TC09617 - [2025] UKFTT 01018 (TC)

Deos further submitted, citing Ammanford, that if HMRC wished to argue that Mr Smith had actual knowledge of the purchases’ connection with VAT fraud, the statement of case would need to (1) specifically allege that Mr Smith had actual knowledge (that can be attributed to Deos); and (2) provide particulars of the primary facts and matters relied on in support of that allegation. However, the statement of case did not do this, and HMRC did not seek to amend it. In these circumstances, Deos argued, it is not properly open to the Tribunal to make a finding of actual knowledge on the part of Mr Smith (or, indeed, of Deos).

HMRC responded that the general nature of their case was set out within the statement of case. During the exchange of witness statements, both parties adduced further evidence in response to matters raised by the other, as anticipated by the Tribunal’s directions. HMRC submitted that it was trite that where further evidence is adduced by the appellant, HMRC may respond to it and rely upon it in support of their case. HMRC also submitted that Ammanford could be distinguished and, in this case, it was perfectly clear that HMRC’s “actual knowledge” case concerned the knowledge of Mr Smith (and Mr Smith’s first witness statement acknowledged as much at paragraph 160, which said: “… I reject entirely the HMRC assertion that I, or Deos, know of a connection to fraud in the transactions in dispute in this appeal”).