KB-2023-003510 - [2025] EWHC 1755 (KB)
Fecha: 11-Jul-2025
JUDGE SPEARMAN
JUDGE SPEARMAN:
I now have to deal with item 9 on the Schedule. This relates to paragraph 74 of the Particulars of Claim and it relates to an alleged peremptory revoking of an offer for increased salary and bonus. The Defendants’ case is that this allegation was made to and was considered by the Employment Tribunal and was rejected.
The Defendants rely, first of all, on the sixth bullet point under paragraph 15 of the Tribunal’s judgment, which reads:
“ ... on 14th July 2017, Mr Shah giving the Claimant a purported statement of the terms of his employment on 14th July 2017, that he knew was contrary to what had been agreed and peremptorily revoking the Respondent’s proposal of the Claimant’s outstanding January 2017 pay review, before the Claimant had been able to properly consider the proposal.”
That, again, is the Tribunal’s summary of the nature of the Claimant's case before the Tribunal under the topic of detrimental treatment in relation to the Claimant’s whistleblowing claim before the Tribunal.
The Defendants submit that that was an issue in front of Tribunal and, moreover, that it was dealt with at paragraph 136 of the Tribunal’s judgment. I do not propose to read all of that text, but the Tribunal, in that paragraph, started by considering a process which it said had started with Mr Shah providing draft terms on 8th June 2017, and the Tribunal then went over, amongst other things, documents in July and August, ending with an 8th August 2017 e-mail. The Tribunal concluded at the end of paragraph 136: “The offer was not peremptorily revoked. The claimant was not subjected to a detriment.”
One of the e-mails considered by the Tribunal, which Mr Dowding has drawn to my attention, is an e-mail dated 8 August 2017, and he says that the Tribunal did not deal with that correctly. His submissions appear to me to be contradictory, because, on the one hand, he is saying that this was not something that the Tribunal was called on to deal with at all, and, on the other hand, he is criticising the way they did deal with it. However, I suppose that it is possible to say although the Tribunal shouldn't have dealt with it at all, they nevertheless went on to do so and then got it wrong.
But be that as it may, in my judgment it is absolutely clear this is an attempt to relitigate a matter that has already been decided by the Tribunal.
If there is a suggestion the Tribunal made an error in its approach or, indeed, as at present advised I should have thought a suggestion that it exceeded its proper remit in dealing with an issue that wasn’t properly in front of it, then, in my view, that is a matter that is appropriately addressed by an appeal from the Tribunal’s decision. That appeal will either fail or succeed, but the one thing that is plainly, in my judgment, impermissible and an abuse of process, is to seek to revisit the topic in these proceedings, contending that the Tribunal’s decision is wrong. That appears to me to be a classic example of seeking to relitigate the same issue in a manner which both case law and principle plainly set their face against.
So I have little hesitation in ruling in favour of the Defendants on issue 9 in the Schedule. Paragraph 74 of the Particulars of Claim must be struck out.
DAY 2
RULING
- Heading
- Introduction
- THE PARTIES
- THE EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL PROCEEDINGS
- THESE PROCEEDINGS
- Paragraph 11
- Paragraphs 34-35
- Paragraph 109
- Paragraph 137
- Paragraphs 206-208.”
- ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS
- OTHER PROCEEDINGS
- THE UNLESS ORDER APPLICATION The applicable legal principles
- TCG’s submissions
- Mr Dowding’s case
- TCG’s riposte
- Discussion and conclusions
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- Then at paragraph 40, those grounds of appeal state
- For those reasons, I accept the Defendants’ submissions in relation to this third topic JUDGE SPEARMAN
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- That is the Tribunal’s summary of Mr Dowding’s case in front of the Tribunal in relation to this topic
- At paragraph 132, the Tribunal move on to the second topic, the so-called NAV/EVO project
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
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- Paragraph 75 pleads that that request for a meeting was sent by email to both Mr Shah and the Claimant. Paragraph 76 pleads that on 2 August 2017, Mr Shah responded and copied the Claimant in, and tha
- The Tribunal rejected that evidence and concluded in paragraph 26
- Just briefly to complete the narrative of how these matters have unfolded, the Claimant then made an appeal against the rulings of the Tribunal, and in support of that appeal he made an application to
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
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- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- DAY 3 JUDGE SPEARMAN
- The announcement that was made is in these terms
- Turning to The Times publication, which the Tribunal expressly dealt with, this records (amongst other things) that
- The Tribunal judgment at paragraph 140 states “contrary to being false or misleading, it was reported that Mr Shah had provided a carefully weighted response, further that he had refused to divulge de
- For those reasons, the material paragraphs of the Particulars of Claim will be struck out JUDGE SPEARMAN
- The judge says at paragraph 122
- As I read that decision, and in accordance with my understanding of the law, it is not the case that a breach of section 172 gives rise to a right of action by a party injured by a breach of contract
- That is my ruling on the issue of the pleaded case against Mr Shah JUDGE SPEARMAN
- The list of factors set out in Ittihadieh v 5-11 Cheyne Gardens RTM Company Ltd & Ors [2017] EWCA Civ. 121 ( “Ittihadieh” ) which are to be taken into account when the Court is striking a balance betw
- First, Mr de Waal reminded me that in the Dawson-Damer v Taylor Wessing [2017] 1 WLR 3255, the Court of Appeal, in reversing the judge below, held, as summarised in the third paragraph of the headnote
- The other principle of law to which Mr de Waal helpfully took me is the often-cited summary of the principles applicable to applications for summary judgment contained in the judgment of Lewison J, as
- When he was addressing me about this personally at an earlier stage of this hearing, Mr Dowding argued that as the litigation related to him, there must be mention of his name in these documents, and
- The Defendants say in paragraph 90 of their skeleton argument that they have “three overarching submissions”. The first is that: “... there is no realistic prospect of the Court concluding that [The C
- The Defendants’ second overarching submission is that there is no realistic prospect of the court exercising its discretion to make an order pursuant to section 167 of the Data Protection Act 2018 on
- The next point is that this is really a quest for documents, and I agree with that The next point is that there is no real value to the data subject, and I agree with that
- Conclusions