numbers in Appendix A7. Ultimately, whether or not the figures in Appendix A7 for tool downtime were or were not drawn from Appendix A8, the Court is left in the position that Mr Scott has provided no rationale for his tool downtime analysis, such that it may sensibly be interrogated or accepted. This contrasts with Mr Moore’s (unchallenged) analysis which sets out in detail the reasons he sought to attribute certain periods to particular downtime causes.

I therefore have no hesitation in concluding that in assessing downtime attributable to causes (which does not include the question of responsibility for those causes) Mr Moore’s analysis is to be preferred.