Case No. UKUT-00330-(IAC)

10. It is convenient at this point to reproduce [19] of this Tribunal’s rather elderly error of law decision: “ The panel did not take into account in assessing proportionality in respect of Article 8, the respondent’s delay of 10 years in issuing the deportation decision after the appellant’s conviction on 20 September 2001 in determining proportionality. The panel did not have a discussion as to the consequences of the fact that the appellant claimed asylum in January 2000 and his application was refused on 3 August 2001 and his appeal against that decision was dismissed on 11 September 2003. The appellant reapplied for asylum on 10 November 2010 and his interview did not take place until 30 January 2012. If the panel had taken the respondent’s inordinate and unexplained delay into account, they might have possibly reached a different decision.” This sole basis upon which the decision of the FtT was set aside was the Judge’s flawed Article 8 proportionality assessment. 11. The most egregious of the multiple incremental discrete periods of delay in the history of this appeal was stimulated by an earlier assessment that further written argument addressing the implications of the Bah decision should be provided. This occurred some 18 months ago. We juxtapose this with a passage in the decision of the FtT which, having recorded that the Secretary of State had ordered the deportation of the Appellant on the “ conducive to the public good ” ground in section 3(5) of the Immigration Act 1971 (in circumstances where the UK Borders Act 2007 did not apply), stated at [21]: “ We are obliged to consider the section 72 Certificate first. Having received a sentence of four years’ imprisonment, the Appellant is presumed to be a danger to the community and that [sic] his deportation is conducive to the public good. If it were the case that the Appellant is a danger to the community, it is difficult to see how the public good or public interest is served by waiting for over 10 years before consideration is given to the issue of deportation. The delay itself suggests that the presumption may not be appropriate or justified in the Appellant’s case. ” And at [22]: “ The Appellant’s offence is a one-off. He has no prior convictions and no subsequent convictions either. This is not a case where the Appellant has spent time seeking to evade deportation or to delay such proceedings. The delays are entirely of the Home Office’s own making and there is no explanation for them. The Appellant has kept out of trouble without the threat of deportation hanging over him and so his good behavior cannot be said to have been influenced by the need to make a good impression on that score. ” The FtT continued, at [23]: “ The presumption under section 72 can be rebutted. The Appellant’s behaviour against the significant delays, none of his making, in which he has been out of trouble for over 12 years lead us