Case Nos: IL-2023-000080 and IL-2024-000038 - [2025] EWHC 2561 (Ch)

Right at the start of their closing written argument the defendants relied on s.116(1) and (2) of the Postal Services Act 2000, as amended:

The defendants emphasised that the terms under which the PAF is licensed must be reasonable. Although I was given no information about how s.116 functions in practice or any other relevant legislation there may be which shines a light on s.116, it is apparent from the section itself that the reasonableness or otherwise of any licence granted is policed by OFCOM (the government regulator of communications services). No doubt any party may apply to OFCOM to raise an objection to a licence, but the section offers no direct right to bring proceedings.

More fundamentally, the defendants never pleaded that they entered into a licence directly with RMG. As I have mentioned, RMG has issued around 50,000 licences to users of the PAF on its standard terms but it was not part of RMG’s case that it has a cause of action against either defendant for breach of contract. The defendants’ closing skeleton argument asserted that the defendants do hold a licence from RMG. If this was intended to mean that there was direct contract between RMG and the defendants which led to a licence, apparently it was the first that RMG had heard of the suggestion. I can give this unsupported argument no further consideration.

More likely, what Mr Smith meant was that RMG’s end user terms afforded the defendants a licence. I turn to that next.