The Appellant’s Submissions
The Appellant’s Submissions
Mr Dunford KC submitted that in any case where the IC is investigating an alleged failure by a disclosing authority to meet its duties under Part I of FOIA (a “Part I Enquiry”), on a true construction of s. 51(1), he is entitled only to information from that authority which he reasonably requires. This is the case whether the Part I Enquiry has been triggered by an application under s. 50(1) (“Trigger A”), or whether he is conducting the Part I Enquiry pursuant to s.51(1)(b) (“Trigger B”).
The overall purpose of FOIA, more especially Part I, is to provide for the provision of information by a disclosing authority to an applicant, unless that information is (a) absolutely exempt from disclosure or (b) exempt, unless the public interest in its disclosure outweighs the authority’s interest in not disclosing (the qualified exemption).
Material covered by LPP (the documentation in issue in this case) is, by virtue of s.42, subject to qualified exemption from disclosure, requiring an authority dealing with a request for its disclosure to undertake the public interest test. Thus, the disclosing authority is the first (but not necessarily the final) arbiter of whether or not material subject to qualified exemption from disclosure should, following the application of the public interest test, remain undisclosed.
The Tribunal at [59-62] interpreted s.51(1) as creating “…two separate, alternative, scenarios – either (section 51(1)(a)) where [the ICO] has received an application under section 50 or (section 51(1)(b)) where he reasonably requires information for the purposes set out in the sub-sections of section 51(1)(b))”.
If the Tribunal’s interpretation of s.51(1) is correct:
if the IC is undertaking a Part I Enquiry into an alleged failure by a disclosing authority to meet its Part I duties under s.51(1)(b)(i) - that is, Trigger B - he is entitled only to information from that authority which he reasonably requires;
- Heading
- Section 1
- The Background
- The Information Notice
- The Statutory Framework
- The Decision of the Tribunal
- The Application and Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
- The Grounds of Appeal
- The Appellant’s Submissions
- if, however, he is undertaking a Part I Enquiry commenced by Trigger A, then he has “…an overall entitlement to require the production of LPP Material” (see [59])
- the public interest test which PSNI comes under a duty to apply under s.42 when considering a request for disclosure of LPP, is more accurately characterised as a weighting exercise, rather than a bal
- suppose further that, as in the judgment at [72], the IC, in the course of his Trigger B Part I Enquiry, was not satisfied that s.42 was actually engaged. In such circumstances, it would be for the IC
- it was never argued on behalf of the PSNI that the Tribunal could not (if so required in a particular case) see LPP Material: the PSNI’s case was and is that the IC is not empowered under the Act to s
- in Wiseman v HMRC [2022] UKFTT 00075 (TC) the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber) was considering a notice which HMRC had issued to Mr Wiseman under paragraph 1 of Schedule 36 to the Finance Act 2008
- LPP is a fundamental right ( R v Derby Magistrates Court, B v Auckland ) any question of LPP being overridden by implication is to be tested by absolute necessity ( R (Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax & anr [2002] UKHL 2
- it must be demonstrably necessary for at least an important aspect of the legislation ( R (Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd ) ) the principle of legality is important in this connection ( R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Simms [2001] 2 AC
- the more fundamental the right, the less likely it will be left to implication ( SLCC v Murray at [33])
- The IC’s Submissions
- The Application of the FOIA Regime
- where the public authority had, on the facts, waived LPP by analysing public statements against the content of the legal advice: Kirkaldie v Information Commissioner & Thanet District Council (EA/2006
- where legal advice from some 14 years earlier was still being used as the basis for a highly contested and doubtful use of public money, the public interest favoured disclosure: Mersey Tunnel Users As
- where legal advice has been used to formulate a policy of general application affecting a category of persons’ access to legal redress, such that transparency justified disclosure of the underlying ad
- where further the detailed exercise of review of information said to engage s.42 was carried out in All Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition v Information Commissioner & Foreign and Co
- The Factual Context to the Notice
- The Appeal
- in fact, the particular terms of s.51(5) serve a readily understandable legislative purpose: they provide an exception from the general power in s.51 to require the provision of LPP material where tha
- Discussion
- That situation stands in contrast to that set out in s.51(1) (b). In contrast, the IC is there exercising regulatory functions outside of the scope of an individual case, in a more thematic or systemi
- Conclusions
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