Case No. UKUT-00330-(IAC)

. This decision records that the Secretary of State had also , on the same date, decided to refuse to grant the Appellant asylum. This was not a decision on the merits: it was, rather, a decision based on the Appellant’s asserted failure to provide supporting evidence and attend for an interview when requested to do so. The FtT decision of September 2003 records the absence of any conceivable basis for an asylum claim. The only live issue was the Appellant’s case based on Article 8 ECHR. The appeal was dismissed on both asylum and human rights grounds. 7. This was followed by seven years unexplained inertia on the part of the Secretary of State. This somnambulance was disturbed only by a second asylum claim made by the Appellant in November 2010. This followed seven years after his unsuccessful appeal to the FtT in September 2003 against the Secretary of State’s refusal of his first asylum claim. A screening and asylum interview was completed on 30 January 2012. No explanation of the Secretary of State’s failure to interview the Appellant until January 2012 (14 months after his claim) or to determine the Appellant’s second asylum claim until 04 September 2012 has been proffered. At the end of this discrete period of almost two years, the Secretary of State’s decision stated, inter alia : “ Your claim is based on your fear of gang violence. These are not reasons for claiming a well-founded fear of persecution under the [Refugee Convention] …. ” In other words, the claim was quite hopeless. No appeal ensued. Rather, the quite separate decision stimulating the five year appeal documented laboriously above was the Secretary of State’s decision to make a deportation order based on the Appellant’s conviction of the offence of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm made on 20 September 2001 , generating a sentence of four years imprisonment. 8. The completion of this judgment was delayed pending a response by the Appellant’s solicitors to the multiple issues raised by the chronology dated in [2] above. That this discrete phase of delay was confined to a handful of days only is attributable to the commendably quick, thorough and comprehensive response which was made. Having considered the further materials thus provided, it is clear that the Appellant’s representatives have not been responsible for any of the successive delays noted above.