Stage 3: were the circumstances of the purchases sufficiently suspicious that a reasonable businessperson would have known that they were connected with fraudulent VAT evasion; put differently, was th
Stage 3: were the circumstances of the purchases sufficiently suspicious that a reasonable businessperson would have known that they were connected with fraudulent VAT evasion; put differently, was there any reasonable explanation for the purchases, apart from VAT fraud?
This stage involves us revisiting the circumstances of the purchases, but through the lens of asking whether a reasonable businessperson would have inferred from them that the purchases were connected with fraudulent VAT evasion.
Once again, the circumstances of the purchases present a mixed picture, in terms of whether they would have caused a reasonable businessperson to draw the inference that they were connected with VAT fraud.
The other way of expressing this test is to ask whether there was any reasonable explanation for the circumstances of the purchases, apart from their connection with VAT fraud.
The aspects of the purchases’ circumstances listed at [122] above would not, in our view, have caused a reasonable businessperson to draw the inference that the purchases were connected with VAT fraud. In other words, they form the basis of a reasonable explanation for the purchases – their commercial rationale – which is not connected with VAT fraud.
The essential question here is whether the aspects of the purchases’ circumstances listed at [123] and [124], which are more suspicious, alter this conclusion.
Our overall view this is a case where the reasonable businessperson would have recognised, from the circumstances of the purchases, a risk that the purchases were connected with VAT fraud, but that person would not, from those circumstances, have known (or have had the means of knowing) that they were so connected. This is because, in our view, the reasonable businessperson, based on those circumstances:
would not have found it particularly odd or un-commercial that Mr Smith had not visited Estanza’s premises or taken up its trade references; the reasonable businessperson would have recognised, and approved, Mr Smith’s observation that such things were unlikely to reveal more than had been picked up through regular contact with Mr Javan by telephone and Zoom, over the 9 months of their trading (with the 2 month break) preceding the purchases; in short, if Estanza was dissembling, it could equally have done so in the course of such further “checks”;
would have recognised that Mr Smith overestimated the significance of whether Estanza had been deregistered for VAT (as there are all sorts of reasons why it would take time for HMRC to investigate and then take that step); but the reasonable businessperson would also have recognised the cogency of Estanza’s 17 January 2022 written response to Deos’ concerns: the letter gave a logical and plausible explanation as to why Estanza’s dealings with WBM Global had ceased some months before and why it had not been aware of WBM Global’s VAT deregistration (namely, because it was no longer trading with it); equally, it gave a fluent description of the checks it did on its suppliers and customers; it was not a letter that, in our view, would support an inference that a reasonable businessperson receiving it would know that Estanza was connected with VAT fraud; the reasonable businessperson would also have recognised that, despite Mr Smith’s impatience, Estanza’s response to Deos’ pre-Christmas request had not been unduly slow, given the holiday period and the fact that Estanza’s accountant need to assure itself, reasonably, around the confidentiality of the information disclosed;
would accept that there had been a meaningful ‘break’ between Deos and Thames: suspicious though the initial introduction to the market by Thames had been, by the time of the purchases, Deos had not traded with Thames for nine months and had effectively sourced its own suppliers and customers; the suspiciousness of Thames, and the fact that it came under HMRC investigation in December 2021, were too ‘remote’, in our view, to support an inference on the part of a reasonable businessperson, on the basis of these circumstances, that the purchases were connected with VAT fraud;
would have recognised that the remaining general concerns about the ‘grey market’ in consumer electronic goods, including Deos’ haziness about its precise role in the value chain, and the small number of fakes in certain shipments to RCS, whilst giving rise to a risk of connection with VAT fraud (when participating in that market), were not specific or detailed enough to support an inference that the purchases were connected with VAT fraud.
In sum, the ordinary commercial explanation for the circumstances of the purchases was relatively compelling, whereas the explanation that depended on connection with VAT fraud was relatively speculative; it was therefore far from being a case where the only reasonable explanation for the circumstances of the purchases was their connection with VAT fraud.
- Heading
- These were appeals against HMRC’s
- The issues for the Tribunal
- Evidence
- FINDINGS OF FACT
- The supply chain in relation to the purchases
- Deos and its business
- Spring 2021: Deos starts buying and selling, wholesale, electronic consumer goods like Apple AirPods
- August 2021: Deos starts buying from Estanza
- Deos’ pattern of trading with Estanza
- Examples showing commercial risks taken by Deos in its trading pattern with Estanza
- The break in Deos’ trading with Estanza in December 2021-February 2022
- Things said about VAT fraud in Mr Smith’s WhatsApp messaging with his contact at RCS Holland BV
- Deos and RC
- Deos’ interactions with HMRC concerning VAT fraud
- Estanza’s VAT deregistration and reregistration
- SUMMARY OF RELEVANT LAW
- Mobilx
- Other authorities on Kittel principles
- HMRC’s pleadings
- THE PARTIES’ CASES
- Deos’ general awareness of MTIC fraud
- The suspiciousness of the market in which Deos was dealing
- Inadequacy of Deos’ due diligence and of its “break” in trading with Estanza in December 2021-February 2022
- The unlikelihood of coincidence that so many of Deos’ transactions should have traced to fraudulent tax losses
- Other points
- HMRC’s concluding submissions
- Deos’ case on its state of knowledge
- Deos’ procedural arguments (and HMRC’s response)
- were not mentioned in HMRC’s statement of case, and so should not be considered by the Tribunal, in keeping with the principle in E Buyer of HMRC having to give properly informative particulars of the
- DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
- Stage 1: persuasive direct evidence of knowledge on the part of Mr Smith?
- Stage 2: were the circumstances of the purchases sufficiently suspicious so as to draw an inference of knowledge (of connection with VAT fraud) on the part of Mr Smith/Deos?
- Stage 3: were the circumstances of the purchases sufficiently suspicious that a reasonable businessperson would have known that they were connected with fraudulent VAT evasion; put differently, was th
- Conclusions
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