KB-2023-003510 - [2025] EWHC 1755 (KB)
King's / Queen's Bench Division of the High Court

KB-2023-003510 - [2025] EWHC 1755 (KB)

Fecha: 11-Jul-2025

Mr Dowding’s case

(3)

Mr Dowding’s case

59.

Mr Dowding filed a 5th witness statement, dated 23 June 2025, in support of the Amendment Application and in opposition to the Unless Order Application. He also served a Skeleton Argument, in almost identical terms to that witness statement. It is therefore sufficient to refer to the witness statement alone. It makes the following principal points with regard to the Unless Order Application:

(1)

On his case, the current proceedings have a value of around £390,000, including interest at the rate of 8% since service of the claim, and the court fee of £10,000.

(2)

TCG had not provided any particularised details of any defence or prospective defence, nor any Letter of Response in compliance with the applicable CPR Practice Direction Pre-Action Protocol.

(3)

The Defendants are seeking to enforce by obtaining an order for sale of the Property and are budgeting a realisation before costs of some £180,000 from a sale.

(4)

The Fraud Proceedings are new proceedings and have yet to be the subject of any application to strike them out, which is any event not going to succeed.

(5)

The punch line of Mr Dowding’s analysis, which proceeds on the basis that the Defendants have not shown any reason why their intended strike out application should succeed, is set out in [34] of the witness statement as follows:

“I ask the Court to infer from the Defendant’s (sic) failure to deny any single allegation that the reason for that can only be they are unable to deny the allegations and there is agreement to the facts as alleged and that the Court has been misled and that includes the use of known to be forged documents in the SO/SJ Application evidence.”

(6)

Steps on the route to that conclusion include the following:

-

The Supreme Court decision in Takhar v Gracefield Ltd and others [2019] UKSC 13 establishes the relevant principles to be applied in the Fraud Proceedings which, in summary, support the maxim “fraud unravels all”.

-

Decisions such as Takhar and Salekipour & Anor v Parmar & Others [2016] EWHC (QB) establish that claims for set aside for fraud are claims dealing with the misleading of the court in a different original action, and therefore any application for strike out as an abuse of process will fail.

-

Freshacre Properties Limited v Kang [2025] EWHC 487 (Ch) establishes that for there to be valid judgment on the point of whether a document is or is not a forgery requires a trial with pleadings. Without pleadings and/or a pleaded response, any finding on the question of forgery is therefore unsustainable.

-

The decision of the Court of Appeal in Rawding v Seaga UK Limited [2015] EWCA Civ 113 considered evidence which showed it to be implausible that four emails were sent or received, as the case might be, by a Mr Rawding. Further it was noted: “Apart from the oral, highly contested, evidence of Mr Chesney and his personal assistant as to the circumstances and manner in which the emails purportedly emanating from him were sent, Seaga relies on upon paper copies of the four emails, having disclosed no hardware or backup material from which they can be reproduced electronically. It is common ground that it would be “childishly easy” to forge those paper copies with a word processor and leave no trace that they were not authentic.”This case illustrates under trial conditions with disclosure, witness evidence, but without the correct expert evidence how easily the Court can be misled by relying on paper copies of documents when there are allegations of fraud which are best tested at trial.

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In Broomhead v National Westminster Bank plc [2020] EWHC 1005 (Ch) the Claimant had been ordered to make a payment on account of £871,157.60. No payments were made, and the Defendant served a bankruptcy petition. The Claimant made a new claim to set aside the original action as having been obtained by fraud. The Defendant made an application to strike out the set aside claim. The Bankruptcy Petition was stayed by the County Court pending resolution of the Defendant’s application to strike out the set aside claim.

60.

So far as concerns legal principles, the witness statement makes the point that in Crystal Decisions (UK) Limited and Others v Vedatech Corporation and Another [2008] EWCA Civ 848 “it is clearly stated that the use of a debarring order or unless order, to ensure that a costs order is satisfied, is subject to ensuring access to justice under Article 6 of the Human Rights Convention”, and “an order requiring payment of costs as a condition of proceeding with litigation should not be where to enforce such an order would drive a party from access to justice”. As indicated above, reliance is then placed on the judgment of Sir Richard Field in the Michael Wilson & Partners case.

61.

At [37] of the witness statement, Mr Dowding states:

“My evidence as to inability to pay down the Judgment Debt now without having the benefit of the proceeds of the breach of contract damages claim of £390,000 is as follows:

I have a property valued at £600,000 fully charged including in favour of HSBC Bank and the Defendants with outstanding mortgage of £440,000. The Defendant’s, I believe have obtained a valuation of £620,000. A copy of my mortgage details can be seen at MD5/35-40.

I have a pension fund of circa £550,000 (please see MD5/47) which on an annuity basis is capable of providing an annual income, for a 60-year-old, according to The Times of between £35,283.16 and £37,207.99 per annum (please see MD5/54). If I liquidated the fund in full now I would have no income and post-tax the realisation would be circa £302,500, however that would leave me with no source of income and is therefore untenable as a strategy to settle the Judgment Debt now as I would have no means to live. I am 60 years old and cannot claim state pension until age 67.

My girlfriend contributes £800 towards bills each month.

Monthly living expenses are circa £2,750 including Rates £188, water £50, electric £180, service charge £340, food and general £2,000.

Fixed monthly mortgage payments are £1,775.58 see MD5/38-40.

Fixed monthly loan repayments are £1,217.55 (Zopa Bank, and Santander see MD5/41 and MD5/44).

I do not have a further source of family or friends finance.”

62.

At [38] of the witness statement, Mr Dowding states:

“I do not have the means to settle the Judgment Debt now, and if the Court makes the unless order in the terms sought by the Defendants that will completely stifle the current claim for breach of contract, which is undefended and has a value in excess of the Judgment Debt. The Defendant has said nothing about any prospective defence and that indicates without more that the claim should succeed and yield damages in excess of the Judgment Debt and thus could provide the necessary funds to settle the Judgment Debt. I believe that an unless order now in the terms sought will result in an infringement of my human rights to pursue the breach of contract claims.”

63.

At [42] and [49] respectively (omitting the intervening paragraphs, which make points about the suggested merits of Mr Dowding’s new fraud proceedings) it is stated:

“In terms of pragmatism and being mindful of the relevant authorities cited above including Broomhead v National Westminster Bank plc [2020] EWHC 1005 (Ch) I respectfully ask the Court to defer the making of any unless order until after there is a resolution of the Set Aside Claim, or at least until after there is a decision pursuant to any strike out application relating thereto.

I ask the Court to exercise its discretion to defer the making of an unless order so that the Breach of Contract claim defence can be presented, (if there is a defence), and damages may become available in short time which the Defendants can seek then seek to enforce settlement of the Judgment debt from the damages, further, I also ask for a stay on enforcement of the Judgment Debt pending resolution of the undefended Sat Aside Claim. I believe such action would be within the overriding objective.”

64.

The first of these quoted paragraphs formed the basis of Mr Dowding’s contention that he had made an application that the hearing of the Unless Order Application should be stayed or adjourned until after determination of the Fraud Proceedings. The second of these quoted paragraphs makes clear, in my view, that if the Court is not minded to grant that application, Mr Dowding is nevertheless arguing that there should be no enforcement of the costs orders contained in the July 2024 Order until after trial of the substantive claim in these proceedings (at which time he suggests that the Defendants can seek to enforce payment of those orders against any damages he may be awarded).

65.

The contents of exhibit MD5 include some screenshots relating to Mr Dowding’s accounts with HSBC. These appear to show a mortgage with a balance of almost exactly £300,000, a second mortgage with a balance of almost exactly £100,000, and a third mortgage with a balance of a little over £40,000. A Zopa screenshot appears to relate to a loan of £25,000, with a little more than that outstanding, and a copy of an agreement with Santander relates to a loan of £20,000. A summary of Mr Dowding’s account with AJ Bell shows that his pension fund was worth £547,737.52 on or about 20 June 2025.

66.

It is immediately apparent that Mr Dowding’s evidence does not explain how he is funding his lifestyle, to say nothing of legal advice and representation and associated expenses such as payment for the reports of forensic handwriting experts. However, in answer to questions from me, Mr Dowding said the following:

(1)

He had expended £2,000 on handwriting experts, and that he had funded that “on a credit card, basically” and by drawing down pension monies.

(2)

He had made an application for pre-action disclosure against Fitzrovia, which had been refused, and that he was appealing against that decision, but none of that involved any legal costs as he was acting in person. (Details of this yet further set of proceedings are given in the witness statement of Mr Stanbury – see below.)

(3)

He had expended £13,000 on lawyers for the claim against Allenby and a further £10,000 for advice in connection with the appeal against dismissal of that claim.

(4)

He incurred no legal costs at all in connection with the appeals against my rulings.

(5)

Mr de Waal had agreed to act for him in the sale of the Property proceedings for £1.

(6)

He has been drawing about £8,000 per month from his pension, upon which he has to pay income tax, leaving him with around “upper £5,000” or £6,000 net per month.

(7)

He has already fully drawn down the 25% tax free allowance from his pension.

(8)

He has a prospective interest in a property under the will of his late mother, but his stepfather has a life interest and the property is only fit for demolition in any event.