Case No. UKUT-00376-(IAC)

. At paragraphs 35 – 39 Lord Brown said the following: “35. It mu st surely be correct to say … that article 1F disqualifies those who make a ‘substantial contribution to’ the crime, knowing that their acts or omissions will facilit ate it … [ and ] that article 1F responsibility will attach to anyone … c ontributing to the commission of such crimes by substantia lly assisting the organisation to continue to function effectively in pursuance of its aims. 36. Of course, criminal responsibil ity would only attach to those with the necessary mens rea (mental eleme nt). But, as article 30 of the ICC Statute makes plain, if a person is aware that in the ordinary course of events a particular consequence will follow from his actions, he is taken to have acted with both knowledge and intent. 38….. Put simply, I would hold an accu sed disqualified under article 1F if there are serious reasons for consi dering him voluntarily to have contributed in a significant way to the or ganisation’s ability to pursue its purpose of committing war crimes, aware that his as sistance will in fact further that purpose.” 31. Applying all of these considerations to the question of whether the Secretary of State has established that there are serious reasons for considering that the appellant has been guilty of crimes against humanity, we turn to the autonomous meaning to be given to the words “serious reasons for considering”. We have applied the guidance given in paragraph 75 of the decision in Al Sir r i