Case Nos: IL-2023-000080 and IL-2024-000038 - [2025] EWHC 2561 (Ch)

Fecha: 10-Oct-2025

Application of EU law

Application of EU law

35.

All parties asserted that pursuant to the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 as amended and the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023 the law governing events occurring before the end of 2023 must be construed at first instance by reference to relevant judgments of the CJEU made by the end of 2020. Regard may be had to decisions of the CJEU delivered from the beginning of 2021.

36.

The parties agreed that the position with regard to events occurring from 1 January 2024 is less clear. The Marleasing principle (Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA (C-106-/89) EU:C:1990:395) no longer has application in English law (see also Makeality Ltd v City Doggo Ltd [2025] EWCA Civ 400, at [38]). On the other hand, the following general proposition has been stated by the Supreme Court in Uber BV v Aslam [2021] UKSC 5:

‘[70] The modern approach to statutory interpretation is to have regard to the purpose of a particular provision and to interpret its language, so far as possible, in the way which best gives effect to that purpose. In UBS AG v Revenue and Customs Comrs [2016] UKSC 13; [2016] 1 WLR 1005, paras 61-68, Lord Reed (with whom the other Justices of the Supreme Court agreed) explained how this approach requires the facts to be analysed in the light of the statutory provision being applied so that if, for example, a fact is of no relevance to the application of the statute construed in the light of its purpose, it can be disregarded. Lord Reed cited the pithy statement of Ribeiro PJ in Collector of Stamp Revenue v Arrowtown Assets Ltd (2003) 6 ITLR 454 , para 35:

"The ultimate question is whether the relevant statutory provisions, construed purposively, were intended to apply to the transaction, viewed realistically."’

37.

It would seem to follow from Uber that in relation to a UK regulation enacted to implement an EU Directive, where Parliament’s intention was that the regulation should be consistent with the Directive, it remains legitimate to consider the language of the Directive when interpreting the Regulation. Possibly also, without being bound, to have regard to any explanation of that language from the CJEU.