Case No. UKUT-00226-(IAC)

( supra ) the Court identified the UK Border Agency as the public authority which was under a positive duty to initiate an effective investigation by the police. This duty was considered to be unaffected by the circumstance that the victim had made no complaint to the police and the absence of continuing police investigations. (64) The same conclusion is reached by the different route provided by Article 4 ECHR. The Appellant is not simply the historical victim of treatment proscribed by this provision. He is, rather, the continuing victim of an enduring breach by the State of its investigative and procedural obligations identified in [ 27 ] above. Within the framework of section 6 of the Human Rights Act, the public authorities who, to date, have failed to discharge these obligations are UKBA, the Authority and the police service. Furthermore, i t is inconceivable that an effective police investigation and any ensuing prosecution could be conducted without the full assistance and co-operation of the Appellant. Realistically, t his will not be feasible if he is removed to Pakistan . Accordingly, to remove him to Pakistan would contravene Article 4 ECHR. The Secretary of State’s removal decision is unlawful on this further ground. (65) Accordingly, on the grounds and for the reasons elaborated above, the Secretary of State’s decision to remove the Appellant from the United Kingdom is not in accordance with the law and is contrary to section 6 of the Human Rights Act, within the framework of section 84(1)(c) and (e) of the 2002 Act. (66) One discrete aspect of the Appellant’s case is that if he is removed to Pakistan this will expose him to a risk of re-trafficking. In our judgment the evidential foundation necessary for making this finding is lacking. Having regard to his age (now 19), his increased maturity and the positive aspects of h is experiences during the last four years, whi ch are likely to have fortified him as a person and will equip him to identify and avoid risks of this kind, we are satisfied that this case is not made out. Furthermore, on the hypothesis of his return to Pakistan , we are confident that the Appellant will be able to locate and re-establish himself in a manner which will distance himself sufficiently from the three persons concerned, his step-grandmother and her tw o nephews , to efficaciously eliminate such risk of re-trafficking as may arise. There is nothing in the evidence, including the experts’ reports (of which more, infra), warranting a different assessment. (67) We turn to examine the protecti o n dimension of the Appellant’s case. It is common case that the Appellant is a member of a particular social group, namely his family. It is also agreed, having regard to our findings, that the Appellant would be at risk of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason at the hands of the three persons concerned. However, we discern no basis upon which to conclude that it would be either unreasonable or impractical for the Appellant to locate and re-establish himself in Pakistan in the manner suggested immediately above. In particular, we take into account that the Appellant has no enduring links with his direct and immediate family in his home area; he has no enduring relationships with any relatives there; he has no employment or education to return to there; he has only one enduring friendship in the area; and, finally, if it were necessary for him to resort to litigation and he were minded to do so, in relation to the inheritance of his deceased father’s lands, there is no evidence that he must permanently re-establish himself in the area of his former home for this purpose. In short, the availability of safe internal relocation undermines the Appellant’s asylum application fatally. (68) Finally, one of the features of the Appellant’s case was his reliance up on four expert reports. These were generated by, respectively, an expert in anthropology, an expert in the laws of Pakistan , an expert in child trafficking and exploitation and an expert in labour exploitation. On behalf of the Secretary of State, Mr Wilding criticised some of this evidence. He suggested that it was mere advocacy and that there were passages in the reports more akin to skeleton arguments than expert commentary and opinion . He further highlighted that none of the experts had interviewed the Appellant. (69) As a perusal of this judgment will confirm, we have made our findings and conclusions favourable to the Appellant without reference to any of the expert evidence. The reason for this is that we did not consider it necessary to do so. However, w hile declining to descend into superfluous detail, we consider that there is some force in the criticisms levelled. Had it been necessary to do so, we would have exami ned them in appropriate detail. In the circumstances, it suffices to highlight the detailed treatment of the duties of expert witnesses in the decision of th is Tribunal in