Case No. UKUT-00376-(IAC)

36. On behalf of the appellant , Ms Pickup drew attention to the terms of article 3 1 of the ICC Statute, which sets out the available defences and observed that acting under duress was specifically included. She drew attention to the terms of article 66 setting out the presumption of innocence and to the terms of article 67 setting out the prohibition on any reverse burden of proof or onus of rebuttal. She drew attention to the way this had been interpreted in Ambos’s Treatise on International Criminal Law , Volume 1 pp 312 to 315 , where the author stated: “In the context of defences it is particularly important that the ICC Prosecutor is under the legal obligation to est ablish the truth and, in doing so, investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally. [….] At the very least, one has to apply the rule prohibiting any reversal of the burden of pr oof or onus of rebuttal to the detriment of the accused not only to the elemen ts of the offence, but equally to defences, that is, the Prosecutor is obliged to disprove the existence of a defence beyond reasonable doubt.” 37. Ms Pickup accordingly submitted that as a matter of international criminal law the defence of duress was available to the appellant and that the onus of disproving that defence lay on the Secretary of State. The particular application of that onus in the present proceedings would require the Secretary of State to demonstrate that there were serious reasons for considering that the appellant did not act under duress. Ms Pickup submitted that the case of