Case No. UKUT-00294-(IAC)

. There can be no legitimate reason to hold such documents. Bearing in mind your previous conviction, your possession of these documents and your association with a man implicated in ETA terrorist offences strongly suggests that you present a significant risk of harm to the public. ” Thus the deportation decision was, in substance, based on two grounds. 8. The decision maker then purported to give effect to regulation 21(5)(a) of the EEA Regulations, which stipulates that any deportation decision must comply with the principle of proportionality and details an inexhaustive list of factors to be taken into account: age, state of health, family and economic situation, length of residence in the United Kingdom, social and cultural integration and links with country or origin. This discrete assessment yielded the following conclusion: “ … Given the threat of serious harm you pose to the public, it is considered that your personal circumstances do not preclude your deportation being pursued. It is considered that the decision to deport you is proportionate …. ” It was further noted that there was no evidence that the Appellant was engaged in any form of rehabilitation in the United Kingdom. 9. Next, the Secretary of State’s decision maker considered Article 8 ECHR, in the following terms: “ You have not provided any evidence of Article 8 family life existing in the United Kingdom … It is accepted that you may have developed a degree of private life …. Your deportation is conducive to the public good and in the public interest because you have been convicted of an offence for which you have been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years. ” The decision maker noted that the deportation provisions of the Immigration Rules – paragraphs A362 and A398 – 399D – and Part 5A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 did not apply to the Appellant’s case. However, these had been “ used as a guide for considering your Article 8 claim ”. This exercise entailed posing the question of whether there were very compelling circumstances sufficient to outweigh the public interest underpinning the Appellant’s deportation. The conclusion made was that there were no such circumstances.