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KB-2023-003510 - [2025] EWHC 1755 (KB)
Fecha: 11-Jul-2025
Paragraphs 206-208.”
Paragraphs 206-208.”
As appears from these paragraphs of the July 2024 Order, TCG sought strike out or summary judgment on the following principal grounds: (1) substantial elements of the Particulars of Claim were the subject of conclusive findings by the ET adverse to Mr Dowding such that there was an issue estoppel or that litigating them afresh would otherwise be an abuse of process, (2) other elements including Mr Dowding’s claims under the Data Protection Act 1998 were properly susceptible to summary judgment in favour of TCG, and (3) further elements contained irrelevant and vexatious material.
As set out above, TCG’s application resulted in the July 2024 Order. The rulings which gave rise to the July 2024 Order are annexed to this Judgment.
On 19 and 26 July 2024, Mr Dowding applied to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal both the costs order elements and the substantive elements of the July 2024 Order and for a stay of execution of the costs order elements pending the outcome of his application for permission to appeal. Grounds 2, 3 and 4 of his applications challenged the exercise of my discretion as to costs, and permission to appeal on those Grounds was refused by Nugee LJ on 10 October 2024. At the same time, Nugee LJ adjourned the consideration of Ground 1 of those applications, which related to my substantive rulings, and reasoned that the order for costs referrable to those rulings should follow the result of the substantive appeal. He therefore ordered a stay of execution of the costs order at paragraph 15 of the July 2024 Order (but not those at paragraphs 17, 18 or 19 of the same) “pending determination of the application for permission to appeal on Ground 1, subject to the proviso that nothing in the stay shall prevent the Court hearing, and, if it thinks fit, granting, the pending application for the interim charging order to be made final [a reference to the charging order identified below]”. (There was no reference to paragraph 26 of the July 2024 Order, but the only stay that was granted appears to have been in respect of paragraph 15 of that Order.)
On 6 January 2025, Nugee LJ made an Order dealing with the substantive appeal. He divided the points into four topics (1) my ruling on the 6 months’ notice period; (2) my ruling on the 100% bonus claim; (3) my rulings striking out various claims; and (4) my ruling granting summary judgment on the DPA claims. He held that (for the detailed reasons that he had given) “I consider that none of the Grounds put forward have any real prospect of success” and “For completeness, I do not consider that there is any other compelling reason for the appeal to be heard”. The stay on paragraph 15 of the July 2024 Order contained in Nugee LJ’s Order dated 10 October 2024 thus expired.
- Heading
- Introduction
- THE PARTIES
- THE EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL PROCEEDINGS
- THESE PROCEEDINGS
- Paragraph 11
- Paragraphs 34-35
- Paragraph 109
- Paragraph 137
- Paragraphs 206-208.”
- ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS
- OTHER PROCEEDINGS
- THE UNLESS ORDER APPLICATION The applicable legal principles
- TCG’s submissions
- Mr Dowding’s case
- TCG’s riposte
- Discussion and conclusions
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- Then at paragraph 40, those grounds of appeal state
- For those reasons, I accept the Defendants’ submissions in relation to this third topic JUDGE SPEARMAN
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- That is the Tribunal’s summary of Mr Dowding’s case in front of the Tribunal in relation to this topic
- At paragraph 132, the Tribunal move on to the second topic, the so-called NAV/EVO project
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- Paragraph 75 pleads that that request for a meeting was sent by email to both Mr Shah and the Claimant. Paragraph 76 pleads that on 2 August 2017, Mr Shah responded and copied the Claimant in, and tha
- The Tribunal rejected that evidence and concluded in paragraph 26
- Just briefly to complete the narrative of how these matters have unfolded, the Claimant then made an appeal against the rulings of the Tribunal, and in support of that appeal he made an application to
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- DAY 3 JUDGE SPEARMAN
- The announcement that was made is in these terms
- Turning to The Times publication, which the Tribunal expressly dealt with, this records (amongst other things) that
- The Tribunal judgment at paragraph 140 states “contrary to being false or misleading, it was reported that Mr Shah had provided a carefully weighted response, further that he had refused to divulge de
- For those reasons, the material paragraphs of the Particulars of Claim will be struck out JUDGE SPEARMAN
- The judge says at paragraph 122
- As I read that decision, and in accordance with my understanding of the law, it is not the case that a breach of section 172 gives rise to a right of action by a party injured by a breach of contract
- That is my ruling on the issue of the pleaded case against Mr Shah JUDGE SPEARMAN
- The list of factors set out in Ittihadieh v 5-11 Cheyne Gardens RTM Company Ltd & Ors [2017] EWCA Civ. 121 ( “Ittihadieh” ) which are to be taken into account when the Court is striking a balance betw
- First, Mr de Waal reminded me that in the Dawson-Damer v Taylor Wessing [2017] 1 WLR 3255, the Court of Appeal, in reversing the judge below, held, as summarised in the third paragraph of the headnote
- The other principle of law to which Mr de Waal helpfully took me is the often-cited summary of the principles applicable to applications for summary judgment contained in the judgment of Lewison J, as
- When he was addressing me about this personally at an earlier stage of this hearing, Mr Dowding argued that as the litigation related to him, there must be mention of his name in these documents, and
- The Defendants say in paragraph 90 of their skeleton argument that they have “three overarching submissions”. The first is that: “... there is no realistic prospect of the Court concluding that [The C
- The Defendants’ second overarching submission is that there is no realistic prospect of the court exercising its discretion to make an order pursuant to section 167 of the Data Protection Act 2018 on
- The next point is that this is really a quest for documents, and I agree with that The next point is that there is no real value to the data subject, and I agree with that
- Conclusions