Case No. UKUT-00226-(IAC)

[2010] 51 EHRR 1, Article 4 ECHR, which outlaws slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour, encompasses also human trafficking. (ii) Trafficking decisions are not immigration decisions within the compass of the 2002 Act, with the result that judicial review provides the appropriate mechanism for direct challenge. (iii) Tribunals must take into account, where relevant, a decision that an appellant has been a victim of trafficking. (iv) Where satisfied that a negative trafficking decision is perverse, Tribunals are empowered to make their own decision on whether an appellant was a victim of trafficking. (v) Tribunals are also empowered to review a trafficking decision on the ground that it has been reached in breach of the Secretary of State’s policy guidance. (vi) While, in principle it seems that other public law misdemeanours can also be considered by Tribunals, this issue does not arise for determination in the present appeal. (vii) Tribunals may well be better equipped than the Competent Authority to make pertinent findings relating to trafficking. (viii) The procedural obligations inherent in Article 4 ECHR are linked to those enshrined in the Trafficking Convention, Articles 10(2) and 18 in particular. (ix) Any attempt to remove a trafficking victim from the United Kingdom in circumstances where the said procedural obligations have not been discharged will normally be unlawful. ANONYMITY Pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (SI2008/2698) we make an Anonymity Order. Unless the Upper Tribunal or Court orders otherwise, no report of any proceedings or any form of publication thereof shall directly or indirectly identify the original Appellant. This prohibition applies to, amongst others, all parties. DECISION AND REASONS I ntroduction (1) The origins of this appeal are traceable to a decision made on b ehalf of the Secretary of State for the Home Department ( hereinafter the “ Secretary of State ”) , dated 01 August 2013, whereby the application of the Appellant, a national of Pakistan aged 20 years, for asylum, was refused. This was followed by a decision dated 02 August 2013 to remove the Appellant from the United Kingdom . By its decision dated 03 December 2013, the First-tier T ribunal (the “ FtT ”) dismissed the Appellant’s ensuing appeal on both asylum and human rights grounds. Following a s omewhat convoluted procedural course, permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal was granted on 23 June 2014. By its decision dated 20 August 2014, this Tribunal (differently constituted) held that the decision of the FtT was vitiated by material error of law and ordered that same be set aside accordingly. We hereby re - make such decision. Error of Law (2) We draw attention to, firstly, [42] of the error of law decision of this Tribunal: “[The FtT] misdirected [itself] , firstly in omitting to make a clear finding as to whether or not the Appellant was a victim of trafficking, secondly in concluding that it was sufficient to ascribe to the Appellant a lower position on a spectrum of trafficking and in omitting clearly to evaluate the nature of the Appellant’s employment in the United Kingdom and whether even if freely chosen by him it was nonetheless exploitative. ” Fundamentally, there was a failure to make any finding on the issues of whether the Appellant was trafficked to the United Kingdom and/or re-trafficked within the United Kingdom . In setting aside the decision of the FtT, Upper Tribunal Judge Goldstein expressly preserved certain findings, namely the FtT’s “ positive credibility findings that related to the Appellant’s circumstances in the United Kingdom …. ” The Trafficking Decision s (3) Under United Kingdom law decisions o n trafficking under the Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings (the “ Trafficking Convention ”) are made by the soi - disant “Competent A uthority” (hereinafter “ the Authority ”) under the so-called National Referral Mechanism (the “ NRM ”), which operates under the auspices of the Home Office and, hence, the Secretary of State. We elaborate on this framework in [19] et seq . On 29 November 2012 one of the national social services agencies made a formal referral of the Appellant to the authority under the NRM. On 0 1 February 201 3, the A uthority made a decision that the Appellant, then aged 16 years, was not a victim of trafficking. While accepting that he had been recruited, transported, transferred to and harboured in the United Kingdom and had been the victim of deception, the A uthority did not accept that the Appellant had been brought to the United Kingdom for the purpose of exploitation. The basis of this was that the Appellant had not made the case that he was coerced into working or that his freedom of movement had been curtailed. In its decision the A uthority stated, inter alia : “ In looking at the circumstances of your client’s passage to the United Kingdom it is accepted that he has been subject to an act of recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt as it is not only accepted that his step-grandmother did accompany him to the United Kingdom, it is also acce pted that he may have been deceiv ed as to the true purpose of being brought to the United Kingdom. Your client has clearly stated that he was told by his step-grandmother he was being brought to the United Kingdom to study ….. Given that he was not enrolled in any form of study or education following his arrival it is accepted that he was potentially deceived as to the true purpose of being brought to the United Kingdom . ” The conclusion made was that there were no reasonable grounds for believing that the Appellant was a victim of trafficking within the compass of the Trafficking Convention ( infra ) . (4) By a further decision dated 02 April 2014, postdating the decision of the FtT, the A uthority notified the outcome of its reconsideration of its dismissal of the Appellant’s trafficking claim. Focusing on the Appellant’s life subsequent to his arrival in the United Kingdom, the A uthority reasoned that , as the Appellant had received a salary, was able to rent accommodation and pay his bills and had mov ed around and work ed in different jobs, he was not exploited and “ …. was never under the control or influence of the alleged traffickers in the UK ”. Next, the A uthority adopted the finding of the FtT that the Appellant had not been the victim of forced labour in the United Kingdom as there had been no threat or menace to him. At the height of the Appellant’s case he may have been subjected to a degree of manipulation which did not amount to exploitation via forced labour. Rather, the Appellant worked “ out of pure economic necessity ”. (5) Next, the A uthority reconsidered the Appellant’s claim of having been trafficked to the United Kingdom by his step-grandmother. It reasoned that even if this were accepted the Appellant was not under the control of his traffickers when first encountered by the police in September 2012, with the result that he did not require time to recover from any trafficking experience. It is appropriate to reproduce this somewhat enigmatic passage in full: “ It is noted that you were not under the control of your alleged traffickers when you were encountered by the police in September 2012. It is therefore not considered that you would require further time to recover fr om your alleged trafficking situation. Furthermore, it is considered that as you left the accommodation that was provided to you by [WY] when you worked in the Kebab shop in August 2013, the benefit of a 45 day period of reflection and recovery would be limited in relation to the time you have already had to recover. Therefore it is not accepted that you require a period of time to recover from the influence of your traffickers. ” The decision maker then highlighted that the Appellant was not suffering from any medical condition and had not made any complaint to the police, continuing: “ In conclusion, for the reasons given above, even if your account of your alleged experiences was accepted, it is considered that you are still not a victim of trafficking for the purpose of the Convention and at the present time. ” The Asylum Refusal Decision (6) This is dated 01 August 2013. In the text the nub of the Appellant’s claim is framed thus: “ If returned to Pakistan , you fear that your life is in danger from your step-grandmother and her son because they have taken your father’s property from you, even though this is in your name. You fear your grandmother’s nephews as well because they are criminals involved in dealing drugs and kill people. ” Continuing, the author suggests that a land dispute described by the Appellant was the reason for him leaving Pakistan and that the fear arising out of such dispute is not based upon a fear of persecution in Pakistan for a Convention reason. The decision maker then highlighted the inconsistent ages ( eight or ten ?) put forward by the Appellant relating to the death of his father and his inconsistent replies relating to siblings (none or two ? ). These two factors were considered to damage his credibility. The decision maker then concluded, highlighting the absence of any documentary proof, that the Appellant’s assertion of a land dispute with his step grandmother could be neither accepted nor rejected. Further, the Appellant’s claim of fearing death at the hands of his step-grandmother and her nephews was rejected as not worthy of belief. In the next section of the decision, the conclusion of the Authority that the Appellant had been neither trafficked to, nor trafficked in, the United Kingdom was adopted. (7) The decision maker’s conclusions were that the benefit of the doubt would not be given to the Appellant regarding the unsubstantiated aspects of his claim; he was not considered to be at risk upon returning to Pakistan because of the rejection of his account of a land dispute with his step-grandmother; further and alternatively internal relocation would be reasonable and viable and there was considered to be a sufficiency of state protection available to him in Pakistan; he was not considered entitled to humanitarian protection; he did not qualify for leave to remain under the Immigration Rules; and his return to Pakistan would not infringe Article 3 or Article 8 ECHR. Decision of the FtT (8) The trafficking issue features in the decision of the FtT. Its findings on this issue include the following: “[72] It seems to me that whether or not there was any intention to bring him to the UK to exploit him as opposed to assisting him to find work and support himself in the knowledge that he was not legally entitled to do so, he was a child at the time he was brought here and under the control of adults. ” “[73] I find on his own evidence that he was not subjected to any physical threats or actual violence to make him work and that when he was not happy with his situation he was able to leave without attracting any adverse attention. I do not find that this amounted to ‘forced labour’ but accept in reality he would have had little choice but to work on the black market as he had no permission to work and needed money to survive. He was a child surrounded by adults from his own country and at the very least would have been heavily influenced by them. Clearly he was vulnerable to exploitation. ” Having referred to the evidence of an expert witness, the FtT continued: “[74] … In her opinion the Appellant ….. would not have been able to facilitate his own travel and employment. In her expert opinion the intermediaries arranged the jobs and accommodation and thus exploited his vulnerability as a child to use him as cheap and illegal labour. It was her opinion that victims of trafficking are often accommodated at the site of the premises making them dependent on exploiters …. Living and usually [working] behind the scenes away from public view so that they can be controlled and isolated from the general public. I am satisfied that at least initially this was the position for the Appellant. However, his detailed account of events in the UK includes reference to him deciding himself to move closer to his work on one occasion …. and to his own decisions to move from one place to another ….. albeit with the assistance of others working in the industry. He was not sleeping at the work premises. He was not at any time subjected to violence or threats. At the most he may have been manipulated. ” “[75] … .. I find as a fact that he was assisted by adult males of Pakistani origin working in the same industry to move around the country to different jobs. I find as a fact that he was not in fear of those people but rather felt he had no choice but to work in these establishments in order to survive. His experiences in the UK may well have been an improvement to the life he had been experiencing in Pakistan before he came here. It is perhaps understandable that he would regard these people as friends and not understand exploitative relationships. He may have been manipulated by them or alternatively they may simply have been helping him to survive as an illegal immigrant. ” “ It was his view that he was paying money to people who arranged for his jobs and accommodation as returning a favour. He accepted long working hours and irregular payments as a fact of life. ” “[77] … He was to some degree exploited by adults in the catering industry who knew he did not have legal status and permission to work and that he was under 18. Given his apparent freedom to move around and choose to rent somewhere closer to his work and the fact that he was able to chose how to spend his money (notwithstanding he was paid below minimum wage) if he was a victim of trafficking this was very much at the lower end of the spectrum. There was no evidence that he was in any way traumatised by his experiences. ” [ Our emphasis.] “[78] …. It was his clear instruction to his representatives that he was not currently a victim of trafficking …. I also take into account that since his arrest by the police he had been looked after by Social Services and having reached the age of 18 was now receiving assistance from a personal advisor in the transition to independent living … I find as a fact that he ceased to be in a situation which might have amounted to being a victim of trafficking following his arrest in September 2012. ” [Emphasis added.] At this juncture we interpose the FtT’s positive finding relating to the Appellant’s credibility: “[75] I found his very detailed SEF […….] with regard to his history in the UK to be a truthful account of his activity up to the point when he was arrested by the police. ” We juxtapose with this finding the absence of any finding in the decision of the FtT that any aspect of the Appellant’s case was to be disbelieved. Framework of this appeal (9) A case management review was convened for the purpose of clarifying and delineating the framework of this appeal . This was stimulated by the panel’s perception of a significant lack of clarity relating to the issues of fact and law to be determined . Th is resulted in th e parties’ joint suggested formulation of the issues in the follow ing term s: (i) First, does this Tribunal have jurisdiction to determine whether the Appellant is a victim of trafficking? (ii) If this Tribunal is so empowered and proceeds to make a finding of trafficking, what is the impact, if any, of such finding on the removal decision under appeal? (iii) Is there any distinction in law between a victim of trafficking and a victim of forced labour? (iv) If this Tribunal finds the Appellant to be a victim of trafficking, does the Secretary of State have continuing obligations to him under Articles 12 – 14 of the Trafficking Convention? And would the removal of the Appellant from the United Kingdom violate A rticle 16 thereof ? (v) In Refugee Convention terms, will the Appellant, in the event of returning to Pakistan , be at risk of persecution as a member of a particular social group (former victims of trafficking and/or his family) or of treatment proscribed by Article 3 ECHR? Following reflection , w e are content to adopt this formulation of the issues and the appeal shall be determined accordingly . Factual Matrix (10) This has three main components: the uncontentious facts, the preserved findings of the FtT and our further findings on contentious factual issues. We interpose at this juncture the Appellant’s chronology, which embraces both the factual background and the (regrettably) rather protracted history of this appeal: We recognise that certain aspects of this chronology are contentious. We shall return to this infra . The Appellant’s family (11) According to the Appellant, his family comprises the following relevant members: (i) His paternal grandfather, who died when the Appellant was aged around ten . The grandfather’s first wife was the Appellant’s grandmother. Following her demise, the grandfather married the Appellant’s step-grandmother (“KF”). (ii) KF, the Appellant’s step-grandmother, is the step-mother of three children of the Appellant’s paternal grandfather. These three persons are the Appellant’s uncles/aunts. One of the aunts has two sons who are described consistently as the step-grand mother ’s nephews. (iii) The Appellant’s father died when he was approximately eleven or twelve years. Subsequently, KF sponsored the marriage between the Appellant’s mother and SI, a son of KF. For some time thereafter, all of the aforementioned persons lived together in the same household. (iv) SI is the Appellant’s paternal uncle and became his step-father subsequent to his father’s death. (v) When the Appellant was on a visit to a maternal aunt, his mother married SI and they and the Appellant’s sisters left the family home. The Appellant claims to have had no contact with any of them subsequently. We shall revisit these factual issues in our findings, infra . Preserved Findings (12) As noted in [2] above, in its error of law decision, this Tribunal preserved the FtT’s “ positive credibility findings that related to the Appellant’s circumstances in the United Kingdom ”. Having considered the parties’ submissions on this issue t hese, on analysis, are the following : (i) The Appellant was conveyed to the United Kingdom by his ste p grandmother, having been deceiv ed by her into thinking that this was for the purpose of being educated. (ii) The Appellant was a child at the material time, having just attained his 16 th birthday and he was “ under the control of adults ”. (iii) Subsequently he was employed and went from job to job, in circumstances wherein - “… He would have had little choice but to work on the black market as he had no permission to work and needed money to survive. ” (iv) “ He was a child surrounded by adults from his own country and at the very least would have been heavily influenced by them. Clearly he was vulnerable to exploitation. ” (v) The Appellant was initially exploited by adults for the purpose of using him as “ cheap and illegal labour ”. (vi) Subsequently (at some unspecified stage) “ at the most he may have been manipulated ”. (vii) The Appellant’s “SEF” account of his life in the United Kingdom prior to arrest by the police (in September 2012) was truthful. (viii) The Appellant was assisted by adult males of Pakistani origin working in the same industry to move around the country from job to job and, in doing so, he “ … felt he had no choice but to work in these establishments in order to survive ”. (ix) He paid a person for the purpose of using that person’s particulars in the event of the Appellant being encountered by the police. (x) The Appellant “ … was to some degree exploited by adults in the catering industry …. ” (xi) Given his movements and changes of job, “ …. if he was a victim of trafficking this was very much at the lower end of the spectrum. ” (xii) “ I accept that he may have telephoned his step-grandmother’s home shortly after arriving in the UK when he was unhappy with his situation and that he may have been told that a lot of effort had been taken [sic] to get him to the UK and even been threatened by one of his step-grandmother’s nephews. ” (xiii) The nature of this threat was a threat to kill him. (xiv) (As regards the Appellant’s account of events in Pakistan ) “ I accept that he was a child and may not be expected to remember detail or respond in interview as an adult would be expected to do. ” Contentious Factual Issues: Our Findings (13) In KS (benefit of the d oubt ) [20 14] UKUT 552 (IAC) and [2015] Imm AR 419 , the Upper Tribunal considered Article 4 of the Qualification Directive, which provides: “ Assessment of facts and circumstances 1. Member States may consider it the duty of the applicant to submit as soon as possible all elements needed to substantiate the application for international protection. In cooperation with the applicant it is the duty of the Member State to assess the relevant elements of the application. 2. The elements referred to in of paragraph 1 consist of the applicant ' s statements and all documentation at the applicants disposal regarding the applicant ' s age, background, including that of relevant relatives, identity, nationality(ies), country(ies) and place(s) of previous residence, previous asylum applications, travel routes, identity and travel documents and the reasons for applying for international protection. 3. The assessment of an application for international protection is to be carried out on an individual basis and includes taking into account: (a) all relevant facts as they relate to the country of origin at the time of taking a decision on the application; including laws and regulations of the country of origin and the manner in which they are applied; (b) the relevant statements and documentation presented by the applicant including information on whether the applicant has been or may be subject to persecution or serious harm; (c) the individual position and personal circumstances of the applicant, including factors such as background, gender and age, so as to assess whether, on the basis of the applicant ' s personal circumstances, the acts to which the applicant has been or could be exposed would amount to persecution or serious harm; (d) whether the applicant ' s activities since leaving the country of origin were engaged in for the sole or main purpose of creating the necessary conditions for applying for international protection, so as to assess whether these activities will expose the applicant to persecution or serious harm if returned to that country; (e) whether the applicant could reasonably be expected to avail himself of the protection of another country where he could assert citizenship. 4. The fact that an applicant has already been subject to persecution or serious harm or to direct threats of such persecution or such harm, is a serious indication of the applicant ' s well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm, unless there are good reasons to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated. ” It was held that the duty on the applicant under Article 4 to substantiate his application for international protection is a limited one. Specifically, it is limited to the situation where aspects of the applicant’s statements are not supported (ie corroborated) by documentary or other evidence. In such circumstances, the effect of Article 4(5) is that the Applicant will not need to provide corroboration where the conditions enshrined therein are cumulatively met: see [81] and [85]. Article 4(5) provides: “ 5. Where Member States apply the principle according to which it is the duty of the applicant to substantiate the application for international protection and where aspects of the applicant’s statements are not supported by documentary or other evidence, those aspects shall not need confirmation, when the following conditions are met: (a) the applicant has made a genuine effort to substantiate his application; (b) all relevant elements, at the applicant’s disposal, have been submitted, and a satisfactory explanation regarding any lack of other relevant elements has been given; (c) the applicant’s statements are found to be coherent and plausible and do not run counter to available specific and general information relevant to the applicant’s case; (d) the applicant has applied for international protection at the earliest possible time, unless the applicant can demonstrate good reason for not having done so; and (e) the general credibility of the applicant has been established.” We shall adopt this approach in making our findings on contentious issues. We also give effect to the lower standard of proof, well established, in asylum cases. (14) Th e main contentious factual issues in the Appellant’s case are ascertainable from his cross examination. These are, in brief compass, the land owned by his deceased father; the jobs which the Appellant had before leaving Pakistan; the date of his father’s death; his step grandmother’s refusal to have him educat ed ; his mother’s remarriage; the departure of his mother, sisters and stepfather from the family home; his sojourn with an aunt in another place; his subsequent attempts to contact his mother; his relationship with his step grandmother and her two sons and, in particular, their treatment of him; the authenticity of the two marriage certificates of his mother upon which he relied and the circumstances in which he acquired these; the date appearing on his father’s death certificate; and his interaction and communications with two former friend s following his departure from Pakistan. Al l of these issues and their off shoots were probed in considerable detail at the hearing. (15) The Appellant’s story is certainly not perfect. The exercise of juxtaposing the accounts provided by him during interview, in his witness statement and in his testimony to the Tribunal exposes a number of inconsistencies and imperfections. The question for us is whether these defects render the core of his account unworthy of belief bearing in mind the burden and standard of proof. We have considered his various accounts with care. In evaluating his story, we have had the benefit of assessing the Appellant’s demeanour and presentation at two separate hearings. In this particular case this has proved to be a n asset of considerable value. While the Appellant had the services of an interpreter at both hearings, he readily co-operated with the Tribunal in its suggestion that he endeavour to give his evidence in English if possible. This established that he had a good command of the English language and this, in turn, facilitated our task of assessing his credibility. The Appellant made no attempt to take advantage of the protective shield which the interpreter would have provided. We were impressed by his willingness to engage with the Tribunal throughout his evidence . (16) Furthermore there was a notable spontaneity about the Appellant’s evidence. On occasions, unprompted, he volunteered further information. Some of this entailed correcting, enlarging or clarifying earlier answers provided by him . This reinforced his credibility. We consider that the inconsistencies and gaps in his several accounts are precisely the kind of imperfections to be reasonably expected, taking into account his youth and immaturity during the key periods and the passage of time. Furthermore, we have identified no inconsistency of note in three of the key aspects of the Appellant’s story, namely the circumstances in which he arrived in the United Kingdom , his life since arrival here and his subsequent communications with friend s in Pakistan . (17) This latter issue encompasses one further issue of substantial importance, namely the authenticity of the marriage certificates and the circumstances in which the Appellant acquired these. As regards the document purporting to be the certificate of the death of the Appellant’s father, we make two specific findings. First, bearing in mind that there was no frontal challenge to its authenticity, and taking into account the onerous burden of proving fraud which would be engaged if there were, we are satisfied that this is a genuine document. Further, t o hold otherwise would be contrary to our findings about the Appellant’s credibility generally. Second, having regard to th is latter consideration and in particular our finding that the Appellant’s struggle with certain dates does not undermine the core of h is story, we find that the date appe aring on the document is not inconsistent with the thrust of the Appellant’s case. The simple reality is that an unerringly precise and accurate chronology of all material events in the Appellant’s story will never be feasible. Furthermore it is perfectly conceivable that the certificate was issued some time after the death. Fundamentally, we consider the Appellant’s account to be inherently plausible. (18) Taking all of the above factors into account, our overarching finding is that the core elements of the Appellant’s case are believable. We shall apply the relevant legal rules to this framework accordingly. Legal Framework (19) The main component of the legal framework within which this appeal is to be determined is the Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings (the “ Trafficking Convention ”). As explained in SHL v Secretary of State for the Home Department [ 2013] UKUT 00312 and [2013] Imm AR 875 , at [31]: “ This is a Council of Europe measure, signed by the United Kingdom Government in 2007 and ratified [on 17 December] 20 08. It entered into force on 1 st February 2008, having received the necessary 10 ratifications. It has been ratified by the vast majority of the Council of Europe Member States. ” In the same passage, the main features of the Convention are summarised thus: “ Where the relevant authority has identified a victim of trafficking, the person concer ned may qualify for a residence permit under Article 14. The Convention is a comprehensive measure, focusing particularly on the protection of victims of trafficking and the safeguarding of their rights. It is also designed to prevent and deter trafficking and to prosecute the perpetrators thereof. It embraces all kinds of exploitation, sexual exploitation, forced labour and kindred abuses, whether national or transnational and irrespective of whether related to organised crime. It establishes an independent monitoring mechanism for the purpose of securing compliance with its provisions by the Parties. ” In the United Kingdom , the Secretary of State is the competent authority ( infra ). (20) Following ratification on 17 December 2008, the Trafficking Convention was given effect in the United Kingdom from 01 April 2009. Unusually, it was not incorporated in legislation. Rather, it was given effect through the mechanism of Government policy. The two main policies, an “Action Plan” (March 2007) and an updated “Action Plan” (July 2008) have recently been supplanted by the composite policy document “Victims of Modern Slavery: Competent Authority Guidance (Version 2), Effective from 31 July 2015”. (21) The two main features of the regime thus established are the so-called “ Competent Authority ” (“ the Authority”) and the National Referral Mechanism (“ NRM ”). The former is the alter ego of the Secretary of State for the Home Department and it operates mainly through the United Kingdom Human Trafficking Centre. Various agencies have specific responsibilities in this discrete sphere. These include in particular the childrens ’ services of local authorities, the Safeguarding Children Boards, the Refugee Council and the various Police Services. The NRM, in its current incarnation, is a three stage process which, following extension with effect from 31 July 2015, now embraces victims of slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour as well as trafficking. (22) The Trafficking Convention is the central component of the legal framework. Article 4 defines “trafficking” in the following terms: “ a. "Trafficking in human beings" shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs; b. The consent of a victim of “trafficking in human beings” to the intended exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) have been used; c. The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered "trafficking in human beings" even if this does not involve any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article; d. "Child" shall mean any person under eighteen years of age; e. “Victim” shall mean any natural person who is subject to trafficking in human beings as defined in this article.” In this context, it is appropriate to consider the Explanatory Report relating to the Convention. This states, at [3]: “Trafficking in human beings , with the entrapment of its victims, is the modern form of the old worldwide slave trade. It treats human beings as a commodity to be bought and sold, and to be put to forced labour, usually in the sex industry but also, for example, in the agricultural sector, declared or undeclared sweatshops, for a pittance or nothing at all. Most identified victims of trafficking are women but men also are sometimes victims of trafficking in human beings. Furthermore, many of the victims are young, sometimes children. All are desperate to make a meagre living, only to have their lives ruined by exploitation and rapacity.” The report continues, at [76] “For there to be trafficking in human beings, ingredients from each of the three categories (action, means, purpose) must be present together. There is, however, an exception regarding children: under Article 4(c) recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation is to be regarded as trafficking in human beings even if it does not involve any of the means listed in Article 4(a). Under Article 4(d) the word “child” means any person under 18 years of age.” The concept s of abuse and vulnerability are explained thus, at [83]: “By ‘ abuse of a position of vulnerability ’ is meant abuse of any situation in which the person involved has no real and acceptable alternative to submitting to the abuse. The vulnerability may be of any kind, whether physical, psychological, emotional, family-related, social or economic. The situation might, for example, involve insecurity or illegality of the victim’s administrative status, economic dependence or fragile health. In short, the situation can be any state of hardship in which a human being is impelled to accept being exploited. Persons abusing such a situation flagrantly infringe human rights and violate human dignity and integrity, which no one can validly renounce.” (23) In the context of this appeal there are certain other significant provisions of the Trafficking Convention. Article 10(2) provides: “ Each Party shall adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to identify victims as appropriate in collaboration with other Parties and relevant support organisations. Each Party shall ensure that, if the competent authorities have reasonable grounds to believe that a person has been victim of trafficking in human beings, that person shall not be removed from its territory until the identification process as victim of an offence provided for in Article 18 of this Convention has been completed by the competent authorities and shall likewise ensure that that person receives the assistance provided for in Article 12, paragraphs 1 and 2. ” By Article 13(1) it is provided: “ 1 Each Party shall provide in its internal law a recovery and reflection period of at least 30 days, when there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person concerned is a victim. Such a period shall be sufficient for the person concerned to recover and escape the influence of traffickers and/or to take an informed decision on cooperating with the competent authorities. During this period it shall not be possible to enforce any expulsion order against him or her. This provision is without prejudice to the activities carried out by the competent authorities in all phases of the relevant national proceedings, and in particular when investigating and prosecuting the offences concerned. During this period, the Parties shall authorise the persons concerned to stay in their territory.” Article 14 states: “1. Each Party shall issue a renewable residence permit to victims, in one or other of the two following situations or in both: a. the competent authority considers that their stay is necessary owing to their personal situation; b. the competent authority considers that their stay is necessary for the purpose of their co-operation with the competent authorities in investigation or criminal proceedings. 2. The residence permit for child victims, when legally necessary, shall be issued in accordance with the best interests of the child and, where appropriate, renewed under the same conditions. 3. The non-renewal or withdrawal of a residence permit is subject to the conditions provided for by the internal law of the Party. 4. If a victim submits an application for another kind of residence permit, the Party concerned shall take into account that he or she holds, or has held, a residence permit in conformity with paragraph 1. 5. Having regard to the obligations of Parties to which Article 40 of this Convention refers, each Party shall ensure that granting of a permit according to this provision shall be without prejudice to the right to seek and enjoy asylum.” Article 15 provides: “1 Each Party shall ensure that victims have access, as from their first contact with the competent authorities, to information on relevant judicial and administrative proceedings in a language which they can understand. 2 Each Party shall provide, in its internal law, for the right to legal assistance and to free legal aid for victims under the conditions provided by its internal law. 3 Each Party shall provide, in its internal law, for the right of victims to compensation from the perpetrators. 4 Each Party shall adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to guarantee compensation for victims in accordance with the conditions under its internal law, for instance through the establishment of a fund for victim compensation or measures or programmes aimed at social assistance and social integration of victims, which could be funded by the assets resulting from the application of measures provided in Article 23.” We shall revisit these provisions and address Article 18 separately infra . (24) In the growing domestic jurisprudence belonging to this field, it has been held that the threshold in play, namely that of merely suspecting without being able to prove, is particularly low: see R (Minh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWHC 1725 (Admin). The standard of proof applicable to this threshold is the balance of probabilities. It was further held in Minh , at [126], that the function of the Competent Authority is inquisitorial in nature. (25) The second element of the legal framework is Article 4 ECHR which, by virtue of the Human Rights Act 1998, is a provision of domestic law . This provides , in material part: “ 1. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude. 2. No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.” Third, there is Council Directive 2011/36/EU on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Human Beings and Protecting The Victims (the “ Trafficking Directive ”). Finally, there is the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (the “ Palermo Protocol ”). Since 01 November 2015 the domestic law framework has included the Modern Slavery Act 2015. By section 52 of this enactment public authorities are obliged to notify the Secretary of State if they suspect that a person is a victim of slavery or human trafficking. Various offences are created. (26) W e turn our attention to some of the leading judicial decisions in this field. In Ra nts ev v Cyprus and Russia [2010] 51 EHRR 1, one of the main legal issues which arose was that Article 4 ECHR does not expressly encompass human trafficking. The specific complaints before the EC t HR was that the Applicant’s daughter had been trafficked from Russia to Cyprus and that both the Russian and Cypriot authorities were in breach of Article 4. The Court acknowledged that it had not previously decided whether the proscription of slavery, servitude and forced and compulsory labour enshrined in Article 4 extended to human trafficking: see [272] – [273]. It drew on its previous decision in