in itself
poses a threat to the fundamental interests of society. There is a risk that the Appellant could use his “ knowledge and potential access to weapons ” in furtherance of his personal interests or those of ETA. Ms Anderson condemned as misconceived any suggestion that the only threat that can be posed by the Appellant is engaging in a terrorist campaign in or affecting the United Kingdom on behalf of ETA. She emphasised that the Appellant qualifies for the minimum level of protection available under the EEA Regulations. Highlighting the Appellant’s failure to give evidence to the Tribunal, Ms Anderson invoked section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004, submitting that a refusal to be interviewed and/or to give evidence belonged to the “ highest possible end ” of conduct warranting the drawing of adverse inferences. Finally, Ms Anderson submitted that the lawfulness of the Secretary of State’s deportation decision is not dependent upon the “ Marchon/Bouchereau ” principle. 88. On behalf of the Appellant Ms Dubinsky advanced four main submissions. First, there is no evidence that ETA or Basque militants have ever posed a threat to the community of the United Kingdom or have any motive for doing so in the future. Second, there is no evidence that ETA or Basque militants pose any risk of resuming armed conflict. Third, there is no evidence that former ETA prisoners pose any risk of reoffending in any form. Fourth, the Appellant’s past offending cannot, without more, as a matter of law be indicative of a propensity to reoffend, per Regulation 21(5)(e). 89. Ms Dubinsky further submitted that there is no adequate evidential basis for the threat attributed to the Appellant in the context of the Regulation 21(5)(c) test. She developed this submission in the following way: (i) In a context where the Appellant has been extradited to Spain, there is no logical basis for believing that he will have resort to the use of false documents in the future. (ii) The Appellant’s past use and possession of forged documents are insufficient to satisfy the statutory test. (iii) The burden of proof is important because the key question of whether the Appellant will re-offend in the United Kingdom is disputed.
- PART 1
- Introduction
- The Statutory Framework
- The Secretary of State’s Decision
- organised crime
- The European Arrest Warrant
- current
- Del Rio Prada v Spain
- Spanish Judicial Authority v Arranz (No 3)
- The Appellant’s Witness Statements
- The Operative Extradition Decision
- itself
- The Principal Grounds of Appeal
- deduced
- The Burden of Proof Issue
- Insofar as the appeal relies upon the 2006 Regulations, the burden is also on the Appellant, the standard being the balance of probabilities
- this
- might
- Other Grounds of Appeal
- (i) Misunderstanding The Evidence
- E v Secretary of State for the Home Department; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department
- E & R
- (ii) Misunderstanding the Second Divisional Court’s Decision
- Paragraph 27
- Paragraph 28
- Paragraph 60
- Kandola
- Spanish Judicial Authority v Arranz
- Vanda Puceviciene
- persecution
- (iv) The Article 6 ECHR Issue
- R (EM Eritrea) v SSHD
- flagrant breach
- R (Ullah) v SSHD
- Conclusion
- PART 2
- The Evidence of Professor Silke
- The Battle Lines Drawn
- in itself
- General
- JS (Sudan)
- The ‘Colectivo’ Issue
- Risk of Reoffending
- The Appellant’s Terrorist Criminality and ETA
- from this perspective,
- Del Rio Prada
- could
- The Reluctant Witness
- Marchon v Immigration Appeal Tribunal
- Nazli
- Ex parte Marchon
- Bouchereau
- Omnibus Conclusion
