Case No. UKUT-00226-(IAC)

would not be given to the Appellant regarding the unsubstantiated aspects of his claim; he was not considered to be at risk upon returning to Pakistan because of the rejection of his account of a land dispute with his step-grandmother; further and alternatively internal relocation would be reasonable and viable and there was considered to be a sufficiency of state protection available to him in Pakistan; he was not considered entitled to humanitarian protection; he did not qualify for leave to remain under the Immigration Rules; and his return to Pakistan would not infringe Article 3 or Article 8 ECHR. Decision of the FtT (8) The trafficking issue features in the decision of the FtT. Its findings on this issue include the following: “[72] It seems to me that whether or not there was any intention to bring him to the UK to exploit him as opposed to assisting him to find work and support himself in the knowledge that he was not legally entitled to do so, he was a child at the time he was brought here and under the control of adults. ” “[73] I find on his own evidence that he was not subjected to any physical threats or actual violence to make him work and that when he was not happy with his situation he was able to leave without attracting any adverse attention. I do not find that this amounted to ‘forced labour’ but accept in reality he would have had little choice but to work on the black market as he had no permission to work and needed money to survive. He was a child surrounded by adults from his own country and at the very least would have been heavily influenced by them. Clearly he was vulnerable to exploitation. ” Having referred to the evidence of an expert witness, the FtT continued: “[74] … In her opinion the Appellant ….. would not have been able to facilitate his own travel and employment. In her expert opinion the intermediaries arranged the jobs and accommodation and thus exploited his vulnerability as a child to use him as cheap and illegal labour. It was her opinion that victims of trafficking are often accommodated at the site of the premises making them dependent on exploiters …. Living and usually [working] behind the scenes away from public view so that they can be controlled and isolated from the general public. I am satisfied that at least initially this was the position for the Appellant. However, his detailed account of events in the UK includes reference to him deciding himself to move closer to his work on one occasion …. and to his own decisions to move from one place to another ….. albeit with the assistance of others working in the industry. He was not sleeping at the work premises. He was not at any time subjected to violence or threats. At the most he may have been manipulated. ” “[75] … .. I find as a fact that he was assisted by adult males of Pakistani origin working in the same industry to move around the country to different jobs. I find as a fact that he was not in fear of those people but rather felt he had no choice but to work in these establishments in order to survive. His experiences in the UK may well have been an improvement to the life he had been experiencing in Pakistan before he came here. It is perhaps understandable that he would regard these people as friends and not understand exploitative relationships. He may have been manipulated by them or alternatively they may simply have been helping him to survive as an illegal immigrant. ” “ It was his view that he was paying money to people who arranged for his jobs and accommodation as returning a favour. He accepted long working hours and irregular payments as a fact of life. ” “[77] … He was to some degree exploited by adults in the catering industry who knew he did not have legal status and permission to work and that he was under 18. Given his apparent freedom to move around and choose to rent somewhere closer to his work and the fact that he was able to chose how to spend his money (notwithstanding he was paid below minimum wage) if he was a victim of trafficking this was very much at the lower end of the spectrum. There was no evidence that he was in any way traumatised by his experiences. ” [ Our emphasis.] “[78] …. It was his clear instruction to his representatives that he was not currently a victim of trafficking …. I also take into account that since his arrest by the police he had been looked after by Social Services and having reached the age of 18 was now receiving assistance from a personal advisor in the transition to independent living … I find as a fact that he ceased to be in a situation which might have amounted to being a victim of trafficking following his arrest in September 2012. ” [Emphasis added.] At this juncture we interpose the FtT’s positive finding relating to the Appellant’s credibility: “[75] I found his very detailed SEF […….] with regard to his history in the UK to be a truthful account of his activity up to the point when he was arrested by the police. ” We juxtapose with this finding the absence of any finding in the decision of the FtT that any aspect of the Appellant’s case was to be disbelieved. Framework of this appeal (9) A case management review was convened for the purpose of clarifying and delineating the framework of this appeal . This was stimulated by the panel’s perception of a significant lack of clarity relating to the issues of fact and law to be determined . Th is resulted in th e parties’ joint suggested formulation of the issues in the follow ing term s: (i) First, does this Tribunal have jurisdiction to determine whether the Appellant is a victim of trafficking? (ii) If this Tribunal is so empowered and proceeds to make a finding of trafficking, what is the impact, if any, of such finding on the removal decision under appeal? (iii) Is there any distinction in law between a victim of trafficking and a victim of forced labour? (iv) If this Tribunal finds the Appellant to be a victim of trafficking, does the Secretary of State have continuing obligations to him under Articles 12 – 14 of the Trafficking Convention? And would the removal of the Appellant from the United Kingdom violate A rticle 16 thereof ? (v) In Refugee Convention terms, will the Appellant, in the event of returning to Pakistan , be at risk of persecution as a member of a particular social group (former victims of trafficking and/or his family) or of treatment proscribed by Article 3 ECHR? Following reflection , w e are content to adopt this formulation of the issues and the appeal shall be determined accordingly . Factual Matrix (10) This has three main components: the uncontentious facts, the preserved findings of the FtT and our further findings on contentious factual issues. We interpose at this juncture the Appellant’s chronology, which embraces both the factual background and the (regrettably) rather protracted history of this appeal: We recognise that certain aspects of this chronology are contentious. We shall return to this infra . The Appellant’s family (11) According to the Appellant, his family comprises the following relevant members: (i) His paternal grandfather, who died when the Appellant was aged around ten . The grandfather’s first wife was the Appellant’s grandmother. Following her demise, the grandfather married the Appellant’s step-grandmother (“KF”). (ii) KF, the Appellant’s step-grandmother, is the step-mother of three children of the Appellant’s paternal grandfather. These three persons are the Appellant’s uncles/aunts. One of the aunts has two sons who are described consistently as the step-grand mother ’s nephews. (iii) The Appellant’s father died when he was approximately eleven or twelve years. Subsequently, KF sponsored the marriage between the Appellant’s mother and SI, a son of KF. For some time thereafter, all of the aforementioned persons lived together in the same household. (iv) SI is the Appellant’s paternal uncle and became his step-father subsequent to his father’s death. (v) When the Appellant was on a visit to a maternal aunt, his mother married SI and they and the Appellant’s sisters left the family home. The Appellant claims to have had no contact with any of them subsequently. We shall revisit these factual issues in our findings, infra . Preserved Findings (12) As noted in [2] above, in its error of law decision, this Tribunal preserved the FtT’s “ positive credibility findings that related to the Appellant’s circumstances in the United Kingdom ”. Having considered the parties’ submissions on this issue t hese, on analysis, are the following : (i) The Appellant was conveyed to the United Kingdom by his ste p grandmother, having been deceiv ed by her into thinking that this was for the purpose of being educated. (ii) The Appellant was a child at the material time, having just attained his 16 th birthday and he was “ under the control of adults ”. (iii) Subsequently he was employed and went from job to job, in circumstances wherein - “… He would have had little choice but to work on the black market as he had no permission to work and needed money to survive. ” (iv) “ He was a child surrounded by adults from his own country and at the very least would have been heavily influenced by them. Clearly he was vulnerable to exploitation. ” (v) The Appellant was initially exploited by adults for the purpose of using him as “ cheap and illegal labour ”. (vi) Subsequently (at some unspecified stage) “ at the most he may have been manipulated ”. (vii) The Appellant’s “SEF” account of his life in the United Kingdom prior to arrest by the police (in September 2012) was truthful. (viii) The Appellant was assisted by adult males of Pakistani origin working in the same industry to move around the country from job to job and, in doing so, he “ … felt he had no choice but to work in these establishments in order to survive ”. (ix) He paid a person for the purpose of using that person’s particulars in the event of the Appellant being encountered by the police. (x) The Appellant “ … was to some degree exploited by adults in the catering industry …. ” (xi) Given his movements and changes of job, “ …. if he was a victim of trafficking this was very much at the lower end of the spectrum. ” (xii) “ I accept that he may have telephoned his step-grandmother’s home shortly after arriving in the UK when he was unhappy with his situation and that he may have been told that a lot of effort had been taken [sic] to get him to the UK and even been threatened by one of his step-grandmother’s nephews. ” (xiii) The nature of this threat was a threat to kill him. (xiv) (As regards the Appellant’s account of events in Pakistan ) “ I accept that he was a child and may not be expected to remember detail or respond in interview as an adult would be expected to do. ” Contentious Factual Issues: Our Findings (13) In KS (benefit of the d oubt ) [20 14] UKUT 552 (IAC) and [2015] Imm AR 419 , the Upper Tribunal considered Article 4 of the Qualification Directive, which provides: