Case No. UKUT-00544-(IAC)

(and technical obstacles), 24/12/2014 the Home Office conclude that current return arrangements from the UK to Iraq, either via Erbil or Baghdad, do not breach Article 3 of the ECHR. However, at paragraph 1.4.3 thereof it also stated that “a person returned to Iraq who was unable to replace their Civil Status ID Card or Nationality Certificate would likely face significant difficulties in accessing services and a livelihood and would face destitution which is likely to reach the Article 3 threshold ”. 38. In its April 2015 guidance Iraq : Security situation in Baghdad , southern governorates and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq , , the Home Office state that: (i) The security situation has deteriorated in Baghdad , Babil, and the southern governorates, while the situation remains relatively stable in the IKR. However, the situation has not deteriorated to such an extent that it has reached a level where it can be said that in general the situation for ordinary civilians in these governorates breaches Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive. (ii) Decision makers should consider whether there are particular factors relevant to the person’s individual circumstances which might nevertheless place them at enhanced risk, particularly in Baghdad and Babil governorates; (iii) The security situation remains fluid and decision makers should take into account up-to-date country information in assessing the risks faced by applicants; (iv) Internal relocation may be a viable option but only if the risk is not present in the place of relocation and it would not be unduly harsh to expect a person to relocate. Each case must be considered on its individual merits. 39. In relation to Baghdad in particular it is concluded that “there currently exists a state of internal armed conflict between ISIL and the Government of Iraq and its allies in Iraq, with the violence principally in northern, central and western areas of Iraq” , and “although recent successes by Kurdish, GoI and US-Coalition forces have pushed back ISIL from territories it occupied in mid-2014 and degraded its military capabilities, ISIL remains in control of parts of the country, although not in Baghdad governorate. ISIL continues to perpetrate attacks in Baghdad governorate, with an ultimate goal of securing its so-called ‘Caliphate state’ in Iraq and Syria ” . 40. It further said that “there are a range of armed actors currently operating in Baghdad governorate, including Shiite and Sunni militias, extremist Islamic groups including ISIL, organised criminal gangs as well as Iraqi security forces. However, there were no reports that ISIL, or other Sunni extremist groups, exercise de facto control in any district of Baghdad City or Baghdad Governorate” . 41. As to the southern governorates, it is opined that the security situation in the governorates of Basra , Kerbala, Najaf, Muthanna, Thi-Qar, Missan, Quadissiya and Wassit remained relatively stable in 2014 and that in general return there would not give rise to a breach of Article 15(c). Similarly, in relation to the IKR, it said that the security situation in the governorates of Erbil , Sulamaniyah and Dahuk was stable in 2014 with low levels of violence. 42. Finally in relation to Babil the Respondent concludes in her Country Information and Guidance titled ‘Iraq: Security situation in Baghdad, southern governorates and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)’ that “there has been a deterioration in the security situation in Babil governorate since 2012 and 2013 ” and that “the government maintains control over the majority of the governorate, including the northern part of Babil around Jurf Al-Sakhr, which was previously an ISIL strong-hold from which it launched attacks on the surrounding area and manufactured car bombs. By the end of 2014 ISIL’s presence in Jurf A-Sakhr had been cleared, with insurgents routed further north. This military success had improved the security situation considerably. However there remained a risk of further violence, both from renewed armed conflict and as a result of IEDs left behind by insurgents” . 43. At paragraph 1.3.25 it is further said that “ while levels of violence have increased in Babil compared to previous years, conditions have not deteriorated to the extent that a person returning there would face a breach of Article 15(c)” . However, it adds that “while in general a return to Babil would not breach Article 15(c), decision makers must also consider whether there are particular factors relevant to the person’s individual circumstances which might nevertheless place them at risk. Such factors include – but are not limited to – the person’s age, gender, health, ethnicity, religion, sect, disability and profession. Some persons, especially those who reside in areas where they are a minority, may face a heightened risk of indiscriminate violence” . UNHCR’s position paper 44. The UNHCR’s view on returns to Iraq is set out in its position paper of 27 October 2014, the conclusion to which reads: “[27] As the situation in Iraq remains highly fluid and volatile, and since all parts of the country are reported to have been affected, directly or indirectly, by the ongoing crisis, UNHCR urges States not to forcibly return persons originating from Iraq until tangible improvements in the security and human rights situation have occurred. In the current circumstances, many persons fleeing Iraq are likely to meet the 1951 Convention criteria for refugee status. When, in the context of an adjudication of an individual case of a person originating from Iraq , 1951 Convention criteria are found not to apply, broader refugee criteria as contained in the relevant regional instruments or complementary forms of protection are likely to apply. In the current circumstances, with massive new internal displacement coupled with a large scale humanitarian crisis, mounting sectarian tensions and reported access restrictions, particularly into the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, UNHCR does in principle not consider it appropriate for States to deny persons from Iraq international protection on the basis of applicability of an internal flight alternative or relocation alternative.” Existing Country Guidance 45. The core of the current country guidance relating to the circumstances in Iraq dates back to the decision in HM and Others (Article 15(c)) Iraq CG [2010] UKUT 00331 (IAC) (“HM1”) in which the Tribunal concluded (i) that enforced returns to Iraq could take place because the degree of indiscriminate violence did not reach such a high level in any part of Iraq so as to show substantial grounds for believing that any civilian returned there would face a real risk within the meaning of Article 15(c); and, (ii) even if such a risk were to be shown to exist in some areas of Iraq, internal relocation would achieve safety and would not in all circumstances be unduly harsh. 46. HM1 was successfully appealed to the Court of Appeal; however, the court did not consider it necessary to deal with any of the substantive grounds but rather allowed the appeal on purely procedural grounds. There then followed two further country guidance decisions relating to Iraq : MK (promulgated on 23 April 2012) and HM2 (promulgated on 23 November 2012). 47. The headnote to MK reads: “ (1) Since the lack of documentation relating to identity in the form of the Civil Status ID (CSID), Iraqi Nationality Certificate (INC) and Public Distribution System (PDS) card (food ration card) is not ordinarily an insuperable problem, it is not a factor likely to make return to any part of Iraq unsafe or unreasonable. (a) The CSID is an important document, both in its own right and as a gateway to obtaining other significant documents such the INC and the PDS. An inability to replace the CSID is likely to entail inability to access the INC and PDS. (b) Although the general position is that a person who wishes to replace a lost CSID is required to return to their home area in order to do so, there are procedures as described in this determination available which make it possible (i) for Iraqis abroad to secure the issue of a new CSID to them through the offices of the local Iraqi Embassy; (ii) for Iraqis returned to Iraq without a CSID to obtain one without necessarily having to travel to their home area. Such procedures permit family members to obtain such documentation from their home areas on an applicant’s behalf or allow for a person to be given a power of attorney to obtain the same. Those who are unable immediately to establish their identity can ordinarily obtain documentation by being presented before a judge from the Civil Status Court , so as to facilitate return to their place of origin. (2) (a) Entry into and residence in the KRG can be effected by any Iraqi national with a CSID, INC and PDS, after registration with the Asayish (local security office). An Arab may need a sponsor; a Kurd will not. (b) Living conditions in the KRG for a person who has relocated there are not without difficulties, but there are jobs, and there is access to free health care facilities, education, rented accommodation and financial and other support from UNHCR. (3) Despite bureaucratic difficulties with registration and the difficulties faced by IDPs, it is wrong to say that there is, in general, no internal flight alternative in Iraq, bearing in mind in particular the levels of governmental and NGO support available. (4) Whilst the situation for women in Iraq is, in general, not such as to give rise to a real risk of persecution or serious harm, there may be particular problems affecting female headed households where family support is lacking and jobs and other means of support may be harder to come by. Careful examination of the particular circumstances of the individual’s case will be especially important.” 48. In HM2 the Tribunal concluded as follows: i. “Whilst the focus of the present decision is the current situation in Iraq , nothing in the further evidence now available indicates that the conclusions that the Tribunal in HM1 reached about country conditions in Iraq were wrong. ii. As regards the current situation, the evidence does not establish that the degree of indiscriminate violence characterising the current armed conflict taking place in the five central governorates in Iraq, namely Baghdad, Diyala, Tameen (Kirkuk), Ninewah, Salah Al-Din, is at such a high level that substantial grounds have been shown for believing that any civilian returned there would solely on account of his presence there face a real risk of being subject to that threat. iii. Nor does the evidence establish that there is a real risk of serious harm under Article 15(c) for civilians who are Sunni or Shi’a or Kurds or have former Ba’ath Party connections: these characteristics do not in themselves amount to “enhanced risk categories” under Article 15(c)’s “sliding scale” (see [39] of Elgafaji). iv. Further evidence that has become available since the Tribunal heard MK (documents - relocation) Iraq CG [2012] UKUT 126 (IAC) does not warrant any departure from its conclusions on internal relocation alternatives in the KRG or in central or southern Iraq save that the evidence is now sufficient to establish the existence of a Central Archive maintained by the Iraqi authorities retaining civil identity records on microfiche, which provides a further way in which a person can identify themselves and obtain a copy of their CSID, whether from abroad or within Iraq. v. Regarding the issue of whether there would be a risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR arising from returns from the UK to Baghdad International Airport (BIAP): a. If a national of Iraq who has failed to establish that conditions inside Iraq are unsafe is compulsorily returned to Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) on either a current or expired Iraqi passport, there is no real risk of detention in the course of BIAP procedures (except possibly in respect of those who are the subject of a judicial order or arrest warrant). Nor is there such a risk if such a person chooses to make a voluntary return with a laissez passer document which can be issued by the Iraqi embassy in the UK . b. If, however, such a person is compulsorily returned to BIAP without either a current or expired Iraqi passport, he may be at risk of detention in the course of BIAP procedures and it cannot be excluded that the detention conditions might give rise to a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR. Such a risk is however, purely academic in the UK context because under the current UK returns policy there will be no compulsory return of persons lacking such documents.” 49. The decisions in HM2 and MK were both the subject of appeal to the Court of Appeal, being heard together and referenced as HF ( Iraq ) and others [2013] EWCA Civ 1276. The appeals against the decisions in HM2 were dismissed and although the court allowed the appeal against the decision in MK it rejected the arguments directed at the country guidance set out therein. The Submissions – A Summary 50. The parties submitted detailed skeleton arguments, which we summarise below. Each supplemented their skeleton argument with oral submissions. Appellant’s skeleton argument 51. In his skeleton argument Mr Bazini observed the Respondent’s acceptance that the “contested areas of Iraq should be considered as meeting the circumstances of internal armed conflict” . As a consequence, he identified the core issue before the Tribunal to be that of internal relocation from the contested areas to either Baghdad or to the Iraqi Kurdish Region. 52. It is said that the situation in Baghdad represents an Article 15(c) risk for an ordinary civilian; there being an enhanced risk for: (i) persons without established connections to Baghdad ; (ii) Kurds; and, (iii) Christians. There is no established Kurdish neighbourhood in Baghdad . 53. It was asserted that a pivotal issue in the assessment of whether it is reasonable for an Iraqi national to relocate is whether such person has Iraqi identity documents; a CSID being the gateway to other important documentation such an Iraqi Nationality Certificate (“INC”) and a Public Distribution System (“PDS”) card. Without a CSID it is not possible for a person to access either services or a livelihood. 54. Reference is made to Dr Fatah’s report of 27 February 2015 to the steps required to obtain a new CSID by a person living outside of Iraq . It is said that this includes the need to provide the reference number of a lost CSID. An original CSID and INC are required to obtain an Iraqi passport. Applications to obtain a laissez-passer are, and have been since November 2014, assessed on a case-by-case basis. 55. A person cannot be expected to travel from Baghdad to their home area in order to obtain a CSID and other documents, if the home area is a contested area. Evidence set out in Dr Fatah’s addendum report of 1 May 2015 identifies the difficulties that will be met by a person seeking to obtain a replacement CSID and/or INC in Baghdad , if that person is not from Baghdad . 56. As to internal relocation to Baghdad , it was submitted that this governorate is statistically the most violent, there having been an increase in violence in the governorate in 2014 and early 2015. A person “will struggle” in Baghdad if not an Arabic speaker and if he/she has no social network to assist in accessing employment and housing. 57. It was further asserted that if a person is returned to Erbil in the IKR and that person is not from the IKR, then such person will not be allowed to exit the airport absent production of a CSID and INC. In any event the IKR authorities do not allow persons from the disputed territories to transfer a food ration card to the IKR. Without a CSID and INC a person will have difficulties in accessing services provided by the state and its partners, in addition it is IKR policy to maintain as much Kurdish presence as possible in the disputed territories so as to strengthen its claim to those areas. There are other ‘elements’ which also govern the authorities entry policy to the IKR: (i) “Event driven nature” – there being greater difficulties faced by single travellers because of the conflict and restrictions have also been put in place to stem the flow of IDPs, (ii) “Ethno-religious nature” – members of particular communities (such as Sunni Arabs) being tarred by association with ISIL and (iii) “Arbitrary nature” – policies applied at checkpoints are unpredictable. In any event, unemployment is high in IKR and IDPs struggle to find work, public sector salaries are not being paid and there has been a suspension of investment in economic projects. 58. As regards the Appellant, he will not be able to obtain identity documentation in Baghdad and, in any event, he cannot access food rations there because these can only be accessed in the home governorate or by returning to the home governorate and transferring access elsewhere. Appellant’s oral submissions 59. Mr Bazini observed that the Appellant has been found to come from Dubis in the Kirkuk Governorate, which is now one of the contested areas. He accepted that the Immigration Judge had found that there was no reliable evidence that the Appellant’s mother and siblings had left Iraq and, also, that the Appellant had a cousin based in Kirkuk . He submitted, however, that given the change of circumstances in Kirkuk since the date of the judge’s determination it is now reasonably likely that the Appellant’s family members are not in Iraq , are not contactable and would not be able to assist him. 60. Mr Bazini commended to us the inclusive approach to Article 15(c) adopted by the Tribunal in HM2 ; observing the Tribunal’s reference at [271] to the need for a qualitative as well as a quantitative approach when assessing the levels of indiscriminative violence in Iraq . He further alluded to the Tribunal’s identification that “one aspect of the inclusive approach is an appreciation that there are threats to the physical safety and integrity of civilians beyond those measured in the civilian casualty rate” at [114] – submitting that the situation in Iraq is now very different to that referred to in HM2 , with much of the violence aimed at civilians in order to bring about fear in the community. 61. It was further submitted that the appeal should not be determined on the basis that a person would be returning to Iraq with a CSID, or the necessary documentation to obtain one, because to do so would not be consistent with the proper application of Article 8 of the Qualification Directive. 62. He continued by submitting that Sunnis had been pushed to the west of Baghdad and are at greater risk. There is no established Kurdish community in Baghdad , making Kurds vulnerable. There had been a rapid increase in the level of indiscriminate violence in Iraq and the economic growth rate had dropped by 2.4 or 2.6% - the drop in oil prices being significant. As a consequence, IDPs are facing shortages of food, accommodation and medical care. 63. As to the issue of re-documentation, it was said that little was known about the Central Archive in Baghdad , including how long it would take to obtain documentation from there; if indeed it can be obtained at all. Reference was made to evidence provided by UNHCR-Iraq cited in Dr Fatah’s second report [paragraph 144 therein] – it being observed that as many as 45% of IDPs surveyed reported that at least one family member was missing their CSID, and that 48% were missing their INC. Only 10% of persons missing documents had tried to replace them in their area of displacement, with 35% successfully doing so. It was suggested by Mr Bazini that it should be inferred from this evidence that it is not easy to replace missing status documents. 64. The Tribunal’s attention was thereafter drawn to passages in Dr Fatah’s reports in furtherance of the submission that it is difficult for IDPs to obtain new status documents. In relation to the Central Archive, it was observed that there was no information regarding how the archive works, how many people work in the archive office, the output of the office, the success rate of those seeking documents from there and how the need to obtain information from the contested areas might hinder their work. 65. Assuming that the Appellant is able to obtain a CSID from Baghdad the process of doing so would, suggested Mr Bazini , take over a month. He submitted that in such circumstances the situation the Appellant would be living in prior to receipt of the CSID would amount to a breach of Article 3. There was very little evidence about what the Appellant would be entitled to under the Assisted Voluntary Return scheme. The leaflet produced by the Secretary of State indicated only that a person may be entitled to support and assistance and does not explain how the money had to be spent. It was also observed that Dr Fatah had confirmed that the Appellant would need $800 - $1,000 a month to stay in a hotel or to rent a room 66. Neither the UNHCR nor Amnesty International support the possibility of internal relocation in Iraq . The security situation in Baghdad is poor. The percentage of the population injured or killed in governorates other than Baghdad is generally lower than in Baghdad . Amnesty International are of the opinion that Baghdad is very dangerous. ISIL are only 70 km from Baghdad and the population are living in fear. Abductions occur throughout the city. Kurds receive threats from Shi’a militias. 67. Turning to the IKR, the Tribunal’s attention was drawn to evidence provided by Dr Fatah to the effect that food prices and the cost of living had increased in the IKR, civil servants salaries had not been paid for a month there and there are 3 million IDPs in temporary shelters. The aid agencies only have limited funds. The conditions for an IDP in the IKR are unduly harsh. Respondent’s skeleton argument 68. The Respondent accepts that the overall security situation in Iraq has deteriorated since HM2 . Mr Blundell summarised the Respondent’s position on the issue of whether an Article 15(c) risk exists in Iraq in the following terms (i) There currently exists a state of internal armed conflict between the GoI and ISIL, with violence principally in the northern, central and western areas of the country; (ii) In parts of Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk (Tameen), Ninewah and Salah Al-din governorates, which are occupied by ISIL or where there is open conflict between GoI and ISIL (the contested areas), the Respondent accepts that Article 15(c) would apply to a civilian with no distinguishing characteristics (“an ordinary civilian”) simply by virtue of his/her presence there; (iii) In Babil governorate, the security situation has deteriorated but not to such an extent that an ordinary civilian would face an Article 15(c) risk there; (iv) In the governorates of Basra, Kerbala, Najaf, Muthana, Thi-Qar, Missan, Qadissiya and Wassit (“the southern governorates”), the security situation has remained relatively stable and would not be sufficient to demonstrate an Article 15(c) risk for an ordinary civilian: (v) In Baghdad city and Baghdad governorate the security situation has deteriorated but not to such an extent that an ordinary civilian, merely on account of his presence there, would face an Article 15(c) risk; and, (vi) The situation in the IKR remains stable and does not engage Article 15(c). (vii) Status as a Sunni, Shia or Kurd is not, of itself, sufficient to give rise to an Article 15(c) risk in any of the governorates in which there is otherwise no Article 15(c) risk for ordinary civilians. 69. As regards internal relocation to Baghdad for those who can demonstrate an Article 15(c) risk in their home area, the Respondent submits as follows in relation to the security situation in Baghdad : (i) There is a 0.05% civilian death rate, 0.12% civilian injury rate and, therefore, a 0.17% civilian casualty rate in Baghdad . These figures do not indicate a serious risk for an ordinary civilian; (ii) There has been a significant net migration of 260,000 persons into Baghdad by displaced persons – the evidence demonstrating that Sunnis in particular are moving to the capital. This is a strong indication that, from the perspective of Iraqis, the security situation in Baghdad is not seen as posing a risk of serious harm; (iii) The night time curfew in Baghdad has recently been lifted, thus supporting the fact that there is no Article 15(c) risk there; (iv) The evidence confirms that no particular groups are at risk in Baghdad and there are no particular hotspots; (v) To the extent that there are incidents of violence in Baghdad governorate, the situation in Baghdad city is more stable than in the surrounding Baghdad Belts. The attacks in Baghdad city are of a more limited nature than those in the suburbs. (vi) The situation in Baghdad Belts does not engage Article 15(c), although it is accepted that it does carry a higher risk than the city itself. 70. At paragraph 50 of the skeleton argument, the Respondent reproduces the following passage from her December 2014 Guidance Note: “ A person returned to Iraq who was unable to replace their Civil Status ID Card or Nationality Certificate would be likely to face significant difficulties in accessing services and a livelihood and would face destitution which is likely to reach the Article 3 threshold.” 71. The Respondent further identifies that returns to Baghdad will only take place if a person has either a current passport, expired passport or a laissez-passer, which will involve pre-clearance with the Iraqi authorities and hence confirmation of Iraqi identity. The Tribunal’s attention was thereafter drawn to the December 2014 Country Information Guidance Note on Iraq . 72. On the issue of the existence of a Central Archive in Baghdad , the Respondent agrees that Dr Fatah’s third report provides a fair summary of the position. It is possible in certain circumstances to obtain replacement civil documentation in Baghdad . There are two alternative offices for civil status affairs - in Baghdad and Najaf – where IDPs from Mosul , Anbar and Salahaddin can obtain replacement documentation. An individual appellant would have to demonstrate why they did not have their documents, how they were able to leave Iraq without them and why they had been unable to reacquire these documents from the UK . It is asserted, however, that consideration of the position of ‘undocumented returns’ is academic because a person will be returned to Baghdad with a passport, expired passport, or laissez-passer – the latter requiring a person’s identity to be proven to the Iraqi consulate before it is issued. 73. The Respondent’s position on internal relocation to the IKR is as set out at paragraphs 1.3.58 to 1.3.61 of the December CIG i.e. that it is not unreasonable or unduly harsh for persons originating from outside the IKR to internally relocate there. Persons of Kurdish ethnicity do not require a sponsor to enter the IKR and would not be perceived as a security risk. It is accepted that where a person has no established links to the IKR and is of Arab or Turkmen ethnic origin, internal relocation will be difficult even if identity documents are in order. A sponsor may be required and entry may be refused due to security concerns. 74. In relation to the Appellant, the Respondent accepted that there would be an Article 15(c) risk to him in the Kirkuk region but submitted that it would not be unreasonable for him to relocate to either Baghdad , the southern governorates or the IKR. Respondent’s oral submissions 75. The concession made in the Respondent’s skeleton argument as to the Article 15(c) risk to ordinary persons in the contested areas was maintained. 76. Mr Blundell submitted that when considering whether an Article 15(c) risk arose in areas other than the ‘contested areas’, the Tribunal’s focus should be on the intensity of the violence. Whilst accepting that the Tribunal’s approach must be holistic/inclusive he asserted that the data relating to the numbers of civilians injured or killed should serve as a “gateway” to such an analysis. Reliance was placed on the Court of Appeal’s decision in QD (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees intervening) [2009] EWCA Civ 620 at [21] in this regard. 77. The Respondent accepted that the security situation in Iraq has deteriorated recently, but observed that the current level of violence is nowhere near the peak in 2006-7, nor is it anything like the level of violence that exists in Syria . It was further noted that the curfew in Baghdad had recently been lifted and that Dr Fatah had accepted that there had not been any wave of violence as a consequence. There is not an Article 15(c) risk within Baghdad city or the Baghdad Belts. Dr Fatah agreed that ISIL were not in control of Baghdad and that, although fighting was more pronounced in the Baghdad Belts, it could not operate there or exert influence there because there was so much military opposition to it. 78. Mr Blundell thereafter accepted that there were no specific Kurdish areas in Baghdad but, nevertheless, asserted that it would still be reasonable to expect a person of Kurdish origin to relocate there. 79. As to documentation, it was confirmed that the Iraqi authorities would only grant entry to a person returned to Baghdad if that person is in possession of a laissez-passer, a current Iraqi passport or an expired Iraqi passport. Dr Fatah accepted that if a person were returned with a passport or expired passport these could be used to obtain a CSID. If a person were to be returned on a laissez-passer that person would either have a CSID or have the sort of documents required to get one, because it would have been necessary for such person to produce these documents to obtain the laissez-passer. A CSID can be obtained from the UK . It was said that in such circumstances the Tribunal should consider the appeal on the hypothetical basis that the Appellant will have a CSID upon return. In any event, there is a Central Archive in Baghdad that can issue documentation. 80. Mr Blundell submitted that the evidence demonstrates that a majority of IDPs in Baghdad live with family members there. Returnees receive assistance under the Voluntary Assisted Return and Reintegration Programme (‘VARRP’). A ‘Start Card’ containing the first £500 [of a possible maximum of £1,500], is provided at the airport as the returnee leaves. This can be used to withdraw the £500 from a bank machine upon return. The rest of the funds can usually be accessed through partner organisations in the country of return, who will use it to give the returnee support and assistance after he or she returns. It was submitted that the Appellant could use this money to obtain accommodation on his return; if need be, in any period prior to obtaining a CSID and other papers, the Appellant could rely on Iraqi and international assistance. Life goes on in Baghdad and it is not unreasonable for a person to internally relocate there. 81. Returns from the UK to the IKR take place on EU letters. A person not originally from the IKR would not be returned there. Returnees are pre-cleared with the IKR authorities. Identity is assured in advance. 82. As to the instant appellant, he would be returned to Baghdad . He could fly from Baghdad to Erbil and would not require a sponsor to enter given his Kurdish ethnicity. He has family in Iraq who could assist in the re-documentation process. It should not be assumed that they have moved on or that they cannot be contacted. Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive Legal Framework 83. Article 15 of the Directive provides as follows: “Serious harm consists of (a) death penalty or execution; (b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an Applicant in the country of origin; and (c) serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict.” 84. Article 15 is applied by Article 2(e) of the Directive which defines a person eligible for subsidiary protection as: “… a third country national or stateless person who does not qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin … would face a real risk of suffering serious harm as defined in Article 15 … and is unable, or, owing to such risk unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of the country.” 85. Paragraph 339C of the Immigration Rules HC 395 (“the Immigration Rules”) gives effect to Article 15(c) in domestic law, providing as follows: “339C. A person will be granted humanitarian protection in the United Kingdom if the Secretary of State is satisfied that: (i) he is in the United Kingdom or has arrived at a port of entry in the United Kingdom; (ii) he does not qualify as a refugee as defined in regulation 2 of The Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006; (iii) substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if he returned to the country of return, would face a real risk of suffering serious harm and is unable, or, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; and (iv) he is not excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection. Serious harm consists of: (i) the death penalty of execution; (ii) unlawful killing; (iii) torture or inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment of a person in the country of return; or (iv) serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international and internal armed conflict.” 86. The Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”), the Court of Appeal and the Upper Tribunal have given extensive consideration to Article 15(c) of the Directive and we gratefully adopt the summary of learning to be derived therefrom set out by the Upper Tribunal in its recent country guidance case on returns to Somalia – MOJ & Ors (return to Mogadishu) Somalia CG [2014] UKUT 00442 (IAC) at [30] – [33]: “30. …There are now two decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) which deal with Article 15(c): Case (C-465/07) Elgafaji v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [2009] 1 WLR 2100 , and Case (C-285/12) Diakite v Commissaire general aux refugies [2014] WLR(D) 37… 4 ; 31. In Elgafaji, the ECJ construed Article 15(c) as dealing with a more general risk of harm than that covered by 15(a) and (b). The essence of the Court’s ruling in Elgafaji was: ’43. Having regard to all of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the questions referred is that Article 15(c) of the Directive, in conjunction with Article 2(e) of the Directive, must be interpreted as meaning that: the existence of a serious and individual threat to the life or person of an applicant for subsidiary protection is not subject to the condition that that applicant adduce evidence that he is specifically targeted by reason of factors particular to his personal circumstances; the existence of such a threat can exceptionally be considered to be established where the degree of indiscriminate violence characterising the armed conflict taking place assessed by the competent national authorities before which an application for subsidiary protection is made, or by the courts of a Member State to which a decision refusing such an application is referred reaches such a high level that substantial grounds are shown for believing that a civilian, returned to the relevant country or, as the case may be, to the relevant region, would, solely on account of his presence on the territory of that country or region, face a real risk of being subject to that threat.’ 32. In Diakite, the Court, having provided a definition of internal armed conflict at [28], reaffirmed in [30] its view that for civilians as such to qualify for protection under Article 15(c) they would need to demonstrate that indiscriminate violence was at a high level: ’30. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that the existence of an internal armed conflict can be a cause for granting subsidiary protection only where confrontations between a State’s armed forces and one or more armed groups or between two or more armed groups are exceptionally considered to create a serious and individual threat to the life or person of an applicant for subsidiary protection for the purposes of Article 15(c) of Directive 2004/83 because the degree of indiscriminate violence which characterises those confrontations reaches such a high level that substantial grounds are shown for believing that a civilian, if returned to the relevant country or, as the case may be, to the relevant region, would – solely on account of his presence in the territory of that country or region – face a real risk of being subject to that threat (see, to that effect, Elgafaji, paragraph 43).’ At [31] the Court reaffirmed the view it expressed in Elgafaji at [39] that Article 15(c) also contains (what UNHCR has termed) a “sliding scale” such that “the more the applicant is able to show that he is specifically affected by reason of factors particular to his personal circumstances, the lower the level of indiscriminate violence required for him to be eligible for subsidiary protection.” The Court thereby recognised that a person may still be accorded protection even when the general level of violence is not very high if they are able to show that there are specific reasons, over and above them being mere civilians, for being affected by the indiscriminate violence. In this way the Article 15(c) inquiry is two-pronged: (a) it asks whether the level of violence is so high that there is a general risk to all civilians; (b) it asks that even if there is not such a general risk, there is a specific risk based on the “sliding-scale” notion. 33. In the United Kingdom, the principal decision of the higher courts dealing with Article 15(c) remains QD (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] 1 WLR 689 . QD helpfully explains and indicates how Elgafaji should be applied. In addition we have the guidance set out in HM and others (Article 15(c) Iraq CG [2012] UKUT 409 (IAC). At [42]-[45] of HM (Iraq) the Tribunal stated that: ‘42. We recognise that the threat to life or person of an individual need not come directly from armed conflict. It will suffice that the result of such conflict is a breakdown of law and order which has the effect of creating the necessary risk. It is obvious that the risk is most likely to result from indiscriminate bombings or shootings. These can properly be regarded as indiscriminate in the sense that, albeit they may have specific or general targets, they inevitably expose the ordinary civilian who happens to be at the scene to what has been described in argument as collateral damage. By specific targets, we refer to individuals or gatherings of individuals such as army or police officers. The means adopted may be bombs, which can affect others besides the target, or shootings, which produce a lesser but nonetheless real risk of collateral damage. By general targets we refer to more indiscriminate attacks on, for example, Sunnis or Shi’as or vice versa. Such attacks can involve explosions of bombs in crowded places such as markets or where religious processions or gatherings are taking place. 43. The CJEU requires us to decide whether the degree of indiscriminate violence characterising the armed conflict taking place reaches such a high level as to show the existence for an ordinary civilian of a real risk of serious harm in the country or in a particular region. When we refer below to the “Article 15(c) threshold”, this is what we have in mind. Thus it is necessary to assess whether the level of violence is such as to meet the test… 44. In HM1 at [73] the Tribunal decided that an attempt to distinguish between a real risk of targeted and incidental killing of civilians during armed conflict was not a helpful exercise. We agree, but in assessing whether the risk reaches the level required by the CJEU, focus on the evidence about the numbers of civilians killed or wounded is obviously of prime importance. Thus we have been told that each death can be multiplied up to seven times when considering injuries to bystanders. This is somewhat speculative and it must be obvious that the risk of what has been called collateral damage will differ depending on the nature of the killing. A bomb is likely to cause far greater “collateral damage” than an assassination by shooting. But the incidence and numbers of death are a helpful starting point. 45. The harm in question must be serious enough to merit medical treatment. It is not limited to physical harm and can include serious mental harm such as, for example, post-traumatic stress disorder. We repeat and adopt what the Tribunal said in HM1 at [80]: “In our judgment the nexus between the generalised armed conflict and the indiscriminate violence posing a real risk to life or person is met when the intensity of the conflict involves means of combat (whether permissible under the laws of war or not) that seriously endanger non-combatants as well as result in such a general breakdown of law and order as to permit anarchy and criminality occasioning the serious harm referred to in the Directive. Such violence is indiscriminate in effect even if not necessarily in aim. As the French Conseil d’Etat observed in Baskarathas , it is not necessary for the threat to life or person to derive from protagonists in the armed conflict in question: it can simply be a product of the breakdown of law and order.” ‘ “ Article 15(c) - Discussion and Conclusions 87. As identified above, the instant appeal was remitted by the Court of Appeal to the Upper Tribunal for reconsideration under Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive. The burden of proof rests on the Appellant, albeit the standard of proof is low. 88. Given that this is a Country Guidance decision, and is restricted to consideration of Article 15(c), it is prudent first to reiterate the following observation made by this Tribunal in HM2 : “260. Our primary focus in these appeals is strictly confined to Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive, and a discrete issue relating to risk on return to BIAP. However, since this case deals with the current situation in Iraq it will inevitably be a reference point for decision-makers deciding asylum-related appeals brought by Iraqis that are not confined to the Article 15(c) issue. In this context we would reiterate the observations made recently by the Tribunal in AK (Afghanistan ) at [154]-[156] that in the general run of appeals decision-makers should ordinarily deal first with the issue of refugee eligibility and only deal with the issue of subsidiary protection (including Article 15(c)) second. They should not deal with Article 3 until last.” 89. Both parties accepted that we should take an inclusive approach to our consideration of Article 15(c). This was the approach adopted by the Tribunal in both HM1 and HM2 as well as in numerous other country guidance decisions of this Tribunal. We remind ourselves that such an approach requires an analysis of the violence that is both qualitative and quantitative and is not to be restricted to a purely quantitative analysis of the number of civilian deaths and injuries in Iraq, or in any particular governorate within Iraq. The list of factors relevant to such an analysis is non-exhaustive but includes within them the conduct, and relevant strength, of the parties to the conflict (see, for example, AK (Article 15(c)) Afghanistan CG [2012] UKUT 00163 at [163]), the number of civilian deaths and injuries; including psychological injuries caused by the conflict, the level of displacement and the geographical scope of the conflict. 90. Turning to the evidence, we found Dr Fatah to be an impressive and authoritative witness. He demonstrated extensive knowledge of the circumstances in Iraq and sought, wherever possible, to provide multiple sources for the evidence he provided, which was to a large extent consistent with the other materials placed before us. When giving oral evidence he clearly identified those parts of his evidence which called for speculation on his part. In all the circumstances we attach significant weight to Dr Fatah’s evidence. 91. The landscape in Iraq has undoubtedly changed since HM2 was heard in October 2012, with the rise of the ISIL - the main insurgent group now operating in the country. This group was established by the Jordanian national Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 1999 – originally being known as Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad . In October 2004 it became known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq and was identified as such by the Tribunal in HM2 . 92. In April 2013 its current leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, changed the group’s name to Al-Dawla Al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham – the “Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham”; al-Sham referring to an undefined region around Syria which translates into English as “The Levant”- thus the use of the acronym ISIL 5 . 93. In June 2014, after a major military offensive, ISIL seized control of the northern city of Mosul and shortly thereafter declared the existence of an Islamic State across parts of northern Iraq and Syria. 94. The UNHCR, in its October 2014 report “UNHCR Positions on Returns to Iraq” summarised the situation thus: “Iraq has experienced a new surge in violence between Iraqi security forces (ISF) and Kurdish forces (Peshmerga) on the one hand and the group “Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham” (hereafter ISIS), which operates both in Iraq and Syria, and affiliated armed groups on the other hand. Civilians are killed and wounded every day as a result of this surge of violence, including suicide attacks and car bombs, shelling, airstrikes, and executions. As a result of advances by ISIS, the Government of Iraq is reported to have lost full or partial control over considerable parts of the country’s territory, particularly in Al-Anbar, Ninewa, Salah Al-Din, Kirkuk and Diyala governorates. Although the ISF and Kurdish forces, supported by US airstrikes, have recently regained control over some localities, mostly along the internal boundaries with the Kurdistan Region, overall frontlines remain fluid. The conflict, which re-escalated in Al Anbar governorate in January 2014 and since then spread to other governorates, has been labelled as a non-international armed conflict. Casualties so far in 2014 represent the highest total since the height of sectarian conflict in 2006-2007.” 95. The objectives of ISIL, so far as they can be ascertained, are threefold: (a) To permanently break down political boundaries in Iraq, Syria and the surrounding region; (b) To establish the Islamic Emirate by controlling terrain across Syria and Iraq, governing within the terrain and defending its external borders; and, (c) To expand the territory of the Emirate and connect it to the wider Muslim community. 96. ISIL is said to have significant financial resources, with funding from individuals in Arab Gulf states, together with income from oil fields it controls and from smuggling and extortion (BBC, 30 June 2014) 97. Dr Fatah observes that in addition to ISIL there are four other anti-GoI groups operating in Iraq; the Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandi (JRTN) movement, the Mujahideen Shura Council, the Revolutionary tribes and Ansar al-Sunni . He also avers that there are eight pro-GoI Shia militia groups and four pro-GoI Sunni militia groups operating in Iraq – as well as a number of foreign forces. 98. The evidence provides a range of figures for deaths and casualties in Iraq during 2014 and early 2015. Before summarising those statistics we sound the same note of caution as was sounded in both HM1 [117] and HM2 [107] in seeking to rely on any particular survey: “Because the estimates of Iraqi casualties contained in this report are based on varying time periods and have been created using different methodologies, readers should exercise caution when using them and should look to them as guideposts rather than as statements of fact.” 99. Iraq Body Count, whose figures Dr Fatah relies upon and were found by the Tribunal in HM2 to be most reliable because of their multiple sourcing [110], record that 17,049 civilians were killed in Iraq during 2014, this being almost double the figure for 2013, which itself was roughly double the figure recorded for 2012. As of 18 February 2015, Iraq Body Count (IBC) had recorded 2,245 civilians deaths in 2015. According to IBC, civilian deaths peaked in 2006 and 2007 at 29400 and 25968 deaths respectively. 100. The GoI record 15,538 civilian deaths in 2014, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) record 12,282 such deaths (April 2015 CIG) or 10,187 (Dr Fatah’s first report) and Musings on Iraq record 17,098 deaths, both over the same period. The number of civilian casualties recorded by the same organisations ranged from 22,000 (GoI) to 26,590 (Musing on Iraq). IBC broke down its record of civilian deaths into three categories – 1,748 deaths caused by Iraqi airstrikes, 4,325 at the hands of ISIL and 10,858 deaths where it was not possible to establish which of the ‘actors’ were involved. The Contested Areas - the governorates of Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk (aka Ta’min), Ninewah and Salah Al-din 101. The contested area is formed of the governorates listed above to the north and west of Baghdad, excluding those in the IKR. 102. We need say little about the situation for ordinary civilians in the contested areas, given the concession made by the Respondent. It is enough for us to identify that the security situation in these areas remains volatile. Following its offensive in June 2014 ISIL took occupation of significant parts of these areas; however, the GoI and its allies subsequently retook a number or towns/areas within these governorates. Nevertheless, ISIL still holds control of key urban areas and on the day prior to the hearing of this appeal took occupation of the strategic town of Ramadi, in the Anbar governorate – 70 miles west of Baghdad. 103. Life in the areas controlled by ISIL is characterised by systematic and widespread acts of violence and gross violations of international humanitarian law and abuses of human rights. Among ISIL victims in areas under its control are those Sunni Muslims who refuse to live by its rules. In its attempts to gain increased occupation of the contested areas ISIL has directly targeted civilians and civilian infrastructures. Although figures for the civilian deaths and injuries in the contested areas have been put before us, we accept the rationality of Amnesty International’s view on such statistics i.e. that “it is difficult to establish the true scale of killings and abductions that ISIS have committed…Accurate casualty figures are very hard to come by for all areas of Iraq, owing to the nature of the conflict and the risks faced by investigators. ” Whilst we accept this is likely to be true country-wide, it must be particularly so within the areas of ISIL control; given the obvious difficulties of accessing the contested areas and thereafter risks in identifying and logging the security incidents. 104. In its May 2015 report Amnesty International record that after re-taking Tikrit from ISIL, Shia militias looted, killed and perpetrated sexual violence against the Sunni residents of the town; actions also reported by Agence France Press. 105. The volatility of the contested areas has led to there being a “massive flow of internal refugees” [Landinfo - February 2015] from these areas to Baghdad. According to the Home Office April 2015 CIG, the International Organisation for Migration Displacement Tracking Index (“DTM”) for March 2015 recorded Baghdad as hosting 325,692 displaced individuals. There was also displacement from the contested areas into the IKR. 106. Given the volatility of the situation in the contested areas, the number of displaced persons therefrom, the tactics of warfare used there by ISIL and the circumstances in the areas controlled by ISIL, we have no hesitation in endorsing the Respondent’s concession and conclude that a civilian with no distinguishing characteristics will, simply by virtue of his/her presence in a contested area, be at real risk of suffering harm of the type identified in Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive. Babil 107. Babil governorate is located directly to the South of Baghdad, sharing the extreme north of its border with Baghdad and Anbar governorates. 108. In paragraph 1.3.22 of its April 2015 Country Information and Guidance document: Iraq: Security situation in Baghdad, southern governorates and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq the Home Office state that: “there has been a deterioration in the security situation in Babil governorate since 2012 and 2013 … In 2014 there was an average of 126 people killed per month” It continues in paragraph 1.3.23 by identifying that “the government maintains control over the majority of the governorate, including the northern part of Babil around Jurf Al-Sakhr, which was previously an ISIL strong-hold from which it launched attacks on the surrounding area and manufactured car bombs. By the end of 2014 ISIL’s presence in Jurf Al-Sakhr had been cleared, with insurgents routed further north. This military success had improved the security situation considerably. However, there remained a risk of further violence, both from renewed armed conflict and as a result of IEDs left behind by insurgents” . 109. At paragraph 1.3.25 it concluded that: “while levels of violence have increased in Babil compared to previous years, conditions have not deteriorated to the extent that a person returning there would face a breach of Article 15(c)” . However, it is added that: “while in general a return to Babil would not breach Article 15(c), decision makers must also consider whether there are particular factors relevant to the person’s individual circumstances which might nevertheless place them at risk. Such factors include – but are not limited to – the person’s age, gender, health, ethnicity, religion, sect, disability and profession. Some persons, especially those who reside in areas where they are a minority, may face a heightened risk of indiscriminate violence” . At paragraph 1.3.27, the Home Office noted that “the security situation remains fluid” . 110. In his first report, of 27 February 2015, Dr Fatah observes that ISIL was ousted from its based in Jurf Al-Sakhr, in the north of the governorate, in October 2014. The majority of the fighting in Babil – and the casualties – occurred during the summer months of 2014 and that the province is now far quieter, although there remains a consistent level of violence. Dr Fatah’s later reports do not describe any change to his position in this regard. Statistics are provided by Dr Fatah identifying that in the first two weeks of February 2015 there were 20 security incidents in the governorate, in which 18 civilians were killed and 59 wounded. The population of Babil governorate, according to the Home Office is 1.8 million. 111. As evidenced by its previous operations in Jurf Al-Sakh, the north of Babil governorate is clearly viewed by ISIL as a strategically advantageous position, because of its proximity to Baghdad and its border with Anbar. Given this, it is important that decision makers, when faced with applicants from that province, carefully consider up-to-date information on the situation there. On the basis of the limited information put before us on the current situation in Babil governorate, which we have summarised above, we do not accept that it has been demonstrated that there presently exists an Article 15(c) risk there to an ordinary civilian; and neither does a person’s ethnicity, religion or sex, whether taken individually or cumulatively, enhance the level of risk there so as to engage Article 15(c). There is no evidence of very recent conflict between ISIL and state authorities in the north of the province, and the security incidents, deaths and injuries to civilians in the governorate from ‘security incidents’, whilst deplorable, is small in number when compared to the size of the governorates population. Iraqi Kurdish Region (IKR) – Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Dahuk 112. In Dr Fatah’s opinion the IKR “is virtually violence free, and only exceptional one offs disrupt this” . The most recent security incident in the IKR referred to in Dr Fatah’s evidence was a suicide car bomb outside the governorate office in Erbil on 19 November 2014, which killed six people, including the driver, and wounded dozens. Prior to that there was a bomb in Erbil on 29 September 2013, which also killed six people. The Home Office April 2015 CIG also makes reference to the November 2014 attack, but identifies there having been 10 deaths as a consequence. It concludes that the IKR is stable and has very low levels of violence. 113. The evidence before us does not establish that there is an Article 15(c) risk to an ordinary civilian in the IKR; and neither does a person’s ethnicity, religion or sex, whether taken individually or cumulatively, enhance the level of risk so as to engage Article 15(c). The Southern Governorates – Basra, Kerbala, Najaf, Muthana, Thi-Qar, Missan, Qadissiya and Wassit 114. Dr Fatah identifies that security incidents in the southern governorates of Iraq are “rare” - with Thi-Qar, Missan, Qadissiya and Wassit being almost entirely free of violence for some years and the mainly Sunni governorate of Muthana being “basically empty”. There were more regular security incidents in Basra and Kerbala, although not on the scale of the incidents in other parts of Iraq. The evidence given by Dr Fatah in relation to the Southern governorates accords with that provided in the April 2015 CIG report at [1.3.29], which recalls the number of civilian fatalities in 2014 in Thi-Qar and Muthana as being eight and six respectively, Basra as having 128 such fatalities, and in Kerbala 200 fatalities. The combined population of the eight governorates is 6.7 million. 115. Our attention has not been drawn to any evidence contradicting that which we have summarised above and, as a consequence, we have no hesitation in concluding that the evidence before us does not disclose that there is a real risk of serious harm – as defined in Article 15(c) – for an ordinary civilian in any of the southern governorates; nor does a person’s ethnicity, religion or sex – whether taken of itself or cumulatively - increase the risk of serious harm to such person so as to engage Article 15(c). 116. Although we have found that Article 15(c) is not engaged for an ordinary civilian in the Southern governorates we are also required to consider issues of safety arising during the process of return to a person’s home area – this being part of the decision on status entitlement ( HH(Somalia) [2010] EWCA Civ 426 at [82-84]). 117. Iraqi nationals not originating from the IKR will be returned to Baghdad by the Respondent. Dr Fatah provides detailed evidence on the safety of road travel from Baghdad to the southern governorates in his second report stating at [103] that “There are no reports of such targeting by armed groups on civilians using roads from Baghdad to southern areas, or vice versa.” He does however provide evidence of a truck bombing on a water purification centre on the Umqasir – Safwan road in Basra in March 2015 and an explosive device attached to a car in northern Babil in February 2015. There are also a number of incidents of attacks on checkpoints in Baghdad. This evidence reflects evidence found elsewhere before us and does not lead us to conclude that there would be a real risk of an ordinary civilian travelling from Baghdad airport to the southern governorates, suffering serious harm en route to such governorates so as engage Article 15(c). Baghdad City 118. Baghdad governorate consists of 10 districts, covers approximately 4500 square kilometres and has a population of between 6.6 and 7.1 million (the figure referred to in HM2 being that produced by the GoI of 7,055,200 - whereas the UN’s Joint Analysis Unit identifies the population of Baghdad governorate to be 6,696,596 as of 2013). The governorate is under the control of the Iraqi Security Forces, although Human Rights Watch wrote on 15 February 2015 that Shia militias were leading security operations in Baghdad. 119. Within the governorate, Baghdad city comprises nine districts and 89 neighbourhoods and is said to have a population of approximately 6.5 million ([199] of HM2 ). A US Congressional Research Service report of February 2015 referred to the population of Baghdad city as being 80% Shia, although the Landinfo report indicates that the percentage mix of Shia and Sunnis in Baghdad is not known. The sensitivity of this political subject led to the national census being deferred. Sadr City, a ‘Shia district’ within Baghdad city, is the centre for Moqtada al-Sadr and his followers and the area relies entirely on the Jaysh al Mahdi for its security. Sunni areas are largely to be found to the west of the city (Al Ghazaliya, Abu Ghraib and Al Jami’ah), although Al Doura, in southern Baghdad, is also reported to be a majority Sunni neighbourhood (USA Today – 13 July 2013) and there are mixed neighbourhoods, such as al Adel in the east of Baghdad and Karkh in the centre of the city. There is no identifiable Kurdish area in Baghdad city and Dr Fatah was unaware of the number of Kurds living in the city. Most violent activity within Baghdad is the responsibility of ISIL and Shia militia groups. ISIL pursues its campaign in Baghdad to undermine the stability of the security apparatus there – instilling fear within general populace and feeding off the global coverage of the incidents. 120. In his first report Dr Fatah refers to their having been 127 ‘incidents’ in Baghdad in the first three weeks of January 2015, killing 185 and injuring 500 persons. Another explosive device detonated in a market on 30 January, killing a further 18-20 people. He describes five bomb attacks (suicide bombs or IEDs) in Baghdad in February 2015, each near a restaurant or other public place, causing approximately 60 deaths in total and a significantly greater number of wounded. These, and other incidents, are also reported elsewhere in the evidence before us. 121. In January 2015 there were 118 IED attacks in Baghdad. Musings on Iraq reported the number of IED attacks in Baghdad in February 2015 in the following terms: “Baghdad continued to suffer from a steady stream of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). 23 went off during the week killing 32 people, 46% of all deaths, and injured another 129, 80% of the total. The Islamic State’s VBIED bases around the capital have largely been disrupted and the group is using most of them for tactical attacks upon the government forces in places like Salahaddin. That has left IEDs as the main form of attack in the capital. While not as deadly as car bombs, most IEDs are set off in public places like shops and markets to harm as many civilians as possible and are the main driver of casualties for the last several months.” 122. According to figures produced by UNAMA, in the first 3 months of 2015 there were 947 civilian deaths and 2,561 civilian injuries in Baghdad. IBC recorded 4,767 civilian deaths in Baghdad governorate in 2014, almost double that of 2013. 123. Later incidents, in May 2015, are detailed in Amnesty International’s report of 14 May – reference being made therein to bomb, and/or rocket attacks of public places in Baghdad on 2, 5, 9 and 12 May this year, and kidnappings and other killings on 7 May. After the hearing we were also provided with news reports relating to two significant car bomb attacks on hotels in central Baghdad, carried out by ISIL at the end of May, in which at least nine more people were killed and dozens injured. 124. Dr Fatah explains that it is Baghdad’s Shiite districts that have borne the brunt of the bomb attacks – with the perpetrators generally believed to be either ISIL or other Sunni insurgents. Amnesty International reports that Shia militias, backed by GoI, have been abducting and killing Sunni civilian men in Baghdad, and around the country – indicating that it has documented “dozens” of such cases in Baghdad, Samarra and Kirkuk. Dr Fatah observes that Sunni districts experience fewer incidents than Shia districts and that such incidents as there are largely take the form of kidnappings and killings. Sunnis are targeted, amongst other reasons, as retribution for the acts of ISIL. 125. There are also reports of the Christian and Kurdish communities in Baghdad receiving death threats from Shi’a militias warning them to leave, although Dr Fatah does not identify the number of such threats, whether the threats prompted the recipients to leave, or whether any such threats were acted upon. 126. When viewed in the context of the size of the population of Baghdad city, we do not find the level of civilian deaths and injuries there, even taken at its highest and allowing for the likelihood of underreporting, to be indicative of the level of indiscriminate violence so as to engage Article 15(c). A resident of Baghdad city could, of course, reduce still further the already small possibility of being caught up in an attack by avoiding those busy public places which the evidence suggests are one of the primary targets. 127. We accept, however, that the statistics as to the level of civilian deaths and injuries in Baghdad are not determinative of the issue before us; indeed if they were then, as Mr Bazini properly points out, they are not significantly different to the statistics on deaths and injuries to civilians drawn in relation to some of the governorates in the contested areas. A more holistic approach is required. 128. There are significant differences as between the circumstances in the contested areas and those prevailing in Baghdad. The April 2015 CIG reports that despite the levels of violence in Baghdad, displacement there has remained low (around 60,000) with the majority of those displaced (40,000) moving within the governorate. This is in contrast to the high levels of population displacement away from the contested areas. 129. Although displacement levels are clearly a relevant factor when taking the inclusive approach to a consideration of Article 15(c), we are cautious about giving them undue prominence in our holistic assessment. A person who is facing egregious violence in one place may decide to move to another place that, whilst safer, is still far from peaceful. We do, however, accept that the large movement of people from the contested areas to Baghdad city is indicative of there being sufficiently less violence in Baghdad to make the arduous and upsetting process of fleeing one’s home worthwhile. The geography also indicates that those moving to Baghdad from the contested areas do not face a “Hobson’s Choice”, in that some, at least, would appear to have the option of seeking refuge in the Southern Governorates or across the border in Jordan. 130. It is also apparent from what we say above that the nature of the conflict is very different as between the contested areas and Baghdad, as are the circumstances of daily life between in the two regions – the nature of the conflict and the features of daily life in Baghdad both being relevant considerations in our determination of whether an Article 15(c) threshold has been met. As to the latter it is observed in the Landinfo report of February 2015, that: “Daily life in Baghdad carries on in the midst of all the violent incidents. Somehow communications, transport, trade and industry and public business go on functioning, in spite of the many restrictions as a result of the many years of misrule, corruption and poor security.” It is also relevant that the violence in Baghdad is largely generated by asymmetrical warfare (i.e. sporadic terrorist attacks) rather than by all out fighting, such as is to be seen in the contested areas. 131. Dr Fatah expressed agreement with the aforementioned passage from the Landinfo report during the course of his oral evidence, with the proviso that although daily life carries on the security situation has instilled a fear in the general populace. This we accept and have had full regard to when coming to our conclusions; nevertheless this must be viewed in the context of the very small proportion of persons living in Baghdad who are killed and injured there as a direct or indirect consequence of the security situation. 132. Having considered all of the evidence before us, a summary of which we have set out above, in our view we do not find that the level of violence in Baghdad city, or in Baghdad governorate as a whole, comes even close to crossing the Article 15(c) threshold. 133. Mr Bazini submits that, Kurds, Christians and persons without established connections to Baghdad should be considered to be in an “enhanced risk category” - by this, reference is being made to the conclusions of the CJEU in Elgafaji that where a person comes within a group of people for whom there is an enhanced risk, the degree of indiscriminate violence does not need to be as high as it would otherwise have to be in order to invoke Article 2 or Article 15(c) – see also Diakite at [31]. 134. Other than the Mr Bazini’s assertion that Christians in Baghdad are at an enhanced risk we heard no submissions directly relating to this issue and were not directed to any evidence in support of the assertion made. Given the paucity of evidence, and lack of detailed submissions, we do not accept that it has been established that Christians in Iraq are in an enhanced risk category under Article 15(c). 135. We have heard or seen nothing that leads us to conclude that either persons without connections, or Kurds, in Baghdad are an “enhanced risk category” . As to the latter, this was put by Mr Bazini primarily on the basis that there is no established Kurdish area in Baghdad. Whilst we accept Dr Fatah’s evidence in this regard, we observe the evidence does not disclose a significant number of attacks on Kurds in Baghdad, nor have we been drawn to any evidence of recent displacement by Kurds out of Baghdad. The same is the position for those who have no connection to Baghdad prior to moving there. The evidence before us does not establish that a person with such a characteristic is at an enhanced risk in Baghdad. 136. It is rightly not suggested that the evidence demonstrates that there is a real risk of Article 15(c) harm arising solely because a person is a Sunni or Shia civilian in Baghdad and we, in any event, conclude that it does not. 137. Furthermore, the evidence does not disclose, and neither was it suggested to us, that those returned to Iraq on an expired passport, or a laissez-passer, have any difficulties at the airport, or when travelling en route to Baghdad city, for reason of not having a current passport or other form of Iraqi identification document. The Baghdad Belts 138. The Institute for the Study of War identifies the Baghdad belts as consisting of residential, agricultural, and industrial areas that encircle the city of Baghdad, as well as the “networks of roadways, rivers, and other lines of communication that lie within a twenty or thirty mile radius of Baghdad and connect the capital to the rest of Iraq. Beginning in the north, the belts include the cities of Taji, clockwise to Tarmiyah, Baqubah [Diyala governorate] , Buhriz [Diyala governorate] , Besmayah and Nahrwan, Salman Pak, Mahmudiyah, Sadr al-Yusufiyah, Fallujah [Anbar governorate] , and Karmah [Anbar governorate] . This "clock" can be divided into quadrants: Northeast, Southeast, Southwest, and Northwest”. 139. This accords with information provided by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (“FCO”) in its letter of the 11 May 2015, in which it is also observed that ISIL and other associated Sunni insurgent groups are active in the Baghdad Belts and have been known to target civilians travelling by road. It said further therein, however, that the numbers of attacks are lower than elsewhere in Iraq due to the generally non-permissive environment for Sunni insurgents to operate in. 140. In its “map of Iraqi towns and Cities seized by the Islamic States and its allies” (circa September 2014) the Long War Journal listed several areas in the Baghdad governorate as showing recent armed clashes – including Madain, Taji and Tarmiyah. 141. Both the Landinfo February 2015 report and the Home Office COI Request of 6 May 2015 report numerous attacks carried by ISIL in, or launched from, the Baghdad Belts. For example, on 18 September 2014 ISIL launched an attack on Baghdad’s Kadhmiyah neighbourhood, using mortar rounds and improvised explosive devices. It is said that it is believed the attacks were launched from Taji. There was also seven attacks on Dhuluyia, on the border of the Baghdad governorate, in September 2014 - an assault on the village being repelled by local fighters on 18 September. On 27 April 2015, 10 cars carrying unidentified armed individuals wearing security uniforms stormed Taji police station and took five detainees. 142. Paragraph 52 the Home Office COI Response records in the following terms incidents of forced displacement from regions within the Belts: 143. The February 2015 Landinfo report reads: “In the suburbs [another name for the Baghdad belts] fighting has been taking place continuously between ISIL and Iraqi forces supported by Shiite militias and the US air force ever since the summer [of 2014]. The army and Shiite militias are trying to prevent ISIL from taking control in these areas which would give them a foothold for launching attacks against the city from the suburbs. According to Jessica Lewis (2014) at ISW, ISIL is trying to hold and extend the positions they established in the summer so that they can surround the city and launch attacks on a larger scale” 144. On 1 May 2015 The Institute for the Study of War listed Nebai, in the North-West of the Baghdad Belts, as a “contested area” – observing that ISIL enjoyed freedom of movement in the area, and had used it as a place from which to launch its attacks. 145. It is immediately apparent from the brief synopsis above, of the geographical reach of the Baghdad Belts, that parts of the Belts to the north, west and east of Baghdad city fall within the territory of the governorates in which we have found there to be an Article 15(c) risk. 146. Given this, and the other evidence before us, we find that there are areas within the Baghdad Belts in which ordinary civilians are at risk of suffering harm of the type identified in Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive. Such areas are though in the significant minority in the Belts, and in the areas closer to the Baghdad city boundaries the risk is akin to that which we have considered above for those person living within the city itself. Although we cannot give an exhaustive list of towns or villages in the Baghdad Belts where an Article 15(c) risk exists, in our view it does include those towns, villages or regions within the five governorates which form a part of the ‘contested areas’ and those parts of the Belts which constitute the borderlands between Baghdad governorate and the ‘contested areas’. Internal relocation