Evidence
Evidence
We had an electronic hearing bundle of 7,728 pages. This included witness statements of several HMRC officers involved in investigations of Deos and other companies in the relevant supply chain, plus that of Officer Dean, who was not so involved but had succeeded the (now retired) HMRC officer who had been allocated to Deos at relevant times, and of Matthew Smith of Deos.
The exhibits to Mr Smith’s witness statements included:
WhatsApp messages with IPT (a trading platform – more is said about it at [25] below) between February and April 2022
emails between Deos and the company from which the purchases were made, Estanza Ltd (“Estanza”), in the December 2021-January 2022 period
WhatsApp messages with Turan Trade SRO (a company to which Deos sold goods acquired in the purchases) between October 2021 and June 2022
WhatsApp messages with First Class SRO (another such company) between December 2021 and September 2022
WhatsApp messages with RCS Holland BV (a further such company) between April 2021 and November 2022.
We heard oral evidence from Officer Dean and from Mr Smith, including under cross examination and in answer to questions from the Tribunal.
In our factual findings which follow, we rely principally on the contemporaneous documentary evidence, which was fulsome, and on the oral evidence of Mr Smith, where corroborated by that documentary evidence. Where Mr Smith’s oral evidence on factual matters was not so corroborated, we exercised some caution in deciding whether or not it was credible (given the human tendency to remember things in a way that might assist one’s own case), and taking into account the plausibility of the evidence and its consistency with other evidence which we considered credible. We found Officer Dean’s oral evidence on factual matters of limited assistance to our fact-finding, as he was not a first-hand witness to the relevant events. When it came to matters of opinion, we gave the evidence of neither witness particularly significant weight (although we listened carefully to what they had to say, as we would to a party’s submissions), as they were not appearing before the Tribunal as experts.
- Heading
- These were appeals against HMRC’s
- The issues for the Tribunal
- Evidence
- FINDINGS OF FACT
- The supply chain in relation to the purchases
- Deos and its business
- Spring 2021: Deos starts buying and selling, wholesale, electronic consumer goods like Apple AirPods
- August 2021: Deos starts buying from Estanza
- Deos’ pattern of trading with Estanza
- Examples showing commercial risks taken by Deos in its trading pattern with Estanza
- The break in Deos’ trading with Estanza in December 2021-February 2022
- Things said about VAT fraud in Mr Smith’s WhatsApp messaging with his contact at RCS Holland BV
- Deos and RC
- Deos’ interactions with HMRC concerning VAT fraud
- Estanza’s VAT deregistration and reregistration
- SUMMARY OF RELEVANT LAW
- Mobilx
- Other authorities on Kittel principles
- HMRC’s pleadings
- THE PARTIES’ CASES
- Deos’ general awareness of MTIC fraud
- The suspiciousness of the market in which Deos was dealing
- Inadequacy of Deos’ due diligence and of its “break” in trading with Estanza in December 2021-February 2022
- The unlikelihood of coincidence that so many of Deos’ transactions should have traced to fraudulent tax losses
- Other points
- HMRC’s concluding submissions
- Deos’ case on its state of knowledge
- Deos’ procedural arguments (and HMRC’s response)
- were not mentioned in HMRC’s statement of case, and so should not be considered by the Tribunal, in keeping with the principle in E Buyer of HMRC having to give properly informative particulars of the
- DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
- Stage 1: persuasive direct evidence of knowledge on the part of Mr Smith?
- Stage 2: were the circumstances of the purchases sufficiently suspicious so as to draw an inference of knowledge (of connection with VAT fraud) on the part of Mr Smith/Deos?
- Stage 3: were the circumstances of the purchases sufficiently suspicious that a reasonable businessperson would have known that they were connected with fraudulent VAT evasion; put differently, was th
- Conclusions
![TC09617 - [2025] UKFTT 01018 (TC)](https://backend.juristeca.com/files/emisores/logo_7HSuEAV.png)