KB-2023-003510 - [2025] EWHC 1755 (KB)
Fecha: 11-Jul-2025
The Tribunal judgment at paragraph 140 states “contrary to being false or misleading, it was reported that Mr Shah had provided a carefully weighted response, further that he had refused to divulge de
The Tribunal judgment at paragraph 140 states “contrary to being false or misleading, it was reported that Mr Shah had provided a carefully weighted response, further that he had refused to divulge details”. It appears to me from this language that the Tribunal may have taken those remarks in the Times article as being a factual statement that Mr Shah was providing a carefully weighted response, as opposed to those words reflecting the appraisal of the journalist, but maybe this is unfair to the Tribunal, as they are careful to say (emphasis added) “it was reported that”.
I do not consider that it is appropriate for me to seek to go behind the findings of the Tribunal, although I do just voice an element of reservation that the topic of whether Mr Dowding had not been in touch with the company to the extent that Mr Shah is attributed as having told the newspaper and the question of whether the response was carefully weighted do not appear to me to be self-evident from what I have seen.
But essentially, the same point remains, that the substance of what was reported in the newspaper is no more than the truth, and the factual description of matters is, if anything, favourable to Mr Dowding in that, in accordance with the findings of the Tribunal, an explanation of the circumstances of his dismissal that was much less sympathetic to him could accurately have been given by the company.
The only other publication that I propose to refer to is the Bloomberg publication, and that, again, is to the effect that there was a breakdown of trust and confidence. The relevant quotes are, first of all, some words attributed to Mr Shah in the middle quote: “It was nothing to do with trading or finances. We just sort of felt that there were a few relationships that had broken down.” Then, later in the Bloomberg article, these words appear: “There was a “fundamental” deterioration in the trust and confidence between Dowding and the board, as well as other employees of the company, Shah said. “Dowding was not doing anything illegal”, he added.”
In my judgment, all of the causes of action that are sought to be relied upon on the basis of these publications are plainly hopeless. There is no real prospect that any of them would succeed at trial. In substance, this was not a misuse of private information. It was not a breach of confidence. It was not a breach of any data rights that Mr Dowding may have had. It was an announcement of accurate information concerning the circumstances of the termination of his employment and his directorship. If and to the extent that anything was not accurate or not fully accurate, it was more anodyne that it might have been in his favour. Further, all that was announced was communicated to a public that had, in my judgment, an absolutely clear right to know the substance of what was being announced.
He, Mr Dowding, was the Group Finance Director of an AIM listed company. The fact that he had been dismissed from his employment and his directorship, seems to me to be manifestly something which it was appropriate for the company to announce to the public, in a way that did not mislead anybody as to the financial circumstances of the company, did not have an improper effect upon the movement in share prices, and formed part of appropriate transparency about the financial and commercial dealings of companies in which the public invest; and, for that matter, which financial journalists have a perfectly understandable and lawfully recognised interest in reporting.
The grievance that misuse of private or confidential information, or announcements in breach of contract or a duty of care occurred here is, in my judgment, quite plainly without any foundation at all. It would be wrong to seek to litigate these issues to trial, when they have no real prospect of success, regardless of the fact that the substance of the matter, although maybe not in terms the regulatory announcement, has plainly been determined already by the Employment Tribunal in the tribunal proceedings.
- Heading
- Introduction
- THE PARTIES
- THE EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL PROCEEDINGS
- THESE PROCEEDINGS
- Paragraph 11
- Paragraphs 34-35
- Paragraph 109
- Paragraph 137
- Paragraphs 206-208.”
- ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS
- OTHER PROCEEDINGS
- THE UNLESS ORDER APPLICATION The applicable legal principles
- TCG’s submissions
- Mr Dowding’s case
- TCG’s riposte
- Discussion and conclusions
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- Then at paragraph 40, those grounds of appeal state
- For those reasons, I accept the Defendants’ submissions in relation to this third topic JUDGE SPEARMAN
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- That is the Tribunal’s summary of Mr Dowding’s case in front of the Tribunal in relation to this topic
- At paragraph 132, the Tribunal move on to the second topic, the so-called NAV/EVO project
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- Paragraph 75 pleads that that request for a meeting was sent by email to both Mr Shah and the Claimant. Paragraph 76 pleads that on 2 August 2017, Mr Shah responded and copied the Claimant in, and tha
- The Tribunal rejected that evidence and concluded in paragraph 26
- Just briefly to complete the narrative of how these matters have unfolded, the Claimant then made an appeal against the rulings of the Tribunal, and in support of that appeal he made an application to
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- DAY 3 JUDGE SPEARMAN
- The announcement that was made is in these terms
- Turning to The Times publication, which the Tribunal expressly dealt with, this records (amongst other things) that
- The Tribunal judgment at paragraph 140 states “contrary to being false or misleading, it was reported that Mr Shah had provided a carefully weighted response, further that he had refused to divulge de
- For those reasons, the material paragraphs of the Particulars of Claim will be struck out JUDGE SPEARMAN
- The judge says at paragraph 122
- As I read that decision, and in accordance with my understanding of the law, it is not the case that a breach of section 172 gives rise to a right of action by a party injured by a breach of contract
- That is my ruling on the issue of the pleaded case against Mr Shah JUDGE SPEARMAN
- The list of factors set out in Ittihadieh v 5-11 Cheyne Gardens RTM Company Ltd & Ors [2017] EWCA Civ. 121 ( “Ittihadieh” ) which are to be taken into account when the Court is striking a balance betw
- First, Mr de Waal reminded me that in the Dawson-Damer v Taylor Wessing [2017] 1 WLR 3255, the Court of Appeal, in reversing the judge below, held, as summarised in the third paragraph of the headnote
- The other principle of law to which Mr de Waal helpfully took me is the often-cited summary of the principles applicable to applications for summary judgment contained in the judgment of Lewison J, as
- When he was addressing me about this personally at an earlier stage of this hearing, Mr Dowding argued that as the litigation related to him, there must be mention of his name in these documents, and
- The Defendants say in paragraph 90 of their skeleton argument that they have “three overarching submissions”. The first is that: “... there is no realistic prospect of the Court concluding that [The C
- The Defendants’ second overarching submission is that there is no realistic prospect of the court exercising its discretion to make an order pursuant to section 167 of the Data Protection Act 2018 on
- The next point is that this is really a quest for documents, and I agree with that The next point is that there is no real value to the data subject, and I agree with that
- Conclusions