[2025] UKUT 262 (AAC)

This judicial review is about the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2012 (“the 2012 Scheme”) and, in particular, the provisions in the 2012 Scheme dealing with animal attacks. More particularly, it is about whether the First-tier Tribunal (“the FTT”) correctly concluded on 4 March 2024 that the interested party in these proceedings (who was the person who made the claim for criminal injuries compensation) had been the victim of a crime of violence under the 2012 Scheme when she had been attacked and injured by a large Alsatian dog.

Under paragraph 4 of the 2102 Scheme a person may be eligible for an award under the Scheme “if they sustain a criminal injury which is directly attributable to their being a direct victim of a crime of violence committed in a relevant place”. Paragraph 4 then sets out that “[t]he meaning of “crime of violence” is explained in Annex B”.

Paragraph 1 of Annex B to the 2012 Scheme states that where a claims officer is satisfied that a crime has been committed, “it is still necessary for that crime to constitute a crime in accordance with this Annex”. Paragraph 2 of Annex B to the 2012 Scheme provides that:

“2.(1)……a “crime of violence” is a crime which involves:

(a)

a physical attack;

(b)

any other act or omission of a violent nature which causes physical injury to a person;

(c)

a threat against a person, causing fear of immediate violence in circumstances which would cause a person of reasonable firmness to be put in such fear;

(d)

a sexual assault to which a person did not in fact consent; or (e) arson or fire-raising.

(2)

An act or omission under sub-paragraph (1) will not constitute a crime of violence unless it is done either intentionally or recklessly.”

However, paragraph 4(1) in Annex B to the 2012 Scheme then provides as follows.

“4.

(1) A crime of violence will not be considered to have been committed for the purposes of this Scheme if, in particular, an injury:

(a)

resulted from suicide or attempted suicide, unless the suicidal person acted with intent to cause injury to another person;

(b)

resulted from the use of a vehicle, unless the vehicle was used with intent to cause injury to a person;

(c)

resulted from an animal attack, unless the animal was used with intent to cause injury to a person;

(d)

was sustained in the usual course of sporting or other activity to which a person consented by taking part in the activity; or

(e)

was sustained in utero as a result of harmful substances willingly ingested by the mother during pregnancy, with intent to cause, or being reckless as to, injury to the foetus.”

I will return to these provisions later. However, I do not think it was disputed before me that, as Upper Tribunal Judge Wikeley indicated in paragraphs [30-[35] of his decision in R (NJ) v First-tier Tribunal and Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority (CIC) [2015] UKUT 196 (AAC); [2015 AACR] 42, paragraph 4(1)(c) in Annex B to the 2012 Scheme represents an avowed tightening up of entitlement under the 2012 Scheme and, compared to earlier iterations of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme, in respect of those people who have been the victims of attacks by animals and dogs in particular.

Following on from this last point, I should emphasise that this is the first decision, as far as I am aware, made by the Upper Tribunal concerning the 2012 Scheme and animal (particularly dog) attacks. Not only has the 2012 Scheme on its face restricted eligibility for those who are injured in dog attacks, it has also (and for the first time) sought to define what is meant by “a crime of violence”. As will be seen, defining what is meant by “crime of violence” has a consequence in terms of whether liability under section 3(1) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 can constitute a crime of violence under the 2012 Scheme. Given all of this, earlier decisions about what was meant by a crime of violence, and in respect of dogs attacks, under earlier versions of the Criminal Injures Compensation Scheme may no longer be relevant.