in Wiseman v HMRC [2022] UKFTT 00075 (TC) the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber) was considering a notice which HMRC had issued to Mr Wiseman under paragraph 1 of Schedule 36 to the Finance Act 2008
in Wiseman v HMRC[2022] UKFTT 00075 (TC) the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)was considering a notice which HMRC had issued to Mr Wiseman under paragraph 1 of Schedule 36 to the Finance Act 2008, requiring disclosure of certain documents so that HMRC could check his tax position for the tax year 2002/03. Mr Wiseman appealed against that notice, contending that some of the documents which it sought were subject to LPP. His representatives listed the documents which they considered were covered by LPP (the similarity to the procedure suggested, but rejected, in this case will be noted). HMRC did not accept that those documents were covered by LPP.Mr Wiseman therefore applied to the Tribunal for resolution of the dispute as to the scope of LPP applying to the documents being sought. It is clear from the report that the Tribunal was provided with copies of the contentious documents in order to see whether those documents (or indeed parts of them) were covered by LPP, and also to consider the possibility of redaction.
Wiseman v HMRC proceeded under a dedicated dispute resolution process (The Information Notice: Resolution of Disputes as to Privileged Communications Regulations 2009 (SI2009/1916)), but the same approach would be available and applicable to resolve the question as to whether LPP material was “reasonably required” by the IC in a Trigger B Part I Enquiry. It is, of course, possible that, in a given case, the alternative method suggested by the PSNI could be employed and might satisfy the IC that the relevant LPP material was not reasonably required.
As already noted, a Part I Enquiry is a Part I Enquiry, whether begun by Trigger A or Trigger B. If the PSNI’s primary submission, namely that the “reasonable requirement” qualification applies to any Part I Enquiry, is accepted, then the PSNI further argues that the Tribunal was wrong to hold in the alternative at [71] that the IChas power by way of necessary implication to compel the production to it of LPP material.
The question of necessary implication was dealt with by the Lord Justice Clerk in Scottish Legal Complaints Commission v Murray[2022] CSIH 46 at [31]-[40]. The headnote to this decision usefully summarises the principles applicable generally on this point:
- Heading
- Section 1
- The Background
- The Information Notice
- The Statutory Framework
- The Decision of the Tribunal
- The Application and Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
- The Grounds of Appeal
- The Appellant’s Submissions
- if, however, he is undertaking a Part I Enquiry commenced by Trigger A, then he has “…an overall entitlement to require the production of LPP Material” (see [59])
- the public interest test which PSNI comes under a duty to apply under s.42 when considering a request for disclosure of LPP, is more accurately characterised as a weighting exercise, rather than a bal
- suppose further that, as in the judgment at [72], the IC, in the course of his Trigger B Part I Enquiry, was not satisfied that s.42 was actually engaged. In such circumstances, it would be for the IC
- it was never argued on behalf of the PSNI that the Tribunal could not (if so required in a particular case) see LPP Material: the PSNI’s case was and is that the IC is not empowered under the Act to s
- in Wiseman v HMRC [2022] UKFTT 00075 (TC) the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber) was considering a notice which HMRC had issued to Mr Wiseman under paragraph 1 of Schedule 36 to the Finance Act 2008
- LPP is a fundamental right ( R v Derby Magistrates Court, B v Auckland ) any question of LPP being overridden by implication is to be tested by absolute necessity ( R (Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax & anr [2002] UKHL 2
- it must be demonstrably necessary for at least an important aspect of the legislation ( R (Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd ) ) the principle of legality is important in this connection ( R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Simms [2001] 2 AC
- the more fundamental the right, the less likely it will be left to implication ( SLCC v Murray at [33])
- The IC’s Submissions
- The Application of the FOIA Regime
- where the public authority had, on the facts, waived LPP by analysing public statements against the content of the legal advice: Kirkaldie v Information Commissioner & Thanet District Council (EA/2006
- where legal advice from some 14 years earlier was still being used as the basis for a highly contested and doubtful use of public money, the public interest favoured disclosure: Mersey Tunnel Users As
- where legal advice has been used to formulate a policy of general application affecting a category of persons’ access to legal redress, such that transparency justified disclosure of the underlying ad
- where further the detailed exercise of review of information said to engage s.42 was carried out in All Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition v Information Commissioner & Foreign and Co
- The Factual Context to the Notice
- The Appeal
- in fact, the particular terms of s.51(5) serve a readily understandable legislative purpose: they provide an exception from the general power in s.51 to require the provision of LPP material where tha
- Discussion
- That situation stands in contrast to that set out in s.51(1) (b). In contrast, the IC is there exercising regulatory functions outside of the scope of an individual case, in a more thematic or systemi
- Conclusions
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