Case No. UKUT-00226-(IAC)

1. Member States may consider it the duty of the applicant to submit as soon as possible all elements needed to substantiate the application for international protection. In cooperation with the applicant it is the duty of the Member State to assess the relevant elements of the application. 2. The elements referred to in of paragraph 1 consist of the applicant ' s statements and all documentation at the applicants disposal regarding the applicant ' s age, background, including that of relevant relatives, identity, nationality(ies), country(ies) and place(s) of previous residence, previous asylum applications, travel routes, identity and travel documents and the reasons for applying for international protection. 3. The assessment of an application for international protection is to be carried out on an individual basis and includes taking into account: (a) all relevant facts as they relate to the country of origin at the time of taking a decision on the application; including laws and regulations of the country of origin and the manner in which they are applied; (b) the relevant statements and documentation presented by the applicant including information on whether the applicant has been or may be subject to persecution or serious harm; (c) the individual position and personal circumstances of the applicant, including factors such as background, gender and age, so as to assess whether, on the basis of the applicant ' s personal circumstances, the acts to which the applicant has been or could be exposed would amount to persecution or serious harm; (d) whether the applicant ' s activities since leaving the country of origin were engaged in for the sole or main purpose of creating the necessary conditions for applying for international protection, so as to assess whether these activities will expose the applicant to persecution or serious harm if returned to that country; (e) whether the applicant could reasonably be expected to avail himself of the protection of another country where he could assert citizenship. 4. The fact that an applicant has already been subject to persecution or serious harm or to direct threats of such persecution or such harm, is a serious indication of the applicant ' s well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm, unless there are good reasons to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated. ” It was held that the duty on the applicant under Article 4 to substantiate his application for international protection is a limited one. Specifically, it is limited to the situation where aspects of the applicant’s statements are not supported (ie corroborated) by documentary or other evidence. In such circumstances, the effect of Article 4(5) is that the Applicant will not need to provide corroboration where the conditions enshrined therein are cumulatively met: see [81] and [85]. Article 4(5) provides: “ 5. Where Member States apply the principle according to which it is the duty of the applicant to substantiate the application for international protection and where aspects of the applicant’s statements are not supported by documentary or other evidence, those aspects shall not need confirmation, when the following conditions are met: (a) the applicant has made a genuine effort to substantiate his application; (b) all relevant elements, at the applicant’s disposal, have been submitted, and a satisfactory explanation regarding any lack of other relevant elements has been given; (c) the applicant’s statements are found to be coherent and plausible and do not run counter to available specific and general information relevant to the applicant’s case; (d) the applicant has applied for international protection at the earliest possible time, unless the applicant can demonstrate good reason for not having done so; and (e) the general credibility of the applicant has been established.” We shall adopt this approach in making our findings on contentious issues. We also give effect to the lower standard of proof, well established, in asylum cases. (14) Th e main contentious factual issues in the Appellant’s case are ascertainable from his cross examination. These are, in brief compass, the land owned by his deceased father; the jobs which the Appellant had before leaving Pakistan; the date of his father’s death; his step grandmother’s refusal to have him educat ed ; his mother’s remarriage; the departure of his mother, sisters and stepfather from the family home; his sojourn with an aunt in another place; his subsequent attempts to contact his mother; his relationship with his step grandmother and her two sons and, in particular, their treatment of him; the authenticity of the two marriage certificates of his mother upon which he relied and the circumstances in which he acquired these; the date appearing on his father’s death certificate; and his interaction and communications with two former friend s following his departure from Pakistan. Al l of these issues and their off shoots were probed in considerable detail at the hearing. (15) The Appellant’s story is certainly not perfect. The exercise of juxtaposing the accounts provided by him during interview, in his witness statement and in his testimony to the Tribunal exposes a number of inconsistencies and imperfections. The question for us is whether these defects render the core of his account unworthy of belief bearing in mind the burden and standard of proof. We have considered his various accounts with care. In evaluating his story, we have had the benefit of assessing the Appellant’s demeanour and presentation at two separate hearings. In this particular case this has proved to be a n asset of considerable value. While the Appellant had the services of an interpreter at both hearings, he readily co-operated with the Tribunal in its suggestion that he endeavour to give his evidence in English if possible. This established that he had a good command of the English language and this, in turn, facilitated our task of assessing his credibility. The Appellant made no attempt to take advantage of the protective shield which the interpreter would have provided. We were impressed by his willingness to engage with the Tribunal throughout his evidence . (16) Furthermore there was a notable spontaneity about the Appellant’s evidence. On occasions, unprompted, he volunteered further information. Some of this entailed correcting, enlarging or clarifying earlier answers provided by him . This reinforced his credibility. We consider that the inconsistencies and gaps in his several accounts are precisely the kind of imperfections to be reasonably expected, taking into account his youth and immaturity during the key periods and the passage of time. Furthermore, we have identified no inconsistency of note in three of the key aspects of the Appellant’s story, namely the circumstances in which he arrived in the United Kingdom , his life since arrival here and his subsequent communications with friend s in Pakistan . (17) This latter issue encompasses one further issue of substantial importance, namely the authenticity of the marriage certificates and the circumstances in which the Appellant acquired these. As regards the document purporting to be the certificate of the death of the Appellant’s father, we make two specific findings. First, bearing in mind that there was no frontal challenge to its authenticity, and taking into account the onerous burden of proving fraud which would be engaged if there were, we are satisfied that this is a genuine document. Further, t o hold otherwise would be contrary to our findings about the Appellant’s credibility generally. Second, having regard to th is latter consideration and in particular our finding that the Appellant’s struggle with certain dates does not undermine the core of h is story, we find that the date appe aring on the document is not inconsistent with the thrust of the Appellant’s case. The simple reality is that an unerringly precise and accurate chronology of all material events in the Appellant’s story will never be feasible. Furthermore it is perfectly conceivable that the certificate was issued some time after the death. Fundamentally, we consider the Appellant’s account to be inherently plausible. (18) Taking all of the above factors into account, our overarching finding is that the core elements of the Appellant’s case are believable. We shall apply the relevant legal rules to this framework accordingly.