UT (Tax & Chancery) UT-2022-0000150 - [2024] UKUT 00254 (TCC)
Fecha: 10-Jul-2024
The economic situation
The economic situation
There were signs of a financial crash in early 2008, and by May of that year it was evident that the world was on the brink of a crisis, and that financial institutions needed to raise capital to avoid risking collapse. At the time, Mr John Varley was Barclays’ CEO, Mr Chris Lucas was its CFO and Mr Paul Emney its COO.
Barclays’ Board decided that very large sums of money needed to be raised to support the bank, and in June 2008 undertook to raise capital. The exercise was engineered by the Barclays Corporate Development team and its Capital Markets team, led by Mr Richard Boath. Mr Kalaris was brought in to help co-ordinate the process, which involved ensuring, in his own words, that “everything and everyone was as joined up as possible and that all relevant senior management were kept informed and all relevant people were involved in any decisions to be made”.
Barclays’ strategy was to try and secure a lead SWF investor to participate in the capital raising, because it was felt that as soon as one significant investor committed, others would have the confidence to follow suit. Barclays approached a number of possible SWFs, including the Qatar Investment Authority (“the Qataris”). The potential investors were given code names based on species of bird, with the Qataris being “Quail”.
On 28 May 2008, Barclays decided it would pay 1.5% underwriting commission on the capital raising. However, by at least 15 May 2008, it was also considering ways of “sweetening” the deal for “cornerstone investors”, including by using a memorandum of understanding (“MoU”) specific to the investor in question.
- Heading
- Introduction and Summary
- The Barclays references
- The Tribunal’s view
- Subsequently
- Legislation, case law and the Handbook
- The legislation and related case law
- The Handbook
- The Decision Notice
- Evidence
- The evidence on the capital raising issue
- Mr Beauchamp
- Mr Tinney
- Mr Perry
- Mr Mason
- Mr Biesinger
- Findings of fact
- Mr Kalaris
- Capital raising, GenVen and the Interviews
- The criminal proceedings
- Saranac
- The SWF initiative
- The economic situation
- The ASA
- The link between the ASA and the capital raising
- The text of the ASA
- The Prospectus
- The second capital raising and PCP
- The 2013 Interview
- What Mr Kalaris knew
- What the Authority knew
- What Mr Kalaris believed about the Authority’s knowledge
- Mr Kalaris’s responses relied on by the Authority
- Question 1: The “genesis of the agreement”
- Q1: The Authority’s position
- Who came up with the idea?
- The two paths
- Strategic relationship
- Unnecessary?
- The Tribunal’s findings
- Question 2: the purpose
- Q2: The Authority’s position
- Q2: Saranac’s position
- Q2: The Tribunal’s findings
- Question 3: the calculation
- Q3: The Authority’s position
- Q3: Saranac’s position
- Q3: The Tribunal’s findings
- Question 4: connection
- Q4: Saranac’s position
- Q4: The Tribunal’s findings
- Motive?
- Overall conclusion on the 2013 Interview
- THE 2014 INTERVIEW
- The culture at Barclays Wealth Americas
- The cultural audit
- The pre-meeting communications
- Briefing and the subsequent meetings
- Ms Hilgart
- The Cultural Workshop
- The Whistleblower email
- The Fed update
- The 2014 Interview
- The position of the parties
- Discussion and consideration
- The briefing on 30 March 2012
- The meeting on 5 April
- The meeting on 10 December 2012
- The weekend of 14-15 December 2012
- Overall findings
- OTHER FINDINGS
- The other evidence
- The Saranac assessment
- The personal references
- The capital raising and the GenVen Report
- Financial services experience
- Mr Kalaris’s approach to regulatory requirements in the past
- Compliance with restrictions
- Training
- The standing of the NEDs
- Mr Elliott
- Mr Neilly
- The Tribunal’s conclusion
- Conclusions