Case No. UKUT-00544-(IAC)

CG [2012] UKUT 00163 at [163]), the number of civilian deaths and injuries; including psychological injuries caused by the conflict, the level of displacement and the geographical scope of the conflict. 90. Turning to the evidence, we found Dr Fatah to be an impressive and authoritative witness. He demonstrated extensive knowledge of the circumstances in Iraq and sought, wherever possible, to provide multiple sources for the evidence he provided, which was to a large extent consistent with the other materials placed before us. When giving oral evidence he clearly identified those parts of his evidence which called for speculation on his part. In all the circumstances we attach significant weight to Dr Fatah’s evidence. 91. The landscape in Iraq has undoubtedly changed since HM2 was heard in October 2012, with the rise of the ISIL - the main insurgent group now operating in the country. This group was established by the Jordanian national Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 1999 – originally being known as Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad . In October 2004 it became known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq and was identified as such by the Tribunal in HM2 . 92. In April 2013 its current leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, changed the group’s name to Al-Dawla Al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham – the “Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham”; al-Sham referring to an undefined region around Syria which translates into English as “The Levant”- thus the use of the acronym ISIL 5 . 93. In June 2014, after a major military offensive, ISIL seized control of the northern city of Mosul and shortly thereafter declared the existence of an Islamic State across parts of northern Iraq and Syria. 94. The UNHCR, in its October 2014 report “UNHCR Positions on Returns to Iraq” summarised the situation thus: “Iraq has experienced a new surge in violence between Iraqi security forces (ISF) and Kurdish forces (Peshmerga) on the one hand and the group “Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham” (hereafter ISIS), which operates both in Iraq and Syria, and affiliated armed groups on the other hand. Civilians are killed and wounded every day as a result of this surge of violence, including suicide attacks and car bombs, shelling, airstrikes, and executions. As a result of advances by ISIS, the Government of Iraq is reported to have lost full or partial control over considerable parts of the country’s territory, particularly in Al-Anbar, Ninewa, Salah Al-Din, Kirkuk and Diyala governorates. Although the ISF and Kurdish forces, supported by US airstrikes, have recently regained control over some localities, mostly along the internal boundaries with the Kurdistan Region, overall frontlines remain fluid. The conflict, which re-escalated in Al Anbar governorate in January 2014 and since then spread to other governorates, has been labelled as a non-international armed conflict. Casualties so far in 2014 represent the highest total since the height of sectarian conflict in 2006-2007.” 95. The objectives of ISIL, so far as they can be ascertained, are threefold: (a) To permanently break down political boundaries in Iraq, Syria and the surrounding region; (b) To establish the Islamic Emirate by controlling terrain across Syria and Iraq, governing within the terrain and defending its external borders; and, (c) To expand the territory of the Emirate and connect it to the wider Muslim community. 96. ISIL is said to have significant financial resources, with funding from individuals in Arab Gulf states, together with income from oil fields it controls and from smuggling and extortion (BBC, 30 June 2014) 97. Dr Fatah observes that in addition to ISIL there are four other anti-GoI groups operating in Iraq; the Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandi (JRTN) movement, the Mujahideen Shura Council, the Revolutionary tribes and Ansar al-Sunni . He also avers that there are eight pro-GoI Shia militia groups and four pro-GoI Sunni militia groups operating in Iraq – as well as a number of foreign forces. 98. The evidence provides a range of figures for deaths and casualties in Iraq during 2014 and early 2015. Before summarising those statistics we sound the same note of caution as was sounded in both HM1 [117] and HM2 [107] in seeking to rely on any particular survey: “Because the estimates of Iraqi casualties contained in this report are based on varying time periods and have been created using different methodologies, readers should exercise caution when using them and should look to them as guideposts rather than as statements of fact.” 99. Iraq Body Count, whose figures Dr Fatah relies upon and were found by the Tribunal in HM2 to be most reliable because of their multiple sourcing [110], record that 17,049 civilians were killed in Iraq during 2014, this being almost double the figure for 2013, which itself was roughly double the figure recorded for 2012. As of 18 February 2015, Iraq Body Count (IBC) had recorded 2,245 civilians deaths in 2015. According to IBC, civilian deaths peaked in 2006 and 2007 at 29400 and 25968 deaths respectively. 100. The GoI record 15,538 civilian deaths in 2014, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) record 12,282 such deaths (April 2015 CIG) or 10,187 (Dr Fatah’s first report) and Musings on Iraq record 17,098 deaths, both over the same period. The number of civilian casualties recorded by the same organisations ranged from 22,000 (GoI) to 26,590 (Musing on Iraq). IBC broke down its record of civilian deaths into three categories – 1,748 deaths caused by Iraqi airstrikes, 4,325 at the hands of ISIL and 10,858 deaths where it was not possible to establish which of the ‘actors’ were involved.