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The Application and Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
The Application and Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
The Appellant sought permission to appeal from the Tribunal, which was refused on 18 November 2024. It then applied to the Upper Tribunal for permission to appeal on 12 December 2024.
On 2 January 2025 I directed a rolled-up hearing of the application for permission to appeal with the appeal to follow if permission were granted and directed the suspension of the Tribunal’s decision pending the resolution of the appeal to the Upper Tribunal. I heard the rolled-up application on 22 May 2025 when both parties were represented by counsel, the PSNI by Mr Craig Dunford KC and the IC by Mr Christopher Knight, to whom I am indebted for their able written and oral submissions.
- Heading
- Section 1
- The Background
- The Information Notice
- The Statutory Framework
- The Decision of the Tribunal
- The Application and Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
- The Grounds of Appeal
- The Appellant’s Submissions
- if, however, he is undertaking a Part I Enquiry commenced by Trigger A, then he has “…an overall entitlement to require the production of LPP Material” (see [59])
- the public interest test which PSNI comes under a duty to apply under s.42 when considering a request for disclosure of LPP, is more accurately characterised as a weighting exercise, rather than a bal
- suppose further that, as in the judgment at [72], the IC, in the course of his Trigger B Part I Enquiry, was not satisfied that s.42 was actually engaged. In such circumstances, it would be for the IC
- it was never argued on behalf of the PSNI that the Tribunal could not (if so required in a particular case) see LPP Material: the PSNI’s case was and is that the IC is not empowered under the Act to s
- in Wiseman v HMRC [2022] UKFTT 00075 (TC) the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber) was considering a notice which HMRC had issued to Mr Wiseman under paragraph 1 of Schedule 36 to the Finance Act 2008
- LPP is a fundamental right ( R v Derby Magistrates Court, B v Auckland ) any question of LPP being overridden by implication is to be tested by absolute necessity ( R (Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax & anr [2002] UKHL 2
- it must be demonstrably necessary for at least an important aspect of the legislation ( R (Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd ) ) the principle of legality is important in this connection ( R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Simms [2001] 2 AC
- the more fundamental the right, the less likely it will be left to implication ( SLCC v Murray at [33])
- The IC’s Submissions
- The Application of the FOIA Regime
- where the public authority had, on the facts, waived LPP by analysing public statements against the content of the legal advice: Kirkaldie v Information Commissioner & Thanet District Council (EA/2006
- where legal advice from some 14 years earlier was still being used as the basis for a highly contested and doubtful use of public money, the public interest favoured disclosure: Mersey Tunnel Users As
- where legal advice has been used to formulate a policy of general application affecting a category of persons’ access to legal redress, such that transparency justified disclosure of the underlying ad
- where further the detailed exercise of review of information said to engage s.42 was carried out in All Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition v Information Commissioner & Foreign and Co
- The Factual Context to the Notice
- The Appeal
- in fact, the particular terms of s.51(5) serve a readily understandable legislative purpose: they provide an exception from the general power in s.51 to require the provision of LPP material where tha
- Discussion
- That situation stands in contrast to that set out in s.51(1) (b). In contrast, the IC is there exercising regulatory functions outside of the scope of an individual case, in a more thematic or systemi
- Conclusions