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KB-2023-003510 - [2025] EWHC 1755 (KB)
Fecha: 11-Jul-2025
TCG’s submissions
TCG’s submissions
Mr Laddie submitted that the case for making an unless order is overwhelming, for the following principal reasons: (1) Mr Dowding has been in breach of the material costs orders for many months, (2) the sums owing are very substantial (i.e. £288,000 plus interest), (3) Mr Dowding has not paid any of the monies owing (in spite of TCG’s invitation to him contained in a letter dated 10 March 2025 to make sensible proposals in terms of the debt); and (4) he has provided no explanation for non-payment.
Anticipating (at the time of drafting of TCG’s Skeleton Argument) that Mr Dowding “will plead impecuniosity and Article 6”, Mr Laddie submitted that (1) Mr Dowding had served no responsive evidence at all and (2) far from raising an impecuniosity argument before now, the plain implication of Mr de Waal’s statement at the hearing on 5 July 2024 that Mr Dowding “has to break into his pension to get the money” was that Mr Dowding was in a position to find the necessary funds from that source.
Mr Laddie further submitted that Mr Dowding had a history of failing to provide detailed, frank and cogent evidence of his means when called upon to do so, relying in particular on the costs proceedings before the ET, where (i) Mr Dowding had ignored the ET’s order that he should provide a statement of his means, and (ii) the ET concluded at [53] of its costs judgment that Mr Dowding’s “evidence on his share sale proceeds and the amount and use of his savings was evasive and unconvincing”.
In addition, Mr Laddie submitted that Mr Dowding was plainly in a position to fund litigation when it suited him. Among other things, (i) in the space of a few weeks in 2024, he had instructed Mr de Waal KC in this claim, Mr Imran Benson (Hailsham Chambers) in the EAT, and Ms Katherine Ratcliffe (Essex Court Chambers) in his claim against Allenby, (ii) in support of the recent proceedings for fraud, Mr Dowding had instructed two expert handwriting reports, each of whom must have been paid, and (iii) in correspondence relating to the proceedings for an order for sale of the Property, he had made reference to his Leading Counsel’s time estimate for a directions hearing.
For these reasons, Mr Laddie submitted that any evidence of impecuniosity that Mr Dowding might adduce “should be scrutinised with the utmost rigour”.
When evidence of means was produced by Mr Dowding shortly before the hearing, Mr Laddie said it was manifestly deficient and fell far short of “full and frank disclosure”.
Finally, Mr Laddie submitted that even if Mr Dowding is impecunious, that is not necessarily a determinative factor.
Mr Laddie submitted that “all the relevant circumstances” in this case include:
Whether enforcement proceedings are an adequate substitute for obtaining payment of the outstanding sums. Leaving aside altogether Mr Dowding’s obvious resistance to those proceedings, even assuming that his efforts at staying or delaying them fail, TCG’s best estimate is that it is only likely to realise £180,000-£200,000 if and when it manages to sell the Property, which is itself only likely to happen many months into the future at best. So the proceedings are not an adequate substitute.
Although the Unless Order Application is founded on the sums that were ordered to be paid by the July 2024 Order, the Defendants’ total costs bill in respect of the SO/SJ Application was £445,220.79 and they expect to recover substantially more upon detailed assessment than the amount of £221,500 that is payable on account.
This is not a case, like Robbins, where there is any disproportionality between the value of the debt and the value of the claim. On the contrary, even leaving aside the immediately preceding point, the two are broadly equivalent: the value of the claim in the draft amended Particulars of Claim is £342,471.46, which is little more than the current value of the sums owed under the July 2024 Order costs orders.
The manner in which Mr Dowding has litigated the claim to date.
The fact that this litigation is only one front in a “war” being waged by Mr Dowding not only against TCG but also those whom he perceives as TCG’s affiliates (including its external lawyers, its brokers (Allenby) and even its brokers’ IT suppliers (Fitzrovia)). Further, Mr Dowding’s recent Fraud Proceedings are “absurd” and “a transparent attempt to [further] muddy the waters”.
Finally, Mr Dowding’s underlying claim is exceptionally stale, and relates to events in September 2017. Mr Dowding decided to issue this claim at the last minute; and it is his fault that the claim has not progressed further than it has since then.
- Heading
- Introduction
- THE PARTIES
- THE EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL PROCEEDINGS
- THESE PROCEEDINGS
- Paragraph 11
- Paragraphs 34-35
- Paragraph 109
- Paragraph 137
- Paragraphs 206-208.”
- ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS
- OTHER PROCEEDINGS
- THE UNLESS ORDER APPLICATION The applicable legal principles
- TCG’s submissions
- Mr Dowding’s case
- TCG’s riposte
- Discussion and conclusions
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- Then at paragraph 40, those grounds of appeal state
- For those reasons, I accept the Defendants’ submissions in relation to this third topic JUDGE SPEARMAN
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- That is the Tribunal’s summary of Mr Dowding’s case in front of the Tribunal in relation to this topic
- At paragraph 132, the Tribunal move on to the second topic, the so-called NAV/EVO project
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- Paragraph 75 pleads that that request for a meeting was sent by email to both Mr Shah and the Claimant. Paragraph 76 pleads that on 2 August 2017, Mr Shah responded and copied the Claimant in, and tha
- The Tribunal rejected that evidence and concluded in paragraph 26
- Just briefly to complete the narrative of how these matters have unfolded, the Claimant then made an appeal against the rulings of the Tribunal, and in support of that appeal he made an application to
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- DAY 3 JUDGE SPEARMAN
- The announcement that was made is in these terms
- Turning to The Times publication, which the Tribunal expressly dealt with, this records (amongst other things) that
- The Tribunal judgment at paragraph 140 states “contrary to being false or misleading, it was reported that Mr Shah had provided a carefully weighted response, further that he had refused to divulge de
- For those reasons, the material paragraphs of the Particulars of Claim will be struck out JUDGE SPEARMAN
- The judge says at paragraph 122
- As I read that decision, and in accordance with my understanding of the law, it is not the case that a breach of section 172 gives rise to a right of action by a party injured by a breach of contract
- That is my ruling on the issue of the pleaded case against Mr Shah JUDGE SPEARMAN
- The list of factors set out in Ittihadieh v 5-11 Cheyne Gardens RTM Company Ltd & Ors [2017] EWCA Civ. 121 ( “Ittihadieh” ) which are to be taken into account when the Court is striking a balance betw
- First, Mr de Waal reminded me that in the Dawson-Damer v Taylor Wessing [2017] 1 WLR 3255, the Court of Appeal, in reversing the judge below, held, as summarised in the third paragraph of the headnote
- The other principle of law to which Mr de Waal helpfully took me is the often-cited summary of the principles applicable to applications for summary judgment contained in the judgment of Lewison J, as
- When he was addressing me about this personally at an earlier stage of this hearing, Mr Dowding argued that as the litigation related to him, there must be mention of his name in these documents, and
- The Defendants say in paragraph 90 of their skeleton argument that they have “three overarching submissions”. The first is that: “... there is no realistic prospect of the Court concluding that [The C
- The Defendants’ second overarching submission is that there is no realistic prospect of the court exercising its discretion to make an order pursuant to section 167 of the Data Protection Act 2018 on
- The next point is that this is really a quest for documents, and I agree with that The next point is that there is no real value to the data subject, and I agree with that
- Conclusions