Case No. UKUT-00294-(IAC)

.” [Emphasis added.] At the beginning of [24] the judge states: “ I accept that there is no presumption of reoffending. ” This is followed by the passage which we have reproduced in full in [28] above. Next, at [27], the judge makes reference to how the Secretary of State has “ attempted to justify the Appellant’s deportation … ”. This is followed by the passage which we have reproduced at [29] above. 39. The last passage of significance in the context of this ground is at [28] (a): “ Considering the provisions of Regulation 21(5), I find for the reasons I have set out at [21] – [24] above, the Secretary of State has not justified her decision to deport based only upon the Appellant’s previous criminal convictions. ” Followed by [28] (d): “ I find that the Appellant’s personal conduct does represent a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society in terms of regulation 21(5)(c). ” In a later passage in this paragraph, the FtT adverts to “ … the Appellant’s continued association with ETA and the means by which he facilitated his exit from Spain, entry to the United Kingdom and residence here with an ETA terrorist ”. 40. We link the above passages to [27], where the FtT refers to those parts of the Secretary of State’s decision which highlighted that there was no evidence of severance by the Appellant of his links to ETA, together with the forged identity cards discovered “ in the possession of the Appellant ” and his residing in London “ with an ETA member wanted for terrorist offences in Spain ”. This is followed by the conclusion: “ … the fact that in all likelihood he left Spain with ETA’s facilitation and supply of numerous false identities and was directed to an address in London where he might live with [name] is evidence sufficient to satisfy Regulation 21(5)(c). ” 41. The argument of Ms Dubinsky on behalf of the Appellant invoked the decision of the Court of Appeal in