KB-2023-003510 - [2025] EWHC 1755 (KB)

Then there are, finally, the Defendants say, an absence of material factors that support a ruling in favour of the Claimant. This is a reference to the statement in Ittihadieh that (emphasis added): “If there are no material factors other than a SAR in valid form and a breach of the data controller’s obligation to conduct a proportionate search, then the discretion will ordinarily be exercised in favour of the data subject”. The Defendants say that the underlined factor is not made out, and that in this case there are numerous material factors which point against the exercise of the discretion in favour of Mr Dowding such that “The Court can be confident at this stage that there is no realistic prospect of coming to a different conclusion”. For reasons explained above, I agree.

Lastly, and I think partly repetitiously of the grounds that they rely on under their second overarching heading, the Defendants submit that this is essentially an abusive exercise. There was no pre-action letter. The Claimant is seeking to achieve something that is not properly a target of a data subject access request. The constant revisiting of the data issues, alteration and expansion of the categories of documents and so forth, is an abuse and a harassment of the Defendants. And finally, although not specifically by reference to the DSAR heads of claim, the claims are obviously inflated because the sums that are sought to be attributed to them are incredibly (i.e. unbelievably) large, and this is indicative of oppressive or abusive conduct overall. In my judgment, there is substance in all of that.

I should add that if, in fairness to Mr Dowding, one does not take into account the magnitude of the financial claims overall when considering whether his pursuit of his data claims is an abuse, that may place him on the horns of a dilemma. This is because that leads to the different question: what is the true value of his data subject access claims? If, as seems to me to correct, the answer to that question is “little or nothing”, that points to the conclusion that pursuit of the same is an abuse. Financial value is not necessarily significant, but where, as I have explained, so many other factors weigh against his claim, a negligible or non-existent financial value is also unhelpful to him.

Counsel agreed with me that the central question that I have to ask is: does the Claimant have a realistic prospect of success (1) of persuading the Court at trial that his rights of access to his data have been infringed, and (2) of obtaining an order for compliance with his data subject access rights in wider terms than the compliance that has already been provided? For the reasons that I have given, I would answer both of those questions in the negative, and accordingly, and on the basis that there is no other compelling reason why the data subject access claims should go to trial, I would accede to the Defendants’ application for summary judgment under this head.