Case No. UKUT-00226-(IAC)

) v Special Adjudicator [2004] UKHL 26 and [2004] 2 AC 323 , at [20]: “In determining the present question, the House is required by section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 to take into account any relevant Strasbourg case law. While such case law is not strictly binding, it has been held that courts should, in the absence of some special circumstances, follow any clear and constant jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court: R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2001] UKHL 23, [2003] 2 AC 295, paragraph 26. This reflects the fact that the Convention is an international instrument, the correct interpretation of which can be authoritatively expounded only by the Strasbourg court. From this it follows that a national court subject to a duty such as that imposed by section 2 should not without strong reason dilute or weaken the effect of the Strasbourg case law. It is indeed unlawful under section 6 of the 1998 Act for a public authority, including a court, to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right. It is of course open to member states to provide for rights more generous than those guaranteed by the Convention, but such provision should not be the product of interpretation of the Convention by national courts, since the meaning of the Convention should be uniform throughout the states party to it. The duty of national courts is to keep pace with the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it evolves over time: no more, but certainly no less.” The further ingredient in the argument is that since the decision of the Author i ty is justiciable before this Tribunal, a challenge to such decision by judicial review is inappropriate, having regard to the well known exhaustion of alternative remedies principle. Trafficking Issues in the IAC Tribunals (34) At the outset, we recall that the decisions of the Secretary of State which were challenged by appeal to the FtT were the refusal of his asylum claim and the corresponding decision to remove him from the United Kingdom . Given the date of these decisions, 01 August 2013, the statutory appeal provisions governing the two appeals which have followed and the remaking decision in which this complete Tribunal is now engaged, the relevant statutory provisions are the following: Section 82, 2002 Act (i) Section 82 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (the “ 2002 Act ”) which, both before and after the reforms effected by the Immigration Act 2014, with effect from 20 October 2014, made provision for a right of appeal against the refusal of a protection claim. Prior to 20 October 2014, section 82 provided: “ (1) Where an immigration decision is made in respect of a person he may appeal to the Tribunal. (2) In this Part “immigration decision” means— (a) refusal of leave to enter the United Kingdom , (b) refusal of entry clearance, (c) refusal of a certificate of entitlement under section 10 of this Act, (d) refusal to vary a person ' s leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom if the result of the refusal is that the person has no leave to enter or remain, (e) variation of a person ' s leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom if when the variation takes effect the person has no leave to enter or remain, (f) revocation under section 76 of this Act of indefinite leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom , (g) a decision that a person is to be removed from the United Kingdom by way of directions under section 10(1)(a), (b), (ba) or (c) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (c. 33) (removal of person unlawfully in United Kingdom), (h) a decision that an illegal entrant is to be removed from the United Kingdom by way of directions under paragraphs 8 to 10 of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 (c. 77) (control of entry: removal), (ha) a decision that a person is to be removed from the United Kingdom by way of directions under section 47 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 (removal: persons with statutorily extended leave), (i) a decision that a person is to be removed from the United Kingdom by way of directions given by virtue of paragraph 10A of that Schedule (family), (ia) a decision that a person is to be removed from the United Kingdom by way of directions under paragraph 12(2) of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 (c. 77) (seamen and aircrews), (ib) a decision to make an order under section 2A of that Act (deprivation of right of abode), (j) a decision to make a deportation order under section 5(1) of that Act, and (k) refusal to revoke a deportation order under section 5(2) of that Act. (3A) Subsection (2)(j) does not apply to a decision to make a deportation order which states that it is made in accordance with section 32(5) of the UK Borders Act 2007; but– (a) a decision that section 32(5) applies is an immigration decision for the purposes of this Part, and (b) a reference in this Part to an appeal against an automatic deportation order is a reference to an appeal against a decision of the Secretary of State that section 32(5) applies. (4) The right of appeal under subsection (1) is subject to the exceptions and limitations specified in this Part.” Section 84, 2002 Act (ii) Section 84 of the 2002 Act which, both before and after the aforementioned date, has made provision for appealing on the grounds that the removal of the Appellant from the United Kingdom would breach the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Refugee Convention and/or would breach the United Kingdom’s obligations in relation to persons eligible for humanitarian protection and/or would be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. Prior to to 20 October 2014, section 84 provided: (1) An appeal under section 82(1) against an immigration decision must be brought on one or more of the following grounds— (a) that the decision is not in accordance with immigration rules; (b) that the decision is unlawful by virtue of Article 20A of the Race Relations (Northern Ireland) Order 1997 or by virtue of section 29 of the Equality Act 2010 (discrimination in the exercise of public functions etc) so far as relating to race as defined by section 9(1) of that Act; (c) that the decision is unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42) (public authority not to act contrary to Human Rights Convention) as being incompatible with the appellant ' s Convention rights; (d) that the appellant is an EEA national or a member of the family of an EEA national and the decision breaches the appellant ' s rights under the Community Treaties in respect of entry to or residence in the United Kingdom; (e) that the decision is otherwise not in accordance with the law; (f) that the person taking the decision should have exercised differently a discretion conferred by immigration rules; (g) that removal of the appellant from the United Kingdom in consequence of the immigration decision would breach the United Kingdom ' s obligations under the Refugee Convention or would be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 as being incompatible with the appellant ' s Convention rights. (2) In subsection (1)(d) “EEA national” means a national of a State which is a contracting party to the Agreement on the European Economic Area signed at Oporto on 2nd May 1992 (as it has effect from time to time). (3) An appeal under section 83 must be brought on the grounds that removal of the appellant from the United Kingdom would breach the United Kingdom ' s obligations under the Refugee Convention. (4) An appeal under section 83A must be brought on the grounds that removal of the appellant from the United Kingdom would breach the United Kingdom ' s obligations under the Refugee Convention. (35) The Trafficking Convention feature s in the decision of the Upper Tribunal in SHL ( supra ). One fea t ure of the matrix of the appeal to the Upper Tribunal in SHL was that the A uthority had made a formal decision that the Appellant was not a victim of trafficking. The Secretary of State, on the same date, made a separate decision rejecting the Appellant’s claim for asylum. This was challenged, unsuccessfully, by appeal to the FtT. In deciding the appeal, this Tribunal stated, at [33] : “ …… t h ere is no right of appeal to this Tribunal against the Respondent’s trafficking decision: see Part (v) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Secondly, the Trafficking Convention cannot be invoked as a free standing source of rights, obligations and legal effects and consequences in domestic law, as it is an unincorporated international treaty. ” The decision continues: “ A corollary of this principle is that a failure by a public authority to take into account the provisions of an unincorporated international treaty is not of itself a ground for impugning the exercise of a discretionary power: R v Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith [1996] QB 517, page 558 (per Sir Thomas Bingham MR). It is, of course, established that unincorporated international instruments have a role in certain contexts, a paradigm example being the presumption that Parliament does not intend to legislate contrary to the United Kingdom ’s international obligations …. Furthermore, a decision may be impugned where a public authority purports to apply an unincorporated international treaty provision but errs in doing so. ” The Tribunal decided that none of these principles was of any avail to the Appellant, noting that it would have been open to him to challenge the Secretary of State’s trafficking decision by judicial review and stating, at [34]: “ We are of the opinion that back door challenges to trafficking decisions made by the Respondent under the Trafficking Convention are not permissible in appeals of the present kind. They lie out with the competence of the First-tier and Upper Tribunals. ” The essence of the decision was that the jurisdiction of this Tribunal is statutory and does not encompass a direct challenge of this kind. (36) The decision in SHL was the subject of comment by the Court of Appeal in AS (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA Civ 1469 and [2014] Imm AR 513 . Before turning to consider this decision in a little detail, it is appropriate to highlight two features of SHL . First, the Appellant was attempting to mount a direct, frontal challenge to the negative trafficking decision of the Authority. Second, the Secretary of State’s policy guidance did not feature in the matrix of the appeal. The Tribunal considered that this was not legally possible. (37) In AS ( Afghanistan ), Longmore LJ formulated the issue to be addressed in the following terms, at [1]: “ The question in this appeal is the extent to which (if at all) Judges of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber should regard as conclusive decisions of the ‘Competent Authority’ determining that an appellant before them has or has not been a victim of trafficking. ” There were two decisions in the matrix. The first was the Secretary of State’s decision rejecting the Appellant’s asylum claim. The second was the decision of the A uthority that the Appellant was not the victim of human trafficking. The Appellant challenged the asylum refusal decision by appeal to the FtT. The appeal was dismissed. On further appeal to the Upper Tribunal, the question arose whether the FtT had erred in law by failing to make a finding on the trafficking issue. It was held that the FtT “ ….had no jurisdiction to review the trafficking decision of the UKBA ”: see [9]. No error of law was demonstrated and the appeal was dismissed. (38) At [11], Longmore LJ records his acceptance of the Respondent’s submission th at a decision of the A uthority is not an immigration decision (within the meaning of the applicable legislation): “ …. and the only remedy … was by way of judicial review ”. However, the Court ruled that in immigration appeals the Tribunal is competent to take into account a positive trafficking decision where relevant to the decision under appeal (normally a removal decision). Longmore LJ continues, at [14]: “ If the First tier Tribunal is entitled to take into account a decision that an appellant is (or has been) a victim of trafficking it seems odd that , if a perverse decision has been reached that an appellant has not been a victim of trafficking, the Tribunal cannot consider whether the facts of the case do, in fact, show that the appellant was a victim of trafficking. ” (our emphasis) In thus holding, the Court reasoned that the decision in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Abdi [1996] Imm AR 148 is authority for the proposition that a failure by the Secretary of State to apply her own policy is an error of law. The Court further held that there is no obligation on the appellant to challenge a negative trafficking decision by judicial review, stating at [14]: “ The FT T Judge should consider the matter for himself. ” The Court expressed its conclusion in the following terms, at [17]: “ ….. First tier Tribunal j udges are competent to consider whether the Secretary of State has complied with her policy in relation to trafficking. If asked to consider that question, they should then decide whether she has in fact complied with her policy since that is (or may be) rele vant to her removal decision. [18] …… No doubt, if a conclusive decision has been reached by the Competent Authority, First T ier Tribunals will be astute (save perhaps in rare circumstances) to allow an appellant to re-run a case already decided against him on the facts. But where, as here, it is arguable that, on the facts found or accepted, the Competent Authority has reached a decision which was not open to it, that argument should be heard and taken into account. ” (39) We are satisfied that in the final part of this passage the Court is referring to the standard of perversity (or Wednesbury irrationality) mentioned twice in earlier passages. The effect of the decision in AS ( Afghanistan ) is that in appeal proceedings the Appellant may, in certain circumstances, mount an indirect challenge to a negative traffic king decision of the A uthority. We are satisfied that a challenge of this kind is not confined to perversity (or irrationality) grounds. Rather, it is clear from a consideration of [12] – [18] as a whole that where a removal decision has been preceded by a negative trafficking decision made in breach of the Secretary of State’s policy guidance , the removal decision will be erroneous in law and , therefore , embraced by the “ not in accordance with the law ” ground of appeal in section 82 of the 2002 Act ( supra ). We further consider that, in principle, there is no reason why the Tribunal’s consideration of negative trafficking decisions should not encompass, in cases where appropriate, other recognised public law misdemeanours such as the intrusion of immaterial considerations, leaving material evidence or considerations out of account, procedural unfairness and bad faith. (40) We give effect to the approach formulated immediately above in the following way. On behalf of the Appellant it is submitted that the issue of whether the Appellant is a trafficking victim is relevant to the immigration decision under appeal, namely the Secretary of State’s removal decision. The specific argument advanced is that this Tribunal should determine that the Appellant’s removal would be contrary to section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 if either (a) he is at risk of retrafficking in Pakistan or (b) he has been denied the benefits and protections which would have flowed from a decision that he was a child trafficking victim and a lawful investigation of his claim to be such a victim. (41) In their able submissions , Ms Cronin and Ms Poynor, on behalf of the Appellant, developed this argument in the following way. They submitted that trafficking and the positive duties enshrined in Articles 12, 13, 14 and 15 of the Trafficking Convention have the status of positive obligations under Article 4 ECHR. To remove the Appellant would infringe Article 4 and, by virtue of section 6 of the Human Rights Act, would therefore not be in accordance with the law, thereby impelling that his appeal be allowed. Article 4 establishes rights which are absolute, unqualified and fundamental, described as the “ basic values of a democratic society ” in Rantsev , at [62] ( supra ). It is acknowledged, for the reasons given by this Tribunal in SHL , the obligations contained in Articles 12 – 14 of the Convention are not justiciable per se . This, however, it is contended, presents no barrier in light of the protections afforded by the Human Rights Act and the decision in Rantsev that it is not necessary to identify whether the offending conduct constitutes slavery, servitude or forced labour and that trafficking is embraced by Article 4 ECHR. As noted in [29] above, c ounsels ’ submissions further drew attention to the decision of the House of Lords in (Ullah) where it was held that United Kingdom Courts should, in the absence of some special circumstance, follow any clear and constant jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court: see [20]. (42) It is convenient to reproduce the following passage in the written submission of Mr Wilding on behalf of the Secretary of State: “ The Respondent accepts that the Tribunal (be it First-tier or Upper) generally can consider whether a person has been trafficked for the purpose of assessing the factual matrix of a case leading to any assessment of risk on return. The starting point for such consideration will of course be the decision of the Competent Authority on whether the Appellant has been trafficked. The Respondent agrees that the issue as [to] whether someone has been trafficked or not can go towards the question of risk on return; in fact in many cases it may well be an important fact finding exercise going to the very heart of risk on return. ” Next, attention is draw n to the status of the Trafficking Convention as an unincorporated international treaty. This is followed by the passage: “ Therefore, as the present appeal is one against the SSHD’s decision to remove the Appellant to Pakistan, the only relevance of the [Trafficking Convention] is whether the Appellant has been trafficked as part of his narrative as to why he is at risk on return to Pakistan. Nothing therefore turns on the trafficking issue if he is not at risk on return ….. The [Upper Tribunal] cannot consider the provisions of [the Trafficking Convention] which do not go to the question of whether the Appellant has been trafficked. ” The specific provisions of the Convention highlighted in this context are Articles 12 – 16. (43) While the Respondent’s submissions also highlighted that the Appellant did not challenge either of the trafficking decisions by judicial review, there was no suggestion – correctly in our view – that this was in some way fatal. While both parties drew our attention to the decision in Nguyen (Anti-Trafficking Convention: respondent’s d uties) [2015] UKUT 00170 (IAC) and [2015] Imm AR 886 , we consider this to be an illustration of the Upper Tribunal’s alertness to the need to give effect to the “ not in accordance with the law ” dimension of the decision of the Court of Appeal in AS (Afghanistan) : see especially [41] – [42]. The Respondent’s submissions further sought to confine the decision in Rantsev , contending that (our summary) the essence of the violation of Article 4 found was the failure of Cyprus to establish a national law framework to combat trafficking, to provide protective measures for trafficking victims and to investigate trafficking allegations. It wa s submitted that the Secretary of State has acquitted this duty via the criminal law legislation and the creation of the NRM. (44) Giving effect to the binding decision of the Court of Appeal in AS (Afghanistan) , we conceive our duty to be to determine whether the immigration decision under challenge in this appeal, namely the decision to remove the Appellant from the United Kingdom and return him to Pakistan in the wake of the anterior refusals of his asylum and trafficking claims, is vitiated by any material error of law in the negative trafficking decisions. In proceeding thus we are conscious of the error of law decision of this Tribunal outlined in [2] above. The factual substratum of our decision is set forth in [10] – [17] above. It was further acknowledged that the Tribunal is empowered to make findings of fact bearing on the Appellant’s case that he was a victim of trafficking. (45) Article 4 ECHR is justic i able before this Tribunal as it is one of the Convention Rights protected by the Human Rights Act and having regard to the provisions of section 82 of the 2002 Act ( supra ). Bearing in mind the decision of the House of Lords in Ullah , we can conceive of no reason not to give full ef fect to the decision of the ECt HR in Rantsev . In this case the Strasbourg Court decided unambiguously that human trafficking falls within the embrace of Article 4 ECHR. Bearing in mind that we are remaking the decision of the FtT, the question for this Tribunal is whether the Appellant has demonstrated that to remove him from the United Kingdom would be in breach of the prohibition against slavery, servitude, forced or compulsory labour and human trafficking and, therefore, in contravention of Article 4 ECHR. This, in the evolution of this appeal, has emerged as the crucial question. (46) We agree with Ms Cronin that this Tribunal is be tter equipped than the Authority to make pertinent findings. The decisions of the Authority were the product of a paper exercise, entailing no live evidence. In contrast, we have the distinct advantage of having heard the Appellant’s viva voce evidence and, further, we have received evidence not available to the Authority. Linked to this is the Secretary of State’s submission, with which we concur, that the Appellant’s credibility is central to the disposal of this appeal. (47) The factual matrix to which we apply the relevant legal rules and principles is set forth in [10] – [17] above. We have made an overarching finding that the core elements of the Appellant’s case are believable. The Appellant’s life is divisible into three phases. Prior to his father’s death, when he was aged around 11 /12 , the Appellant evidently had a relatively normal, stable and happy childhood. His father’s death was a wa tershed. During the following four years approximately, prior to his departure from Pakistan , the Appellant’s life was shaped by forced labour, neglect, isolation and physical abuse at the hands of his cousins. His mother was weak and under the influence of others. Ultimately she abandoned him in his early teenage years. This second phase of the Appellant’s life culminated in his departure for the United Kingdom . At this stage there was no parent or parental figure in his life and, given his age and events during the previous four years, he was obviously vulnerable. (48) At this juncture we conduct the exercise of making certain further findings. We find that the Appellant’s journey to the United Kingdom was arranged by his step grandmother, he was accompanied by her and the arrangements which materialised upon his arrival were made by her. At this time he was heavily influenced by and dependent upon his step grandmother. She deceived the Appellant into travelling to the United Kingdom . He was not acting voluntarily. He was, rather, under the control of a significantly older person whom he viewed as having been instrumental in attempts to disinherit him. We consider this to be a classic case of subtle, psychological compulsion. (49) H is arrival in the United Kingdom heralded the beginning of the third phase in the Appellant’s life. He had been deceived into believing that he had been brought to the United Kingdom to be in education. The contrast between the vision which this would have engendered and the ensuing reality was acute. This would have exacerbated his vulnerability. We readily infer that the labour which followed had been arranged by h is grandmother and that she profited financially from the transaction. This was a callous arrangement motivated bilaterally by financial gain. (50) Contrary to the promises made the Appellant’s life did not entail attending an educational institution and mixing, socially and otherwise, with his peers. Rather, he was plunged into an adult world of work, business and profits. He became an object of cheap and illegal labour. He was ruthlessly exploited by those who employed him. He found himself alone in a foreign country with an alien language and culture. He was bereft of parental and family support and his life was devoid of any parental figure. We consider that he was exploited from the moment of his departure to the United Kingdom , within days of his 16 th birthday until his encounter with the police some 15 months later. We find that, during the initial phase, the Appellant received no pay for his work. The stamp of compulsion applied to his labour, where he worked, the hours he worked, his accommodation and those with whom he shared accommodation and associated . The Appellant had no true freedom of choice at any stage. (51) We take account of the fact that the Appellant did not have a single, fixed employment during the period under scrutiny. However, as appears from the preserved findings rehearsed in [ 12] above, his “mobility” was limited, it was confined to the Asian food industry ; it was facilitated by fellow adult employees ; and , finally, it was plainly motiva ted by a naïve and probably desperate hope of find ing a better way of living. Moreover, as the preserved findings make clear, he was, properly analysed, acting under compulsion and manipulation at all times. He was not truly free in any real sense. He was, rather, a desperate, frightened and coerced teenager. Accordingly the factor s of mobility and more than on e employment do not alter our assessment above. (52) To borrow the phraseology of Rantsev , the Appellant was at the material time a commodity who had been bought and sold and put to forced labour for little payment, living and working under poor conditions: see [281]. Servitude and compulsory labour were the hallmarks of his existence. In Article 4 terms, his human dignity was relentlessly violated and he was denied a fundamental freedom. (53) It is necessary to evaluate the outworkings of the assessment and conclusions above. In the context of these proceedings, arguably the most important feature of the Rantsev decision is the Strasbourg ’s Court assessment of the procedur al, or adjectival, dimension of Article 4. Ms Cronin was right to press this discrete point. The obligations on the State are to ensure the practical and effective protection of the rights of trafficking victims, actual or potential, and to penalise and prosecute effectively any acts aimed at maintaining a person in a situation of slavery, servitude or forced or compulsory labour: see [283] –[289] of Rantsev . The nexus here with the Trafficking Convention, the Palermo Protocol and the EU Trafficking Directive is evident. Furthermore, there is a specific procedural obligation to investigate situations of potential trafficking which are not dependent upon a complaint from the victim. (54) In the Appellant’s case, the first opportunity which the State had to discharge its aforementioned obligations arose at the time of his encounter with the police. The Appellant’s case, unchallenged on this issue, is that he has at all times been co-operative with the police and, indeed, he remains willing to co-operate fully with them. We consider that the most elementary of enquiries at this stage viz late 2012 would have elicited from him an account including the circumstances of his arrival in the United Kingdom and details of subsequent employers and work conditions. This should, in principle, have resulted in prosecut ions for offences under, inter alia, the Slavery Act 2015 , subject of course to the application of the established criteria for prosecution . However, on the evidence before us, there is no indication of even the most elementary of police enquiries. (55) The second opportunity presented to the State to discharge its procedural obligations under Art icle 4 arose when the Authority became seized of the Appellant’s trafficking complaint. Yet another oppor tunity arose when the Authority was required to review its initial negative decision. We refer to our summary of these decisions in [3] – [5] above. Given our assessments and findings above, both decisions of the Authority are manifestly unsustainable. They are infected by a failure to conduct proper enquiries and to amass relevant and available evidence. They are further undermined by a failure to properly examine and assess the realities of the Appellant’s life during the period of some four years before his departure from Pakistan . Further, the Authority failed to properly analyse the factors of the Appellant’s pay, accommodation and mobility and failed to identify the elements of fear and coercion in his work circumstances. (56) In addition, in its assessment that the Appellant worked due to economic necessity, the A uthority failed to recognise that this was not inconsistent with continuing exploitation, manipulation and forced labour. F urther , the Authority placed disproportional weight on the failure of this frightened, isolated mid-teenager recently exposed to the culture and language of an alien country to make a formal complaint to the police. Finally, we consider that its approach to the issue of respite and recovery was hopelessly inadequate. In our judgment, t hese inadequate and cursory decisions would plainly have been vulnerable to successful challenge by judicial review. (57) As the decision in AS ( Afghanistan ) makes clear, the Wednesbury principle is of continuing relevance at this stage. The effect of our foregoing analysis and conclusions is that both decisions of the Authority are unsustainable by reference to the three limbs of the Wednesbury principle, that is to say they are infected by failing to take into account material facts and evidence, together with the intrusion of distorted factors and assessments and, ultimately , irrationality, which is the synonym of the AS (Afghanistan) terminology of “ perversity ”. (58) At this juncture we must consider the effect of our above conclusions . We remind ourselves of the essential elements of the framework of the appeal before us, which are: the Secretary of State has refused the Appellant’s application for asylum and, having done so, is proposing to remove him to Pakistan and the Competent Authority (effectively the Secretary of State) has refused the Appellant’s application to be recognised as a victim of trafficking. We have held that this latter decision is unsustainable in law in the sense outlined above. We have also identified a breach of Article 4 ECHR. (59) If the Authority had made a lawful decision the Appellant would have been recognised as a victim of trafficking. This would have entitled him to a “ recovery and reflection period ” of at least 30 days, per Article 13(1) of the Trafficking Convention. At this remove, the loss of this benefit is irreparable. The Appellant would have qualified for a renewal residence permit under Article 14 if the Authority had considered his stay necessary “ owing to [his] personal situation ”. We consider it highly probable that the Authority, duly armed with all appropriate information, directing itself properly in law and acting rationally would have found this condition to be satisfied. In accordance with Article 14(4), the grant of a residence permit would have been a material consideration in subsequent applications by the Appellant for leave to remain. He has, accordingly, been deprived of a valuable benefit. (60) Furthermore, the decision to remove him from the United Kingdom is not in accordance with the law for the discrete reason that none of these factors was taken into account. This was due to the unlawful decisions of the Authority. We note that our analysis and conclusions on the Trafficking Convention issues mirror closely those of the Administrative Court in