Case No. UKUT-00544-(IAC)

Iraq) and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA Civ 1276, an international protection claim made by P cannot succeed by reference to any alleged risk of harm arising from an absence of Iraqi identification documentation, if the Tribunal finds that P’s return is not currently feasible, given what is known about the state of P’s documentation. C. POSITION ON DOCUMENTATION WHERE RETURN IS FEASIBLE 8. It will only be where the Tribunal is satisfied that the return of P to Iraq is feasible that the issue of alleged risk of harm arising from an absence of Iraqi identification documentation will require judicial determination. 9. Having a Civil Status Identity Document (CSID) is one of the ways in which it is possible for an Iraqi national in the United Kingdom to obtain a passport or a laissez passer. Where the Secretary of State proposes to remove P by means of a passport or laissez passer, she will be expected to demonstrate to the Tribunal what, if any, identification documentation led the Iraqi authorities to issue P with the passport or laissez passer (or to signal their intention to do so). 10. Where P is returned to Iraq on a laissez passer or expired passport, P will be at no risk of serious harm at the point of return by reason of not having a current passport or other current form of Iraqi identification document. 11. Where P’s return to Iraq is found by the Tribunal to be feasible, it will generally be necessary to decide whether P has a CSID, or will be able to obtain one, reasonably soon after arrival in Iraq. A CSID is generally required in order for an Iraqi to access financial assistance from the authorities; employment; education; housing; and medical treatment. If P shows there are no family or other members likely to be able to provide means of support, P is in general likely to face a real risk of destitution, amounting to serious harm, if, by the time any funds provided to P by the Secretary of State or her agents to assist P’s return have been exhausted, it is reasonably likely that P will still have no CSID. 12. Where return is feasible but P does not have a CSID, P should as a general matter be able to obtain one from the Civil Status Affairs Office for P’s home Governorate, using an Iraqi passport (whether current or expired), if P has one. If P does not have such a passport, P’s ability to obtain a CSID may depend on whether P knows the page and volume number of the book holding P’s information (and that of P’s family). P’s ability to persuade the officials that P is the person named on the relevant page is likely to depend on whether P has family members or other individuals who are prepared to vouch for P. 13. P’s ability to obtain a CSID is likely to be severely hampered if P is unable to go to the Civil Status Affairs Office of P’s Governorate because it is in an area where Article 15(c) serious harm is occurring. As a result of the violence, alternative CSA Offices for Mosul, Anbar and Saluhaddin have been established in Baghdad and Kerbala. The evidence does not demonstrate that the “Central Archive”, which exists in Baghdad, is in practice able to provide CSIDs to those in need of them. There is, however, a National Status Court in Baghdad, to which P could apply for formal recognition of identity. The precise operation of this court is, however, unclear. D. INTERNAL RELOCATION WITHIN IRAQ (OTHER THAN THE IRAQI KURDISH REGION) 14. As a general matter, it will not be unreasonable or unduly harsh for a person from a contested area to relocate to Baghdad City or (subject to paragraph 2 above) the Baghdad Belts. 15. In assessing whether it would be unreasonable/unduly harsh for P to relocate to Baghdad, the following factors are, however, likely to be relevant: (a) whether P has a CSID or will be able to obtain one (see Part C above); (b) whether P can speak Arabic (those who cannot are less likely to find employment); (c) whether P has family members or friends in Baghdad able to accommodate him; (d) whether P is a lone female (women face greater difficulties than men in finding employment); (e) whether P can find a sponsor to access a hotel room or rent accommodation; (f) whether P is from a minority community; (g) whether there is support available for P bearing in mind there is some evidence that returned failed asylum seekers are provided with the support generally given to IDPs. 16. There is not a real risk of an ordinary civilian travelling from Baghdad airport to the southern governorates, suffering serious harm en route to such governorates so as engage Article 15(c). E. IRAQI KURDISH REGION 17. The Respondent will only return P to the IKR if P originates from the IKR and P’s identity has been ‘pre-cleared’ with the IKR authorities. The authorities in the IKR do not require P to have an expired or current passport, or laissez passer. 18. The IKR is virtually violence free. There is no Article 15(c) risk to an ordinary civilian in the IKR. 19. A Kurd (K) who does not originate from the IKR can obtain entry for 10 days as a visitor and then renew this entry permission for a further 10 days. If K finds employment, K can remain for longer, although K will need to register with the authorities and provide details of the employer. There is no evidence that the IKR authorities pro-actively remove Kurds from the IKR whose permits have come to an end. 20. Whether K, if returned to Baghdad, can reasonably be expected to avoid any potential undue harshness in that city by travelling to the IKR, will be fact sensitive; and is likely to involve an assessment of (a)the practicality of travel from Baghdad to the IKR (such as to Irbil by air); (b)the likelihood of K’s securing employment in the IKR; and (c) the availability of assistance from family and friends in the IKR. 21. As a general matter, a non-Kurd who is at real risk in a home area in Iraq is unlikely to be able to relocate to the IKR. F. EXISTING COUNTRY GUIDANCE DECISIONS 22. This decision replaces all existing country guidance on Iraq TABLE OF CONTENTS GLOSSARY CSID - Civil Status Identity Document DTM - Migration Displacement Tracking GoI - Government of Iraq IBC - Iraq Body Count IDP - Internally Displaced Person IED - Improvised Explosive Device IKR - Iraqi Kurdish Region INC - Iraqi Nationality Certificate IOM - International Organisation for Migration IRC - International Rescue Committee ISF - Iraqi Security Forces ISIL - Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant MODM - Ministry of Displacement and Migration MoI - Ministry of Interior NRC - Norwegian Refugee Council PACS - Protection and Assistance Centres PARCS - Protection, Assistance and Reintegration Centres PDS - Public Distribution System UNAMI - United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq USAID - United States Agency for International Development VARRP - Voluntary Assisted Return and Reintegration Programme Anonymity Pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (SI2008/269) an Anonymity Order is made. Unless the Upper Tribunal or Court orders otherwise, no report of any proceedings or any form of publication thereof shall directly or indirectly identify the original Appellant. This prohibition applies to, amongst others, all parties. DECISION AND REASONS Introduction 1. Each member of the panel has contributed to this decision. The appeal comes before us by order of Davis LJ sealed on the 25 October 2012, who remitted it: “ … for reconsideration pursuant to paragraph 12 of schedule 4 to the Transfer of Functions of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal Order 2010 and section 14 of the Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act 2007” . 2. This case has been identified to give country guidance on Iraq in light of circumstances in that country that have arisen since the decision in HM and others (Article 15 (c)) Iraq CG [2012] UKUT 00409 (IAC) (“HM2”). Our consideration has been limited to the issue of whether Article 15(c) of Council Directive 2004/83/EC 1 (“the Qualification Directive”) prevents the removal of Iraqi nationals, and in particular the Appellant, to Iraq on the basis that they are entitled to subsidiary protection. 3. The Appellant is a national of Iraq who entered the United Kingdom on 7 January 2009, aged 17. He applied for asylum on the following day, having first been arrested. This application was refused by the Respondent on 18 June 2009 and on the same date a decision was made to remove the Appellant to Iraq pursuant to section 10 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. The Appellant appealed this decision to the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal on Refugee Convention, humanitarian protection and human rights grounds, but his appeal was dismissed by Immigration Judge Batiste in a determination dated 7 September 2009. On 27 January 2010 Burnett J (as he then was) ordered the Tribunal to reconsider the Appellant’s appeal. Thereafter, on the 23 June 2010, Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Wynne set aside the determination of Immigration Judge Batiste on the basis that: “… the IJ’s treatment of the expert evidence was contradictory because the IJ preferred the expert on factual matters to the COIS report but approached the report with “a great deal of circumspection” and placed “very limited weight” on it. Thus the IJ rejected aspects of the expert evidence whilst accepting other parts of it without adequate reasons for adopting this approach. … because the Appellant was at the relevant time under the age of 18, the IJ was wrong in taking into account what he is alleged to have said at his age assessment by social workers. … the IJ’s rejection of the Appellant’s humanitarian protection claim under Article 15c of the Qualification Directive is flawed for inadequate reasoning” 4. The re-making of the decision on the Appellant’s appeal was adjourned and came back before Judge Wynne on 22 February 2011, on which occasion the Appellant gave further oral evidence. Judge Wynne dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds in a determination dated 1 April 2011. In doing so it was accepted that: (i) the Appellant lived in the family home in Dubis, Kirkuk until he left Iraq at the end of 2008 to travel to the United Kingdom; (ii) the Appellant’s father died in 2006; and, (iii) the Appellant’s cousin is a lorry driver who remains living in Iraq, and is based in Kirkuk. Judge Wynne did not accept the truth of the Appellant’s evidence that: (i) his father had been a high ranking Ba’ath official, (ii) his uncle had been a Ba’ath official of lesser rank than his father and, (iii) his family (mother and sisters) had left Iraq for Syria. 5. The original grounds seeking permission to appeal from the Court of Appeal related solely to Judge Wynne’s assessment of the credibility of the evidence given by the Appellant. Moses LJ refused to grant the Appellant permission in relation to such grounds. However, shortly thereafter the Court of Appeal handed down its judgment in the case of HM ( Iraq ) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 1536. This prompted the Appellant to amend his grounds to rely upon the terms of that judgment. Laws LJ subsequently granted permission to appeal in relation to the amended ground only and, as identified above, Davis LJ later allowed the appeal, without a hearing, and the matter was remitted to the Upper Tribunal for “reconsideration”. Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Statement of Reasons attached to the order of Davis LJ read: “6. The Respondent accepts that this appeal should be remitted to the Upper Tribunal for reconsideration under article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive only… 7. For this reason, the parties are agreed that the matter be remitted back to the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the Upper Tribunal for re-hearing of the appeal by the Tribunal.” The Evidence – A Summary 6. The Appellant produced written evidence from Dr Rebwar Fatah, contained in reports dated 27 February 2015, 8 April 2015 and 1 May 2015. Dr Fatah also gave oral evidence before us. In addition to the evidence provided by Dr Fatah , there was also a considerable amount of other documentary evidence before us, a schedule of which is attached as Appendix A hereto. The Appellant was not called to provide oral evidence. We have had regard to all of the material before us, both written and oral, when coming to our conclusions. Written Evidence of Dr Fatah 7. Dr Fatah was awarded a BSc and MSc by the University of London and a PhD by University College London and worked in commercial and strategic positions from 1989-2001 for British Telecom, Fujitsu, Nortel Networks and 186K. Since 2000 he has been working as an expert producing country reports , nationality assessments and document authentication reports for solicitors’ firms in the United Kingdom , the Netherlands , the United States and Norway . He has also acted as a consultant to the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons of Belgium and with the Finnish League for Human Rights. He speaks Kurdish Sorani and Arabic in addition to English. 8. Since 2000, he has completed approximately 2,000 expert reports (these include reports for four country guidance cases) as well as over 100 scientific, technical and commercial conference papers. He is the founder of the Middle East Consultancy Service (“MECS”). This service has provided in-depth research for UNHCR, International Organisation for Migration-Iraq, Transparency International and Risk Advisory. He travels to Iraq and IKR on a regular basis and was most recently there between 31 August and 16 September 2014 and 29 January and 6 February 2015. 9. In his 90 page report, dated 27 February 2015, Dr Fatah addresses the general security situation in Iraq in some detail, with particular reference to the ‘disputed territories’, Baghdad , the south and the IKR. He thereafter provides in depth evidence in relation to the issue of relocation within Iraq , focusing on Baghdad and the IKR and, in particular, the economic and humanitarian situation in those areas and the obtaining of identity documentation. 10. In his report of 8 April 2015 Dr Fatah provides detailed evidence on the demography and security situation in Baghdad, with particular consideration being given to whether non-state militia are present in Baghdad, whether they have de facto control of any civilian urban areas within the Baghdad governorate; whether they target civilians and, if so, how and who. Thereafter he addresses issues relating to road travel in the south of Iraq and the circumstances prevailing in the southern governorates. Dr Fatah then sets out a summary of the contact he, or his organisation, has with, inter alia , the Ministry of Interior of Iraq, the Ministry of Displacement and Migration, an Iraqi MP, UNHCR-Iraq, the International Organisation for Migration, the Norwegian Refugee Council and USAID Iraq Access for Justice – identifying in particular the role that these organisations play in Iraq. He finally turns, in his second report, to further consider relocation to the IKR and, in particular, the mechanics of entry into and residence within that region. 11. In the latter of his three reports Dr Fatah addresses the nature and extent of Baghdad ’s “Central Archive” of civil records. Oral Evidence of Dr Fatah 12. In oral evidence Dr Fatah attested to the accuracy of his written reports and expanded further on matters set out therein. He referred to the evidence already provided as to the documents an Iraqi national is required to produce to the Iraqi consulate in London in order to obtain a laissez-passer. A laissez-passer is not a recognised form of identity document in Iraq . A recognised Iraqi identity document is required in order to move around Iraq and access services there. 13. Dr Fatah was referred to the conclusions found in paragraph 91 of the Tribunal’s decision in MK (documents – relocation) Iraq CG [2012] UKUT 00126 (IAC) i.e. that a healthy adolescent or adult Iraqi would have memorised or have access to the book, page, and volume number of the location of their family record. He disagreed with this conclusion, although he accepted that some people would remember these details. Iraqi nationals do not need to recall such details because they have to produce the actual identity document when they wish to rely upon it. Each member of a person’s immediate family i.e. wife and children is listed on the same pages. The 2014 Landinfo report Iraq : Travel documents and other identity documents , relied upon by Dr Fatah, explains that before marriage an individual will appear on pages in the family record with his or her parents and siblings and after any marriage he or she will be listed on pages including his or her spouse and any of their own children. Therefore, immediate family members will have the same file and page number in the family records. If a person’s family record is moved to a different file and/or page , the old record identifies this fact, as well as details of where any new record is to be found. The Civil Status Identity Document (“CSID”) is the most important document and is a gateway to all other identity documents. 14. Obtaining a replacement CSID requires production of evidence confirming identity. If a person has no documents to prove his identity it is possible to make a request to the National Status Court to issue a verdict as to that person’s identity. This requires such person to produce two witnesses, each of whom must have a CSID, who would have to convince a judge of the person’s identity and the fact that he/she has lost their CSID. The documentary record of this verdict can thereafter be produced to the Civil Status Office. This could take “three weeks or longer” depending on the area. The Baghdad office is busy. 15. Moving on to the economic situation in Iraq , Dr Fatah observed that the price of oil has crashed – oil revenue forming a significant part of Iraq ’s GDP. ISIL either destroys or controls output from the oil fields in the contested areas. The other industries in the contested areas have also disappeared. 16. ISIL have now taken control of Ramadi. It can reach places as close as 20 km from Baghdad . Over 100,000 people have fled from Ramadi. These IDPs are being put into documentation centres by the Iraqi authorities and are required to prove who they are. IDPs are supported by local and international agencies as well as the Iraqi authorities. This is a significant burden on such agencies. Under cross-examination 17. Dr Fatah maintained that the most unstable area of Iraq is the line of conflict south of the IKR border. He agreed: (i) that the violence in Mosul ‘ebbs and flows’; (ii) that the categorisation of the level of violence in particular areas of Iraq identified in his reports (i.e. high, medium, low or less than low) was undertaken by reference to the number of civilian deaths and injuries in those areas; (iii) Baghdad has a population of between 6 and 7 million people; and, (iv) the population of an area is a relevant consideration in the assessment of the intensity of violence in such area. He further observed that it is attractive to an insurgent group to penetrate into Baghdad because there are areas, such as market places, in which thousands of people can be killed in one incident – thus creating fear and media attention, which they seek. Dr Fatah also accepted that there is an underlying level of criminality in Baghdad , much as there is in all major cities around the world. He was unaware of any figures relating to this. 18. Dr Fatah continued by confirming that ISIL has never been in control of Baghdad , but that they do have influence in some neighbourhoods. Baghdad has a majority Shia population, although there are Sunni areas – these being identified in his first report. The curfew in Baghdad was lifted on 7 February 2015. There was no consistent wave of violence as a consequence of the lifting of the curfew. Although there were incidents on 10 February 2015, these could not be linked to the lifting of the curfew. 19. Dr Fatah was asked whether he thought Landinfo to be a reputable and reliable organisation – he confirmed he did. He agreed that communications, transport, trade and industry go on functioning in Baghdad – as he said, “Life goes on.” The roads in and to the south of Baghdad are not targeted by militia groups, but the checkpoints are. 20. Turning to the issue of documentation – if a person wishes to obtain a laissez-passer that person must convince the consulate of their nationality and identity. A person in the UK can use a family member or lawyer with a power of attorney in Iraq as a proxy in order to obtain identity documentation. For example, a family member or lawyer can attend court in Iraq on a person’s behalf to confirm such a person’s family record details. 21. Dr Fatah also said that if an individual had lost or wanted to renew his CSID in London , he would need to provide the Iraqi Embassy with the relevant reference numbers for his CSID before it would issue a replacement. He was specifically asked whether the parents of a person in London without a CSID could go to the Iraqi authorities, with their identity documentation, and obtain confirmation that the family record shows that they have a child and the date of the birth of such child. He saw no procedural problems with this. He cautioned, however, that it would be speculation to conclude that the consulate would necessarily accept the identity of a person in London as a consequence of production to them of the type of confirmation previously identified. The Iraqi family records confirm only that there is a person with such details. 22. The process and documents required to obtain CSID from the consulate in London is set out in the report of 27 February 2015 [paragraph 232 therein]. Notarised colour copies of a person’s parents’, or sibling’s, documents would probably suffice to prove a person’s identity – “It is necessary to prove who you are beyond reasonable doubt” . Dr Fatah noted that if a person in the UK did not have a CSID and had no family in Iraq it would be possible for a friend of that person, with a CSID and a power of attorney, to go to court in Iraq and vouch for such person’s identity. 23. Dr Fatah agreed that there is evidence of a ‘central archive’ in Baghdad – the issue is how comprehensive the archive is. The Kurdish authorities claim not to have sent any records to Baghdad since 1991. 24. As regards the IKR, there are flights there from Baghdad every second day and flights directly from London . Dr Fatah accepted that he had not interviewed anyone at Erbil airport when providing his opinion as to the requirements of entry into the IKR. He thought the imposition of entry requirements for the IKR to be arbitrary and dependent upon the person manning the entry point. He had spoken to an Iraqi national who had not been asked for a sponsor when travelling to the IKR in February/March 2015 but who had recently been informed that a sponsor was required. He believed that persons entering IKR to study require a sponsor and that Arabs are not wanted in the IKR – the UNHCR also agreed that single Arabs have problems entering the IKR. A Kurd from outside the IKR can obtain entry for 10 days as a visitor and then renew this for a further 10 days. If such a person finds employment they can remain for longer, although they will have to register with the authorities providing details of the employing company’s name. A work permit can also be renewed, however, if a person loses their employment they will have to leave the IKR. Dr Fatah was not aware of whether the IKR authorities proactively remove Kurds from the IKR whose permits have come to an end. Under re-examination 25. Dr Fatah averred that the ability to renew a visit permit for the IKR is event driven and dependent on the particular Asayish 2 officer considering the application. He did not think that the laissez-passer used by a person to return from the UK to Baghdad could be used for an onward trip to the IKR. The laissez-passer is a document valid for one trip and is likely to be taken by the authorities on arrival in Baghdad . 26. In response to questions from the Tribunal, Dr Fatah confirmed that on return to Iraq a current or expired Iraqi passport can be used to obtain a CSID. 27. Dr Fatah also said that in order to obtain a laissez-passer from the Iraqi consulate a person would need to demonstrate their nationality and identity and that consideration of the evidence would be on a case by case basis. He also said that he presumed that the individual would have to produce a photocopy of a previous passport and a report from the police confirming that it had been lost or stolen, a CSID or a nationality certificate. Landinfo, in its 2014 report, confirm the same. It would not be sufficient for an individual to simply provide the page and file number for his CSID. 28. After the hearing, and in response to questions raised by the Tribunal, Dr Fatah provided the following additional evidence by way of an e-mail dated 19 May 2015. He had visited Arbat IDP camp on the outskirts of Sulaymaniya in the KRG. The camp was divided according to ethnic and religious groups. It was expanding. The number of children was exceptionally high, there being 2300 families there. There were physical dangers in the camp such as a big pond with no barriers to protect the children. The camp is funded by local and international agencies. There is another camp in the same district housing Syrian refugees. As a consequence the public services in the area are under great pressure. The IDPs are not subject to the normal ‘visa’ requirements because they are controlled and registered with the Asayish. Entry and exit to the camp is controlled. IDPs are allowed to leave the camp to work, see friends and walk around. Dr Fatah understands that returned asylum seekers are not treated as IDPs. 29. Dr Fatah thereafter identified that USAID has provided evidence that each displaced family in Iraq is provided with one million Iraqi Dinar by the government unless the family is headed by a women over 35 in which case 500000 dinar is provided; single people receive 200000 Dinar. A CSID, INC or passport is required in order to register for these monies. Cash benefits are only provided to the head of household and family relationships must be documented. In the IKR IDPs need a copy of either their CSID, INC or passport in order to obtain a residency letter, without which the IDP may not be able to register for the monies or other services. IDPs are not permitted to travel within the IKR because residency cards are only applicable in the governorate of issue. All government procedures in the IKR are being delayed due to the large number of IDPs. Amnesty International 30. Amnesty International also provided a report, dated 14th May 2015, which was written for the specific purposes of the instant case, and which made observations about the current situation in Iraq . In paragraphs 12 and 13 of its report Amnesty International state as follows regarding the information that led it to the conclusions summarised below: “The information to be provided in this matter is sourced from Amnesty International’s Iraq Team, part of the Middle East and North Africa Programme, which carries out research and advocacy work on countries in the region including Iraq . The Iraq Team consists of experienced research and campaigning staff who conduct research both in the field, where possible, and from AI’s various offices. The Team receives information from a wide variety of sources. These sources include state and officially sanctioned, or permitted sources, such as online newspapers and state broadcasters; a wide range of websites and blogs; human rights activists, including lawyers and community workers and from detainees and their families. Other sources include journalists, refugees, diplomats, religious bodies and humanitarian agencies. The team monitor online news outlets and newspaper websites and other media outlets… Amnesty’s crisis senior researcher…has conducted on the ground research during the current crisis and documented a wide range of human rights abuses…” 31. In summary, Amnesty International concluded that: “[t]he areas held or contested by IS 3 contain very substantial dangers of killing and other human rights abuse of the utmost gravity, including torture and sexual violence. Baghdad city continues to be one of the most dangerous cities on earth, with mass-casualty terrorist incidents perpetrated both by IS supporters and armed militias, as well as kidnappings and murders by such militias against Sunnis, other minority groups and those perceived as likely to be worth ransom money” . It expressed serious concern “ at the prospect of Iraqis from the contested zones being returned to Iraq on the basis that it would be reasonable for them to relocate to Baghdad or the IKR.” 32. The report noted in particular that “while Amnesty International had been expressing serious concerns regarding the human rights conditions in Iraq for many years, the events of the last year have rendered the country one of the most dangerous in the world” . It added that “the rise of the armed group calling itself Islamic State (IS) across both Iraq and Syria has led to extraordinary levels of violence occurring across the country and on a daily basis” . It then reviewed reports by the UNHCR, the US Institute for the Study of War and various newspapers relating to the areas in Iraq currently held by ISIL and added that it regarded the situation as highly volatile, fluid and subject to change at very short notice. Reference is made to Amnesty’s own reports on the scale of human rights abuses by ISIL and the mass exodus of Shi’a Muslims, Christians and other minorities from the areas captured by ISIL. In particular, it noted that in September 2014 it was reported that “the group that calls itself the ISIL has carried out ethnic cleansing on a historic scale in northern Iraq ” . In addition it is noted that the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq had found evidence of numerous examples of targeted executions carried out by ISIL and the use of mass graves. 33. Amnesty International also observed that “IS operatives, supporters and allied groups (chiefly sectarian Sunni militia) have regularly perpetrated attacks [outside the contested areas], chiefly through the use of Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED), Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDS), bombings, suicide bombings, mass shootings and targeted assassinations” . A review was undertaken of the known statistics for the number of Iraqis killed and wounded in February 2015 and observation was made that Baghdad was the worst affected governorate with 1,165 civilian casualties. In addition, the report listed a variety of attacks in many areas of Baghdad in May 2015, which involved IEDs, VBIEDs, beheadings, shootings and rocket attacks – it being stated that “perpetrators appear to vary but include individuals resident in the city allied to IS or in sympathy with them, members of clandestine militia and terrorist groups; and sectarian militias and members or sympathisers of IS who succeed in entering the city from IS held territory” . As a result, checkpoints have been set up around entrance points to Baghdad and militiamen at one such checkpoint told a person, whom they were unaware was a representative of Amnesty International, that “if we catch ‘those dogs’ [Sunnis] coming down from the Tikrit area we execute them; in those areas they are all working with DA’ESH (ISIL). They come to Baghdad to commit terrorist crimes. So we have to stop them.” It also noted that it , “along with many other independent international observers, have documented for months the use of retaliatory and sectarian attacks by government forces and Shi’a militias against Iraq ’s Sunni population and other minority groups” . 34. The report continues by noting that the Jamestown Foundation have provided an outline of the leading Shi’a militia groups currently operating in Iraq, which says that “it is estimated that close to a million volunteers answered Sistani’s call [for Iraqis to form militias to fight ISIL] and signed up in the following weeks and months. Some of the most important militias under the Hashd al-Sha’abi include the Badr Organization, Saraya al-Salam, Asa’ib, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Saraya Taleaa al-Khorasani and Kata’ib Imam Ali”. It added that “Hashd al-Sha’abi is assisted by Iran via General Qasem Soleimani, the head of Iran ’s elite Quds Force, the overseas paramilitary wing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps” . In addition, it observed that “Hashd al-Sha’abi is funded by the Iraqi government, which not only provides the fighters’ salaries but also its military capabilities” . The report went on to identify that the Shi’a militias “were substantially responsible for preventing the complete overrun of Iraq by ISIL forces after the collapse of the Iraqi army in the summer of 2014. They have since been heavily engaged in the anti-ISIL fighting alongside ISF troops. However, they have also been documented to have engaged in large scale sectarian violence against Iraq ’s Sunni population both in areas outside of IS control and in recently ‘liberated’ areas” . It is later observed that “while the rise of IS and the brutality of its behaviour has been widely documented in the international press, this concurrent rise in sectarian murder by Shi’a militias and Iraqi government forces has received less mainstream attention” . 35. The report continues by identifying that there has been a “[p]attern of Shi’a militia attacks, justified by the perpetrators as retribution and retaliation for IS activities but frequently motivated by sectarian hatred and ordinary criminality, has continued” – subsequently adding that “[w]hile the majority of sectarian killing appears to be between the adherents to the Sunni and Shi’a Islamic faiths, Amnesty shares the concerns of many other international observers that sectarian violence appears to be spreading through other communities, as the ongoing conflict appears to be breaking down what remains of the inter-communal bonds within the Iraqi state as a whole.” Home Office Country Information 36. In paragraph 1.3.34 of its Country Information and Guidance – Iraq: the security situation in the ‘contested’ areas of Iraq (August 2014), 22/08/2014 it is concluded that the contested areas of Iraq, include Kirkuk, Diyala, Anbar, Salah al Din and Ninewah governorates and should be considered as areas of internal armed conflict for the purposes of any risk assessment . It is further stated that “although all cases must be considered on their individual merits, based on the current objective evidence, decision makers are advised that in the vast majority of cases, the combined individual and collective risk factors are such that return to a contested area would be in breach of Article 15 of the Qualification Directive and therefore a grant of Humanitarian Protection would be appropriate if internal relocation was not possible” . 37. At paragraph 1.4.1 of its later Country Information note – Iraq: Internal relocation (and technical obstacles), 24/12/2014 the Home Office conclude that current return arrangements from the UK to Iraq, either via Erbil or Baghdad, do not breach Article 3 of the ECHR. However, at paragraph 1.4.3 thereof it also stated that “a person returned to Iraq who was unable to replace their Civil Status ID Card or Nationality Certificate would likely face significant difficulties in accessing services and a livelihood and would face destitution which is likely to reach the Article 3 threshold ”. 38. In its April 2015 guidance Iraq : Security situation in Baghdad , southern governorates and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq , , the Home Office state that: (i) The security situation has deteriorated in Baghdad , Babil, and the southern governorates, while the situation remains relatively stable in the IKR. However, the situation has not deteriorated to such an extent that it has reached a level where it can be said that in general the situation for ordinary civilians in these governorates breaches Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive. (ii) Decision makers should consider whether there are particular factors relevant to the person’s individual circumstances which might nevertheless place them at enhanced risk, particularly in Baghdad and Babil governorates; (iii) The security situation remains fluid and decision makers should take into account up-to-date country information in assessing the risks faced by applicants; (iv) Internal relocation may be a viable option but only if the risk is not present in the place of relocation and it would not be unduly harsh to expect a person to relocate. Each case must be considered on its individual merits. 39. In relation to Baghdad in particular it is concluded that “there currently exists a state of internal armed conflict between ISIL and the Government of Iraq and its allies in Iraq, with the violence principally in northern, central and western areas of Iraq” , and “although recent successes by Kurdish, GoI and US-Coalition forces have pushed back ISIL from territories it occupied in mid-2014 and degraded its military capabilities, ISIL remains in control of parts of the country, although not in Baghdad governorate. ISIL continues to perpetrate attacks in Baghdad governorate, with an ultimate goal of securing its so-called ‘Caliphate state’ in Iraq and Syria ” . 40. It further said that “there are a range of armed actors currently operating in Baghdad governorate, including Shiite and Sunni militias, extremist Islamic groups including ISIL, organised criminal gangs as well as Iraqi security forces. However, there were no reports that ISIL, or other Sunni extremist groups, exercise de facto control in any district of Baghdad City or Baghdad Governorate” . 41. As to the southern governorates, it is opined that the security situation in the governorates of Basra , Kerbala, Najaf, Muthanna, Thi-Qar, Missan, Quadissiya and Wassit remained relatively stable in 2014 and that in general return there would not give rise to a breach of Article 15(c). Similarly, in relation to the IKR, it said that the security situation in the governorates of Erbil , Sulamaniyah and Dahuk was stable in 2014 with low levels of violence. 42. Finally in relation to Babil the Respondent concludes in her Country Information and Guidance titled ‘Iraq: Security situation in Baghdad, southern governorates and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)’ that “there has been a deterioration in the security situation in Babil governorate since 2012 and 2013 ” and that “the government maintains control over the majority of the governorate, including the northern part of Babil around Jurf Al-Sakhr, which was previously an ISIL strong-hold from which it launched attacks on the surrounding area and manufactured car bombs. By the end of 2014 ISIL’s presence in Jurf A-Sakhr had been cleared, with insurgents routed further north. This military success had improved the security situation considerably. However there remained a risk of further violence, both from renewed armed conflict and as a result of IEDs left behind by insurgents” . 43. At paragraph 1.3.25 it is further said that “ while levels of violence have increased in Babil compared to previous years, conditions have not deteriorated to the extent that a person returning there would face a breach of Article 15(c)” . However, it adds that “while in general a return to Babil would not breach Article 15(c), decision makers must also consider whether there are particular factors relevant to the person’s individual circumstances which might nevertheless place them at risk. Such factors include – but are not limited to – the person’s age, gender, health, ethnicity, religion, sect, disability and profession. Some persons, especially those who reside in areas where they are a minority, may face a heightened risk of indiscriminate violence” . UNHCR’s position paper 44. The UNHCR’s view on returns to Iraq is set out in its position paper of 27 October 2014, the conclusion to which reads: “[27] As the situation in Iraq remains highly fluid and volatile, and since all parts of the country are reported to have been affected, directly or indirectly, by the ongoing crisis, UNHCR urges States not to forcibly return persons originating from Iraq until tangible improvements in the security and human rights situation have occurred. In the current circumstances, many persons fleeing Iraq are likely to meet the 1951 Convention criteria for refugee status. When, in the context of an adjudication of an individual case of a person originating from Iraq , 1951 Convention criteria are found not to apply, broader refugee criteria as contained in the relevant regional instruments or complementary forms of protection are likely to apply. In the current circumstances, with massive new internal displacement coupled with a large scale humanitarian crisis, mounting sectarian tensions and reported access restrictions, particularly into the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, UNHCR does in principle not consider it appropriate for States to deny persons from Iraq international protection on the basis of applicability of an internal flight alternative or relocation alternative.” Existing Country Guidance 45. The core of the current country guidance relating to the circumstances in Iraq dates back to the decision in HM and Others (Article 15(c)) Iraq CG [2010] UKUT 00331 (IAC) (“HM1”) in which the Tribunal concluded (i) that enforced returns to Iraq could take place because the degree of indiscriminate violence did not reach such a high level in any part of Iraq so as to show substantial grounds for believing that any civilian returned there would face a real risk within the meaning of Article 15(c); and, (ii) even if such a risk were to be shown to exist in some areas of Iraq, internal relocation would achieve safety and would not in all circumstances be unduly harsh. 46. HM1 was successfully appealed to the Court of Appeal; however, the court did not consider it necessary to deal with any of the substantive grounds but rather allowed the appeal on purely procedural grounds. There then followed two further country guidance decisions relating to Iraq : MK (promulgated on 23 April 2012) and HM2 (promulgated on 23 November 2012). 47. The headnote to MK reads: “ (1) Since the lack of documentation relating to identity in the form of the Civil Status ID (CSID), Iraqi Nationality Certificate (INC) and Public Distribution System (PDS) card (food ration card) is not ordinarily an insuperable problem, it is not a factor likely to make return to any part of Iraq unsafe or unreasonable. (a) The CSID is an important document, both in its own right and as a gateway to obtaining other significant documents such the INC and the PDS. An inability to replace the CSID is likely to entail inability to access the INC and PDS. (b) Although the general position is that a person who wishes to replace a lost CSID is required to return to their home area in order to do so, there are procedures as described in this determination available which make it possible (i) for Iraqis abroad to secure the issue of a new CSID to them through the offices of the local Iraqi Embassy; (ii) for Iraqis returned to Iraq without a CSID to obtain one without necessarily having to travel to their home area. Such procedures permit family members to obtain such documentation from their home areas on an applicant’s behalf or allow for a person to be given a power of attorney to obtain the same. Those who are unable immediately to establish their identity can ordinarily obtain documentation by being presented before a judge from the Civil Status Court , so as to facilitate return to their place of origin. (2) (a) Entry into and residence in the KRG can be effected by any Iraqi national with a CSID, INC and PDS, after registration with the Asayish (local security office). An Arab may need a sponsor; a Kurd will not. (b) Living conditions in the KRG for a person who has relocated there are not without difficulties, but there are jobs, and there is access to free health care facilities, education, rented accommodation and financial and other support from UNHCR. (3) Despite bureaucratic difficulties with registration and the difficulties faced by IDPs, it is wrong to say that there is, in general, no internal flight alternative in Iraq, bearing in mind in particular the levels of governmental and NGO support available. (4) Whilst the situation for women in Iraq is, in general, not such as to give rise to a real risk of persecution or serious harm, there may be particular problems affecting female headed households where family support is lacking and jobs and other means of support may be harder to come by. Careful examination of the particular circumstances of the individual’s case will be especially important.” 48. In HM2 the Tribunal concluded as follows: i. “Whilst the focus of the present decision is the current situation in Iraq , nothing in the further evidence now available indicates that the conclusions that the Tribunal in HM1 reached about country conditions in Iraq were wrong. ii. As regards the current situation, the evidence does not establish that the degree of indiscriminate violence characterising the current armed conflict taking place in the five central governorates in Iraq, namely Baghdad, Diyala, Tameen (Kirkuk), Ninewah, Salah Al-Din, is at such a high level that substantial grounds have been shown for believing that any civilian returned there would solely on account of his presence there face a real risk of being subject to that threat. iii. Nor does the evidence establish that there is a real risk of serious harm under Article 15(c) for civilians who are Sunni or Shi’a or Kurds or have former Ba’ath Party connections: these characteristics do not in themselves amount to “enhanced risk categories” under Article 15(c)’s “sliding scale” (see [39] of Elgafaji). iv. Further evidence that has become available since the Tribunal heard MK (documents - relocation) Iraq CG [2012] UKUT 126 (IAC) does not warrant any departure from its conclusions on internal relocation alternatives in the KRG or in central or southern Iraq save that the evidence is now sufficient to establish the existence of a Central Archive maintained by the Iraqi authorities retaining civil identity records on microfiche, which provides a further way in which a person can identify themselves and obtain a copy of their CSID, whether from abroad or within Iraq. v. Regarding the issue of whether there would be a risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR arising from returns from the UK to Baghdad International Airport (BIAP): a. If a national of Iraq who has failed to establish that conditions inside Iraq are unsafe is compulsorily returned to Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) on either a current or expired Iraqi passport, there is no real risk of detention in the course of BIAP procedures (except possibly in respect of those who are the subject of a judicial order or arrest warrant). Nor is there such a risk if such a person chooses to make a voluntary return with a laissez passer document which can be issued by the Iraqi embassy in the UK . b. If, however, such a person is compulsorily returned to BIAP without either a current or expired Iraqi passport, he may be at risk of detention in the course of BIAP procedures and it cannot be excluded that the detention conditions might give rise to a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR. Such a risk is however, purely academic in the UK context because under the current UK returns policy there will be no compulsory return of persons lacking such documents.” 49. The decisions in HM2 and MK were both the subject of appeal to the Court of Appeal, being heard together and referenced as HF ( Iraq