Deos’ case on its state of knowledge
Deos’ case on its state of knowledge
Deos submitted that HMRC had no credible basis for alleging that Deos knew the purchases were connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT; and that HMRC could not prove that the such evasion was the only reasonable explanation for the purchases. It submitted that the purchases looked like ordinary, legitimate supplies – there was nothing about them that was inconsistent with ordinary commercial trading
Deos’ submissions included that:
its pattern of trading with Estanza (e.g. purchases matched with onward sales; goods held in Unicorn) was perfectly commercial;
its trading in the electronics good market was commercial and entrepreneurial and shared this characteristic with its core business;
the facts that Estanza started off life as an off-licence in Glasgow, and did not have premises to store large amount of electronic goods, were not un-commercial (and so “suspicious”), given that, from a business perspective, the electronics goods wholesale business (a) did not require the storage of goods, and (b) could be carried on alongside a retail business (as Deos’ own case illustrated);
there was nothing un-commercial (and so “suspicious”) about the onward sales of the goods being to customers outside the UK (in contrast to the customers of Does’ core business, who were in the UK);
there was genuine price negotiation as between Deos and its counterparties;
as regards Deos’ checks on Estanza, HMRC have not established what would have been discovered if Deos had conducted visits or obtained trade references;
it was Mr Smith’s unchallenged evidence that he had not seen or read HMRC’s “How to Spot Missing Trader Fraud” leaflet until shortly before the 22 June 2022 meeting between Deos and HMRC;
HMRC’s 21 April 2022 letter to Deos (likely received around 27 April) was a generic letter that did not say that Deos’ purchases were connected with fraud (speaking of not more than a “risk”), and did not mention Estanza;
RC’s role was very limited;
at their highest, Mr Smith’s messages with his contact at RCS show that he, at points, became excised in relation to VAT fraud related issues, but that does not mean that Deos should have known the purchases were connected with VAT fraud.
- Heading
- These were appeals against HMRC’s
- The issues for the Tribunal
- Evidence
- FINDINGS OF FACT
- The supply chain in relation to the purchases
- Deos and its business
- Spring 2021: Deos starts buying and selling, wholesale, electronic consumer goods like Apple AirPods
- August 2021: Deos starts buying from Estanza
- Deos’ pattern of trading with Estanza
- Examples showing commercial risks taken by Deos in its trading pattern with Estanza
- The break in Deos’ trading with Estanza in December 2021-February 2022
- Things said about VAT fraud in Mr Smith’s WhatsApp messaging with his contact at RCS Holland BV
- Deos and RC
- Deos’ interactions with HMRC concerning VAT fraud
- Estanza’s VAT deregistration and reregistration
- SUMMARY OF RELEVANT LAW
- Mobilx
- Other authorities on Kittel principles
- HMRC’s pleadings
- THE PARTIES’ CASES
- Deos’ general awareness of MTIC fraud
- The suspiciousness of the market in which Deos was dealing
- Inadequacy of Deos’ due diligence and of its “break” in trading with Estanza in December 2021-February 2022
- The unlikelihood of coincidence that so many of Deos’ transactions should have traced to fraudulent tax losses
- Other points
- HMRC’s concluding submissions
- Deos’ case on its state of knowledge
- Deos’ procedural arguments (and HMRC’s response)
- were not mentioned in HMRC’s statement of case, and so should not be considered by the Tribunal, in keeping with the principle in E Buyer of HMRC having to give properly informative particulars of the
- DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
- Stage 1: persuasive direct evidence of knowledge on the part of Mr Smith?
- Stage 2: were the circumstances of the purchases sufficiently suspicious so as to draw an inference of knowledge (of connection with VAT fraud) on the part of Mr Smith/Deos?
- Stage 3: were the circumstances of the purchases sufficiently suspicious that a reasonable businessperson would have known that they were connected with fraudulent VAT evasion; put differently, was th
- Conclusions
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