Case No. UKUT-00376-(IAC)

18. The respondent’s reasons for refusal letter begins with an assessment of the conduct of the Iranian authorities in recent years and then narrates , over some thirty or so pages , various, sometimes repetitive, circumstances and considerations which she appears to have taken into account in determining whether the appellant ought to be excluded from the protection of the Refugee Convention by virtue of article 1F. It is not always easy to follow the thinking which lies behind this letter and a number of the considerations identified have no application to the appellant and her conduct. However, having the benefit of the skeleton argument prepared on behalf of the respondent , and having heard submissions from Ms Isherwood, we understand the respondent’s position to be this. Article 1F of the Refugee Convention provides as follows: “The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that: (a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the i nternational instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes;” 19. The meaning to be given to article 1F(a) is to be found in international law rather than domestic law and the guiding instrument is the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“the ICC Statute”). 20. The respondent contended that the acts of torture admittedly perpetrated within the prison in which the appellant worked were of a nature and extent such as would fall within the definition of a crime against humanity, as set out in article 7 of the ICC Statute. Although it was not suggested that the appellant personally conducted any acts of torture, she fell to be held responsible in light of the terms of article 25 paragraph 3(c) which attached criminal responsibility to someone who: “For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission;” 21. The Secretary of State’s contention was that the appellant facilitated the acts of torture which occurred in the part of the prison controlled by the Intelligence Service by her conduct in identifying those prisoners who were listed for interrogation and by taking them from the general part of the prison to the part controlled by the Intelligence Service. It was contended that the mental elements of intent and knowledge required for criminal responsibility by the ICC Statute were met in light of the terms of article 30, which provides as follows: 2. For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where: (a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct; (b) in relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events. 3. For the purposes of this articl e, “knowledge” means awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events. ‘Know’ and ‘knowingly’ shal l be construed accordingly.” 22. On the appellant’s own evidence she intended that those identified by her as corresponding to the names on the list should be transferred to the relevant part of the prison and she did this in the knowledge that they would be subjected to torture once she had done so. She personally undertook the transfer on various occasions. In these circumstances the respondent contended that on the evidence available it was clear that the appellant’s conduct facilitated what occurred, that she knew what the consequence for the prisoners of her participation would be and she had therefore made a substantial contribution to the acts of torture constituting a crime against humanity perpetrated in the prison. Relying on the authority of