KB-2023-003510 - [2025] EWHC 1755 (KB)
Fecha: 11-Jul-2025
The Tribunal rejected that evidence and concluded in paragraph 26
The Tribunal rejected that evidence and concluded in paragraph 26:
“The Tribunal’s conclusion in this regard was unanimous and emphatic. The Tribunal concludes the Claimant had always had all of the emails he had requested of the Respondent."
Further, in relation to his evidence before the Tribunal or a statement that the Claimant apparently made, that he had not realised his disclosure obligations extended to electronic emails, as opposed to physical copies, the Tribunal said:
“… it was unbelievable he would draw a distinction between his obligation to disclose, or his entitlement to receive, physical not electronic documents. He was a Group Financial Director of a PLC, working in an electronic age”.
The Tribunal then went on to deal with an allegation that the Claimant had raised in his witness statement. Now I will attempt a brief excursion into the background, before I deal with how this arose in front of the Tribunal.
The position is that the Tosca email was not relied upon, as I understand it, in the Claimant’s pleaded case before the Tribunal. The exclusion from the Tosca meeting later in August was relied on, but not the Tosca email specifically. Neither party disclosed any version of the Tosca email in disclosure. There was no reference to the Tosca email in the Claimant’s first witness statement in front of the Tribunal, although there was evidence about him being excluded from the meeting.
The Tosca email was then disclosed by the employer company in or about February 2019. On 24 September 2019, Ms Nahal gave a statement, responding to the Claimant’s statement concerning his exclusion from the meeting. The thrust of the evidence, and this was the thrust of the employer company’s case in the Tribunal, was that the exclusion was instigated by Tosca and not by Mr Shah. That was crucial, of course, to whether the exclusion was part of detriment occasioned to the Claimant and, therefore, supportive of his case that he had been wrongfully treated as a whistleblower. There was no reference to the Tosca email in that witness statement.
Then came the event which drew the Tosca email into the proceedings. That was a witness statement of the Claimant, undated in the bundle in front of me, and indeed unsigned, but the date given on the unsigned version is 5 January 2020. That contains in an unnumbered paragraph on page 2 of the witness statement, the following words (in which “Amrit” refers to Ms Nahal and “Kiran” refers to Mr Shah):
“The document page 1441 purported to be an email invitation re Tosca, 2 August, from Amrit and which is evidence in this case as being presented in a form materially inconsistent with the original document and Amrit must know that. The authentic original document will show the invitation was made to both Kiran and I, not Kiran alone.”
That is an allegation that was made by the Claimant in those proceedings. It is self-evidently an extremely serious allegation, and in consequence of it, as the evidence in front of the Tribunal showed, what happened was that Ms Nahal felt that she needed to report the matter to her professional regulatory body, the Financial Conduct Authority, and also her conduct was subjected to an internal investigation by her employers, Allenby, to determine whether in fact she had indeed doctored or forged the email, which procedure in due course, on the evidence, acquitted her completely.
The Tribunal dealt with those matters in paragraph 29 and again, in light of the time that it would take, I will not read the whole of that paragraph. It includes the findings in the middle: “The Claimant maintained the version he had seen was different yet he confirmed to the Tribunal he had copies of all emails and failed to provide his version of the original to the Tribunal or to clearly explain why this could not be done”. It goes on to say that the Claimant maintained that the evidence had been tampered with, and then it rehearses Ms Nahal’s evidence that she self-reported to the FCA and that there had been a subsequent investigation into the allegation, and that as a result she had been exonerated as the original email was found to have been unaltered. It records that this evidence was not challenged and was accepted by the Tribunal.
The Tribunal further referred to this matter at paragraph 77 when it rehearsed the history in the context of a factual narrative, starting off by saying that Ms Nahal sent an email invitation for a meeting with Tosca on 2 August. That is page 1441, the very document that Mr Dowding had referred to his witness as being doctored.
Paragraph 77 rehearses Mr Dowding’s allegations that the document was fake and his levelling of blame against Ms Nahal for that and her denials of it. Again, the full paragraph can be taken as being read into this ruling. It ends up with these words: “The Tribunal accepted the evidence of Ms Nahal in this regard … Her explanation was clear and consistent with the email trail and otherwise innocuous”.
Finally, the Tribunal again alluded to this at paragraph 134 of its judgment, beginning with the words “The evidence of Ms Nahal was believed over the Claimant in relation to the Tosca meeting”, and ending with the words “The claimant was not subjected to a detriment, the claimant was not ostracised”. That is the Tribunal’s finding on the fundamental issue of whether the Claimant was occasioned detriment.
- Heading
- Introduction
- THE PARTIES
- THE EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL PROCEEDINGS
- THESE PROCEEDINGS
- Paragraph 11
- Paragraphs 34-35
- Paragraph 109
- Paragraph 137
- Paragraphs 206-208.”
- ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS
- OTHER PROCEEDINGS
- THE UNLESS ORDER APPLICATION The applicable legal principles
- TCG’s submissions
- Mr Dowding’s case
- TCG’s riposte
- Discussion and conclusions
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- Then at paragraph 40, those grounds of appeal state
- For those reasons, I accept the Defendants’ submissions in relation to this third topic JUDGE SPEARMAN
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- That is the Tribunal’s summary of Mr Dowding’s case in front of the Tribunal in relation to this topic
- At paragraph 132, the Tribunal move on to the second topic, the so-called NAV/EVO project
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- Paragraph 75 pleads that that request for a meeting was sent by email to both Mr Shah and the Claimant. Paragraph 76 pleads that on 2 August 2017, Mr Shah responded and copied the Claimant in, and tha
- The Tribunal rejected that evidence and concluded in paragraph 26
- Just briefly to complete the narrative of how these matters have unfolded, the Claimant then made an appeal against the rulings of the Tribunal, and in support of that appeal he made an application to
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- JUDGE SPEARMAN
- DAY 3 JUDGE SPEARMAN
- The announcement that was made is in these terms
- Turning to The Times publication, which the Tribunal expressly dealt with, this records (amongst other things) that
- The Tribunal judgment at paragraph 140 states “contrary to being false or misleading, it was reported that Mr Shah had provided a carefully weighted response, further that he had refused to divulge de
- For those reasons, the material paragraphs of the Particulars of Claim will be struck out JUDGE SPEARMAN
- The judge says at paragraph 122
- As I read that decision, and in accordance with my understanding of the law, it is not the case that a breach of section 172 gives rise to a right of action by a party injured by a breach of contract
- That is my ruling on the issue of the pleaded case against Mr Shah JUDGE SPEARMAN
- The list of factors set out in Ittihadieh v 5-11 Cheyne Gardens RTM Company Ltd & Ors [2017] EWCA Civ. 121 ( “Ittihadieh” ) which are to be taken into account when the Court is striking a balance betw
- First, Mr de Waal reminded me that in the Dawson-Damer v Taylor Wessing [2017] 1 WLR 3255, the Court of Appeal, in reversing the judge below, held, as summarised in the third paragraph of the headnote
- The other principle of law to which Mr de Waal helpfully took me is the often-cited summary of the principles applicable to applications for summary judgment contained in the judgment of Lewison J, as
- When he was addressing me about this personally at an earlier stage of this hearing, Mr Dowding argued that as the litigation related to him, there must be mention of his name in these documents, and
- The Defendants say in paragraph 90 of their skeleton argument that they have “three overarching submissions”. The first is that: “... there is no realistic prospect of the Court concluding that [The C
- The Defendants’ second overarching submission is that there is no realistic prospect of the court exercising its discretion to make an order pursuant to section 167 of the Data Protection Act 2018 on
- The next point is that this is really a quest for documents, and I agree with that The next point is that there is no real value to the data subject, and I agree with that
- Conclusions