Kandola
, that the Senior District Judge was wrong on the facts of this case to act on the unreasoned statement of the Spanish judge.
(1)
Proper evidence had been adduced before the court that there was a means of examining the appellant in the United Kingdom; therefore the sole reason for the decision to prosecute not having been made was not his absence from Spain.
(2)
There are real concerns about the delay in this case. The matter with which the appellant is charged relates to events in April 2011 and further delay would not be acceptable.
(3)
It would not have been difficult for the Spanish Judicial Authority to have responded on this point. It could easily set out its reasons, taking into account that the purpose of s.12A was to ensure that there would be no delays.
(4)
It is inexplicable in these circumstances why the Spanish Judicial Authority did not seek to take advantage of the invitation which we extended to put in evidence during the course of the appeal. We are very concerned that our invitation was expressly declined on the instructions of the CPS, in contradistinction to acceptance by the Spanish Judicial Authority of the need to terminate the proceedings underlying EAW1.
(5)
In the light of these matters and of evidence which we have considered under the first issue, "judicial engineering", and the concerns we have expressed, the failure to answer the simple points raised by Mr Casanova cannot be accepted in this particular case.
(6)
Even if Kandola was wrongly decided (which we think it was not) and the usual position is that it is permissible to accept the unreasoned statement of a judicial authority, it would not in the circumstances of this case be appropriate to accept the unreasoned statement of the Spanish Judicial Authority.”
Followed by, at [61]:
“It follows that we consider the judge was wrong. We must therefore allow the appeal and discharge the Appellant.”
62. The Appellant’s argument also invokes the decision of the Divisional Court in
- PART 1
- Introduction
- The Statutory Framework
- The Secretary of State’s Decision
- organised crime
- The European Arrest Warrant
- current
- Del Rio Prada v Spain
- Spanish Judicial Authority v Arranz (No 3)
- The Appellant’s Witness Statements
- The Operative Extradition Decision
- itself
- The Principal Grounds of Appeal
- deduced
- The Burden of Proof Issue
- Insofar as the appeal relies upon the 2006 Regulations, the burden is also on the Appellant, the standard being the balance of probabilities
- this
- might
- Other Grounds of Appeal
- (i) Misunderstanding The Evidence
- E v Secretary of State for the Home Department; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department
- E & R
- (ii) Misunderstanding the Second Divisional Court’s Decision
- Paragraph 27
- Paragraph 28
- Paragraph 60
- Kandola
- Spanish Judicial Authority v Arranz
- Vanda Puceviciene
- persecution
- (iv) The Article 6 ECHR Issue
- R (EM Eritrea) v SSHD
- flagrant breach
- R (Ullah) v SSHD
- Conclusion
- PART 2
- The Evidence of Professor Silke
- The Battle Lines Drawn
- in itself
- General
- JS (Sudan)
- The ‘Colectivo’ Issue
- Risk of Reoffending
- The Appellant’s Terrorist Criminality and ETA
- from this perspective,
- Del Rio Prada
- could
- The Reluctant Witness
- Marchon v Immigration Appeal Tribunal
- Nazli
- Ex parte Marchon
- Bouchereau
- Omnibus Conclusion
